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This survey1 is a continuation of previous articles on the topic of Florida criminal law
and procedure.
I. CONFESSIONS
A. Right to Counsel and Right to be Silent
The principles of Miranda v. Arizona2 and Escobedo v. Illinois8 were
applied by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Statewright
v. State.4 Defendant was taken to the police station and advised that he
did not have to say anything; that anything he said could be used against
him; that he had a right to an attorney, and if he did not have one, the
state would furnish him one at no cost to him. The defendant then
waived his rights and gave a statement. In reversing defendant's con-
viction, the court held that a suspect must be clearly informed that he
has the right to have a lawyer with him during interrogation and that
the warnings given were insufficient to clearly inform the defendant of
this right.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that charges
of careless driving resulting in an accident and of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating beverage are petty
offenses for which the Miranda warnings need not be given.'
1. This survey covers cases reported in 248 So. 2d through 278 So. 2d and laws enacted
by the 1972 and 1973 Regular and Special Sessions of the Florida Legislature. Professor Wills
who usually writes this survey was on a leave of absence and will continue to write future
surveys.
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. 378 U.S. 478 (1964), which held that the right to counsel applies at the police station
when an investigation ceases to be general in nature and begins to "focus in" on the de-
fendant. Although it is still a viable case, Escobedo has largely been superseded by and in-
corporated into Miranda.
4. 278 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
5. County of Dade v. Callahan, 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). The court relied on
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The court in Weinstein v. State,6 held that the dictates of Miranda
are not confined to hardened criminals, but apply to all citizens regard-
less of age. However, a juvenile may both assert and intelligently waive
rights to remain silent and to have counsel. 7
Cases frequently arise where a defendant has made two confessions,
one having been coerced and the other free from coercion, after the
proper Miranda warnings had been given. The Supreme Court of Florida
has stated that in cases such as these,
questions arise as to (1) whether coercive influences actually exist
in the first instance, (2) whether those influences have abated,
or persist, up to the time of the statement being given and (3)
whether such influences as have persisted did, in fact, render
the statement involuntary. These questions are mixed questions
of fact and law to be determined initially by the trial court in
ruling on admissibility of the statement and ultimately by thejury.,
A statement should be excluded if the attending circumstances are
calculated to delude the accused as to his true position or to exert im-
proper or undue influences over him. However, where an agent of the
Bureau of Narcotics advised defendant of his rights at the time of his
arrest, then told him there was nothing to fear and that he would be
protected, was not a deluding of the defendant since he was again advised
of his rights at a later time by other officials.9 A similar result was reached
in Grimsley v. State,'0 where defendant was given the proper Miranda
warnings but indicated that she did not know if she should waive an
attorney and asked the officer for his opinion. He said "I don't know."
She then asked, "Well, do you think I should tell the truth?" The officer
said, "Yes, by all means."'" Defendant then signed a waiver of rights.
The court held that the waiver was valid and the testimony of her ad-
missions to the police officer was properly admitted.
In Myers v. State,12 the police twice attempted to give the Miranda
warnings but were stopped by the defendant who stated that he knew
and understood his rights and then freely gave a statement. The court in
holding that the statement was admissible, stated that "where the state
makes every reasonable effort to inform a defendant of his rights and the
Wright v. Worth, 83 Fla. 204, 91 So. 87 (1922), which held that offenses against municipal
ordinances were not criminal in nature as contemplated by the state constitutional provisions
relating to the rights of an accused in a criminal prosecution.
6. 269 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). Defendant, a 17-year-old was not told of his right
to counsel or that anything he said could be used against him.
7. Arnold v. State, 265 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
8. State v. Oyarzo, 274 So. 2d 519, 521 (Fla. 1973).
9. Id.
10. 251 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
11. Id. at 672.
12. 256 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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defendant refuses to listen ... it is not necessary to hold him down and
read them to him.' 3
Where defendant claimed that he didn't completely understand
when the police informed him of his rights and yet told the officers that
he did understand, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held
that the confession was admissible.14
In Colocado v. State, 5 a police officer entered the premises in ques-
tion with a search warrant and asked who was in charge. Defendant
answered that he was. This statement was held admissible even though
no prior Miranda warnings were given. The court reasoned that the
officer was merely discharging his statutory obligation of determining the
identity of the person in charge so that a copy of the warrant and inven-
tory could be read and delivered to him. The court also noted that the
inquiry did not in any sense constitute an in-custody interrogation of
one suspected of a crime.
B. Illegal Detention and Interrogation
In In re AJ.A., a confession was obtained from a 16 year-old after
several hours of interrogation at the police station. The court held that
the confession was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of
Florida Statutes section 39.03(3) (1971) " which requires notification,
without delay of the child's parents. A different result was reached under
similar circumstances by the District Court of Appeal, First District, in
State v. Roberts.'8 That court held that the McNabb-Mallory rule did
not require the exclusion of a confession despite a violation of Florida
Statutes sections 39.03 (3), 901.06 or 901.23. The confession is admissible
if the Miranda warnings were administered prior to the statement or con-
fession. The District Court of Appeal, First District, has also held that
Florida Statutes section 39.03(6), which requires that a juvenile be
fingerprinted and photographed, should be read in conjunction with
section 39.03 (3) so that a confession obtained during this process before
the juvenile is taken to a magistrate is admissible."9
Where the defendant was arrested in the early morning and his
confession was obtained before noon on that day, it was held that there
13. Id. at 402.
14. Hall v. State, 260 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
15. 251 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
16. 248 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
17. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3) (1971), provided that:
The person taking and retaining a child in custody shall notify the parents or legal
custodians of the child and the principal of the school in which said child is enrolled
at the earliest practicable time, and shall, without delay for the purpose of investiga-
tion or any other purpose, deliver the child, by the most direct practicable route, to
the court of the county or district where the child is taken into custody ....
This section is revised significantly in Florida Statutes section 39.03(3) (1973).
18. 274 So. 2d 262 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1973).
19. Cooper v. State, 257 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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was no unnecessary delay in presenting him before the committing magis-
trate and thus his confession was admissible. 20
In Jetmore v. State,21 the defendant was illegally arrested, taken to
the police station and read the Miranda warnings. He confessed within
45 minutes. Defendant argued that because the arrest was illegal the
ensuing confession was inadmissible.22 The District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, held that the confession was freely and voluntarily given
after the Miranda warnings, and that it was independent of the illegal
arrest.28
The District Courts of Appeal, Third and Fourth districts, have
held that a defendant's initial request for an attorney during interrogation
by a police officer does not preclude taking statements from the defen-
dant at any future time before an attorney is furnished.24
C. Voluntary Confessions
If a defendant is informed of all of his contitutional rights, and then
knowingly and intelligently waives them, his statement is not inadmis-
sible on the ground that at the time of his arrest the defendant told the
arresting officer that he wanted to talk to an attorney.21 If the statement
was voluntarily made by the defendant after a full warning of his con-
stitutional rights, the confession was valid despite the fact that it was
made orally.26
When the state attempts to introduce a confession given during in-
custody interrogation, the question of voluntariness need only be deter-
mined by a preponderance of the evidence.27 A statement by the accused
that he fully understands and waives his rights is not an essential link
in the chain of proof; waiver may be shown by attendant circumstances. 28
It is also not necessary that the defendant waive each separate item of
the Miranda warnings as they are given as long as there is evidence of
a clear manifestation of a knowing intent to waive.
Where a defendant has employed his own counsel, or one has been
appointed for him, the presence of his counsel is not essential to the
20. Hughes v. State, 272 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
21. 275 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
22. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
23. It is submitted that the Miranda warnings themselves are not sufficient to show at-
tenuation for the illegal arrest. It is only one piece of evidence to consider. The facts of this
case do not seem sufficient to constitute the attenuation required by Wong Sun.
24. Barker v. State, 271 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973) ; see McDougald v. State, 275
So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), holding that a statement made by defendant after requesting
counsel but before request is honored, is not per se inadmissible.
25. James v. State, 263 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
26. Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972).
27. State v. Harris, 276 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
28. Fowler v. State, 263 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1972), citing United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d
375 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006 (1968).
29. Davis v. State, 275 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
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validity or effectiveness of defendant's waiver of the right to have coun-
sel present at an interrogation. 0
In Anglin v. State,81 a 15-year-old defendant made a confession
after his mother told him to tell "the truth" or "she would clobber him."
The court held that the mother's statement did not amount to a threat
or coercion although it recognized that other jurisdictions might agree
that such an admonition by a parent might deprive a teenager of his
constitutional rights.
In Foster v. State,82 defendant on a boat radioed the Coast Guard
that he had killed two people and had thrown their bodies overboard.
He was then taken into custody and inadequate Miranda warnings were
given. Defendant again admitted the murders and also re-enacted them.
The court found that the initial statements made by the defendant were
not made as a result of any custodial situation. Under these circumstances,
compliance with the Miranda requirements was not necessary because de-
fendant voluntarily admitted his crime before he was taken into custody.
D. Use of Confession at Trial
The introduction into evidence of a co-defendant's confession im-
plicating the defendant does not constitute reversible error, even though
the co-defendant elected not to testify and was unavailable for cross-
examination, if there was ample corroborative evidence as to defendant's
guilt, particularly if it was given by the victim."8 It is upon this latter
point that this situation can be distinguished from Bruton v. United
States.34 In Brown v. State,8 the court held that Bruton does not apply
in a non-jury case but, if it did apply, the state could nevertheless urge
that the conviction is valid, notwithstanding error in considering in-
criminating statements made by the co-defendant, on the ground that
the case against the defendant is so overwhelming that the error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The fact that a confession was oral and not written or recorded,
would go only to the weight to be given it by the trial judge in deter-
mining its voluntariness and by the jury in its findings of fact.86
In Williams v. State,3 7 defendant's written confession was not ad-
mitted because the state was unable to produce the stenographer who
took the confession. Yet statements made to a police officer which re-
30. Johnson v. State, 268 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
31. 259 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
32. 266 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
33. Blackwell v. State, 269 So. 2d 737 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1972).
34. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
35. 252 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). See also Pressley v. State, 261 So. 2d 522 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1972).
36. Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972).
37. 261 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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lated to facts contained in the written confession were admitted into
evidence. The court held that since there was no evidence of duress or
inducement, and the oral statements were made at another place and
time, it was not error to admit them even if the written confession was
inadmissible.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, stated in Hernandez
v. State8 8 that:
[T]he admissibility of a confession shall be determined by the
trial court from a preliminary consideration of evidence offered
by either party bearing on the circumstances, conditions and
surroundings under which the confession was made, which may
include evidence as to age, sex, disposition, experience, char-
acter, education, training, intelligence and the mental condition
of the defendant. 9
This determination should be made in the absence of the jury, so as to
prevent it from being prejudiced against a defendant if the confession
was not voluntarily made.4"
The rule that it is error to show that the defendant remained silent
during interrogation has been held to be subject to the harmless error
rule. In Wright v. State,4 the court upheld as harmless error, the ad-
mission of a police officer's testimony that defendant had no explanation
for stolen items in an automobile after he had been advised of his rights
to counsel and to remain silent.
When the defendant and the police officers give different versions
of the same event, the defendant's version is not binding on the court.
The police officer's version may satisfy the state's burden to prove that
the confession was voluntary.
42
In Richardson v. State,43 a psychiatrist testified that during the
course of a mental examination defendant said that he had been picked
up for various things but had not been convicted and that he had beaten
a robbery charge. The court held that, although it is not proper for a
psychiatrist to repeat at trial the statements of the accused taken during
his mental examination, it was harmless error since the evidence of guilt
was overwhelming and the prejudicial effect could have been removed
by a request to strike the statement and an instruction that the jury
disregard it.
In State v. Retherford,44 the Supreme Court of Florida, adopting the
holding in Harris v. New York, 45 ruled that once a defendant has volun-
38. 273 So. 2d 130 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1973).
39. Id. at 133, citing Brown v. State, 135 Fla. 30, 184 So. 518 (1938).
40. Hernandez v. State, 237 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
41. 251 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
42. Barker v. State, 271 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
43. 248 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
44. 270 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972).
45. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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tarily taken the stand, his credibility may be impeached by the introduc-
tion of prior conflicting statements made before he was given the Miranda
warnings.
It is incumbent upon the state to prove the corpus delecti in every
case. In so doing it must rely on proof other than the confession of the
defendant. Thus, where only hearsay evidence could establish the corpus
delecti, the conviction had to be set aside even though the defendant had
confessed. 6
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A search warrant is invalid if it fails to require the person executing
the warrant to bring the property found and the person in possession
thereof before either the magistrate who issued the warrant or some other
court having jurisdiction of the offense. An officer conducting a search
under a valid search warrant may lawfully seize property not specifically
described in the warrant if he has probable cause to believe it is stolen
property." Accordingly, where a search warrant sufficiently described
certain of the items seized, but did not describe a sufficient amount, the
property was properly seized since the thieves accompanied the police
officers during the search and identified the property received by the
defendant as stolen."9
It was held that a search warrant which failed to show the specific
time or times when an informant allegedly obtained narcotics from the
defendant's premises was fatally defective.50 In State v. Henderson,51
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that if the original
search warrant was signed by the proper officer and was read to the de-
fendant in toto before the search was commenced, the ministerial act
of leaving an unsigned and undated duplicate of the original search war-
rant, would not be prejudicial error. The state in such a situation has
the burden of producing the original warrant and showing that it had
been read to the defendant. If a search warrant leaves out the date of
execution, but that date can be indisputably deduced from other dates
in the documents, the evidence obtained will not be suppressed if the
error is not prejudicial.5 2
The issue in search warrant proceedings is not guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, but probable cause for believing that a crime has been
committed and that evidence has been secreted in a specific place.53 Thus,
hearsay evidence may provide the probable cause necessary for the issu-
46. Smart v. State, 274 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
47. State v. Dawson, 276 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
48. Partin v. State, 277 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
49. State v. Hutchins, 269 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
50. State v. Mills, 267 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
51. 253 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
52. State v. Cain, 272 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
53. Anderson v. State, 265 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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ance of a search warrant. 54 In Ingram v. State,55 the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, held that where an officer approached the de-
fendant for the purpose of obtaining information and recognized him
as the person who, according to hearsay reports, was armed with a re-
volver, the officer properly conducted a search of the defendant for a
weapon.
Probable cause cannot be based on mere suspicion; it must be based
on facts known to exist. However, the test for probable cause is not
whether the evidence would be admissible for the purpose of proving
guilt at trial, but whether the information would lead a man of prudence
and caution to believe that the offense has been committed.56 The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, has stated that justification for seizure
need not be established by proof beyond and to the exclusion of reason-
able doubt but may be proven by clear and convincing evidence.57
A warrantless search must be founded on probable cause.58 Under
the "open view" doctrine it is not an unreasonable search for an officer
to move to a position where he has a legal right to be, and look for things
he may have reason to believe will be seen.59 Accordingly, in Moore v.
Wainwright,0 the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that a
warrantless seizure of stolen television sets and other items of property
from an abandoned farmhouse was not illegal since the television set
was placed near an open door of the house, was clearly visible, and was
found by the officers without the necessity of searching the premises.
Also, once the privacy of a dwelling has been lawfuly invaded, the police
are not required to obtain an additional warrant to seize items that they
discover in a lawful search.61
In Chavis v. State,62 the defendant was stabbed. While in the emer-
gency room of the hospital, a police officer made an inventory search of
his clothing without a warrant and found a package of heroin. The court
held that the actions of the police officer were justified because the
search was made with the preservation of evidence in mind, a valid pro-
cedure in investigating a crime. Compare the facts in Johnson v. State:68
A police officer had helped to carry defendant's wife up the stairs to
their apartment. While placing the wife upon the bed, the officer pulled
out a small automatic weapon from defendant's coat pocket. The court
held that the officer had no probable cause to justify the search and
seizure of the gun since defendant was in his own home, had committed
54. Id.
55. 264 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
56. Suiero v. State, 248 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
57. State v. Ansley, 251 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
58. State v. Miller, 267 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
59. Id.
60. 248 So. 2d 262 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1971).
61. Partin v. State, 277 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
62. 274 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
63. 253 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
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no act involving a violation of the law, and had not threatened anyone
and was at the time of the search cooperating with the police officer.
In State v. Olson,64 the court held Florida Statutes, section 465.131
(1971),15 valid as a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. A
warrantless administrative search is constitutional and neither probable
cause nor suspicion that illegal activity is or has been going on is re-
quired. In addition, the court held that the instant search was not made
on pretext merely because another law enforcement agency had a concur-
rent or common interest in the search and had either encouraged the
search by authorized agents or accompanied the agent in a search limited
to areas incident to the licensed activity.6
Abandoned property is not subject to the constitutional safeguards
against unreasonable search and seizures. Thus, where a police officer
had stopped the defendant and inquired about a bulge in defendant's
trousers and the defendant produced a vial from his pocket and threw
it into an adjacent waterway, there was an abandonment of possession.
The vial, which was found to contain marijuana, was admissible, not-
withstanding the fact that the officer had no valid basis to stop and in-
terrogate the defendant.67
The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures applies in cases involving governmental action only and does
not apply to searches and seizures made by private individuals." Thus,
where a police officer was told by the operator of a service station that
he had observed defendant with narcotics paraphernalia through an
opening in the restroom wall, the officer had probable cause to arrest the
defendant, notwithstanding the alleged violation of defendant's privacy
by the service station operator.69
An automobile may be searched without a warrant where the officers
have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains articles
which they are entitled to seize. In State v. Sanders,70 police officers
arrested the defendant in his car on a charge of rape. The police then
searched the car for the gun thought to have been used in the rape al-
though he was already in custody. The court reasoned that it would have
64. 267 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
65. The Florida Pharmacy Act authorizes agents of the Board of Pharmacy to inspect,
in a lawful manner at all reasonable hours, any retail drug establishment or manufacturer
for the purpose of determining a violation of any regulation promulgated pursuant to the Act.
66. The court would probably not condone searches so frequently undertaken as to con-
stitute undue harrassment.
67. Riley v. State, 266 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). The court disregarded the "fruits
of the poisonous tree" doctrine on the basis that the evidence was not produced through
means of a search. The court did not consider the fact that the officer had no authority to
stop the defendant initially.
68. Bernovich v. State, 272 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973).
69. Werley v. State, 271 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973) ; see also note 54 supra and ac-
companying text, relating to searches based on hearsay.
70. 266 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
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taken too long to obtain a search warrant and the gun might have been
lost, or perhaps taken by the employees of the car-towing company.
When police officers are lawfully in possession of a vehicle after
its owner has been placed under arrest and are responsible for protecting
it, it is reasonable to conduct a search for the purpose of making an
inventory of the contents of the vehicle.7 1 Although a minor traffic viola-
tion cannot be used as a pretext to search a vehicle for evidence of other
crimes, a defendant, who was stopped by policemen because he had
exceeded the speed limit by about 15 miles per hour, was properly ar-
rested for drinking and careless driving after the policemen detected
alcohol on his breath.72 Before impounding the automobile, an inventory
search was made which uncovered evidence leading to defendant's con-
viction for breaking and entering. The court held that the evidence
should not be suppressed since this was a routine inventory of a car
which had been taken into custody.
In Gustafson v. Florida,78 defendant was arrested for driving his
automobile without having the proper operator's license in his possession.
During the course of a pat-down search of defendant the officer found
a box containing marijuana cigarettes. The United States Supreme Court
held that the officer was entitled to make a full search of defendant's
person incident to the lawful arrest. It made no difference that there was
no evidentiary purpose for the search and that the officer did not indicate
arv subjective fear of the defendant. The Court relied heavily on United
States v. Robinson,74 which was decided on the same day. In Robinson,
the Court also held that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest, a full
search of the defendant's person is not only an exception to the warrant
reci-rement of the fourth amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search.
lPefore Gustafson was decided by the United States Supreme Court,
the Florida courts began to apply the holding of the Supreme Court of
Florida in State v. Gustafson.78 In State v. Foust,7' defendant was stopped
bv a police officer without probable cause. The officer then discovered
that a bench warrant had been issued against the defendant. The officer'
then arrested the defendant and conducted a search which disclosed
marijuana. The court held the search valid under State v. Gustafson.
71. State v. Cash, 275 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
72. Urquhart v. State, 261 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
73. 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973).
74. 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973). This case is noted at 28 V. MIAmi L. REV. 974 (1974).
75. 258 So. 2d I (Fla. 1972). The court held that a search which reasonably ensues after
a legal arrest is proper, without regard to whether there is a nexus between the offense in
question and the object sought.
76, 262 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
77. 258 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972). There was no discussion of the reasonableness of the search.
The court also felt that it was immaterial that the officers had no probable cause for stopping
the defendant originally. This is another case in which a Florida court has disregarded the
"fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See also State v. Hatten, 264 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1972).
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Advising one of his right not to consent to a search is not required
either to validate a consent or to establish (prima facie) that the search
was voluntary.7 s Instead, all surrounding circumstances must be con-
sidered in deciding the question of voluntariness.79 In Earman v. State, °
the Supreme Court of Florida held that a search conducted by officers
following their illegal entry into a house for the purpose of arresting the
defendant did not lose its unconstitutional taint even though the defen-
dant had consented to the search. Consent to the search had taken place
after one of the officers drew a gun, made a preliminary search of the
house, illegally arrested and searched the defendant and took him to an
upstairs bedroom where he signed the consent while sitting on a bed
beside an open box of marijuana.
Conversely, one who voluntarily turns his car keys over to the police
cannot later complain about the legality of the search.81 The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that where the police searched
defendant's briefcase at the jail prior to delivering it to him in his cell,
the search was reasonable and had to be considered as having been made
with defendant's implied consent. The court noted that defendant could
not expect the police to give him his suitcase without first examining it."'
In Powers v. State,s a female undercover agent and a friend entered the
defendant's house as guests. The agent observed the smoking of marijuana
and asked that a cigarette be rolled for her which she kept as evidence.
The court held that the evidence should not be suppressed since the
agent's entry was legal, creating an implied consent to the seizure of the
evidence. The fact that the entry into the house was accomplished by
fraud did not negate the consent where, as here, the entry was not
forcible.
In executing a search warrant an officer must attempt to call his
presence to the attention of those within the residence by knocking or
other reasonable means before entering the residence. He must also an-
nounce his authority and the purpose of his visit at the residence.8 4 If
the officer falls to do this, the items seized are not admissible into evi-
dence.8 5 However, an officer's entry without first announcing his presence
and purpose is justified if the officer's safety would otherwise be im-
periled.' In State v. Kelly,8 7 the District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
78. State v. Spanierman, 267 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
79. Id.
80. 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972).
81. State v. Custer, 251 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
82. State v. Kircheis, 269 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
83. 271 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
84. State v. Collier, 270 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), construing FA. STAT. § 933.09
(1973).
85. Id.
86. State v. Bell, 249 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See also Benefield v. State, 160
So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964).
87. 260 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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trict, held that the statutory "knock and announce" requirements were
violated when police officers, with a search warrant, stepped into the
defendant's house without first announcing their presence even though
the drugs seized could have been easily destroyed by the defendants
had they known that police officers were present.
Rule 3.190(h) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that the trial court hold a hearing on a motion to suppress and rule on
the motion before the trial begins, upon the basis of the evidence adduced
at the hearing on the motion."8 It is error to fail to suppress in-court
testimony concerning an article of evidence when an in-court motion to
suppress the evidence was not ruled on, notwithstanding the fact that
the articles were not received in evidence. 9 Where defendant's motion to
suppress is denied and for this reason he pleads nolo contendere, he has
preserved for appeal the issue on his motion to suppress even though
the plea of nolo contendere was not expressly made on condition that
the error be preserved.90 In Paulson v. State,91 the court, affirming de-
fendant's conviction, distinguished the case of Davis v. Mississippi, 92
which had recognized that the prohibitions of the fourth amendment apply
to the taking of fingerprints. In the present case, the initial arrest for
drunkenness was not for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints, or inves-
tigating other crimes.
The statute93 providing that the state attorney may authorize an
application for a court order permitting the interception of wire or oral
communications permits the delegation of such authority to any assistant
state attorney. 4 The justices of the Supreme Court of Florida have
jurisdiction to issue an interception order.95 A witness who has been
summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury during an investiga-
tion concerning matters related to intercepted communications has no
standing to challenge the legality of court authorized wiretaps by a pre-
indictment and preinterrogation motion to suppress the communications. 6
If a wire tap is made without first securing the permission of a magistrate
and is based on the consent of one of the parties to the conversation, the
state must produce that party in order that the defendant have the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine him.97
A defendant who complains of an unlawful search must claim and
prove that he was, at the time of the search, the owner, tenant, or lawful
88. Foster v. State, 255 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
89. Id.
90. Ackles v. State, 270 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
91. 257 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
92. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
93. FLA. STAT. § 934.07 (1973).
94. State v. Angel, 261 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
99. State ex rel. Kennedy v. Lee, 274 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1973).
96. In re Grand Jury Investigation Concerning Evidence Obtained by Court Authorized
Wiretaps, 276 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
97. Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1973).
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occupant of the premises searched. 8 It is doubtful whether one who is
not the owner of a vehicle could object to the search of the vehicle after
being stopped for speeding. 99
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
In Furman v. Georgia,00 the United States Supreme Court held that
capital punishment as a discretionary sentence was unconstitutional. Re-
sponding to this decision, the Supreme Court of Florida,110 in a very
comprehensive opinion, examined the effect that Furman would have
upon the various aspects of Florida law. Subsequent to this decision,
the Florida Legislature revised sections 175.082 and 921.141 and rein-
stated the death penalty. Following conviction for a capital offense, a
separate sentencing proceeding must now be held during which any evi-
dence may be presented which the court deems relevant, including matters
relating to certain enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
An advisory sentence is rendered by the jury to the court which may
enter a sentence of either death or life imprisonment. A written opinion
must be given in support of a death sentence. These revisions were held
constitutional by the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Dixon.02 The
rationale of the court was that the Furman decision did not totally pro-
hibit the use of discretion in the sentencing procedure. The court rea-
soned that if the discretion necessary in the statute is "reasonable and
controlled" and not "capricious and discriminatory," the test of Furman
is fulfilled.108
It was held that despite elimination of authorization from the 1968
Florida Constitution, a grand jury is still proper as it is founded in com-
mon law, and since the constitution 4 continues to imply its propriety.'0 5
Florida Statutes section 867.01 (1973), prohibiting the exhibition
for pay or compensation of any crippled or physically-distorted, mal-
formed or disfigured person in any circus, sideshow, etc., was found un-
constitutional in that it failed to set forth reasonable standards to be
followed in its application. 106
In contrast, the statutory provision that "[w]hoever commits such
acts as are of the nature to corrupt the public morals or outrage the sense
of public decency... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . , is suffi-
98. Russell v. State, 270 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
99. State v. Patterson, 252 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
100. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Because there were a number of varying opinions in Furman,
the door still appears open for states to promulgate statutes providing capital punishment in
certain cases. See FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1973).
101. Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972).
102. 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
103. This case is noted at 28 U. Mami L. REV. 723 (1974).
104. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15(a).
105. Reed v. State, 267 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1972).
106. World Fair Freaks & Attractions, Inc. v. Hodges, 267 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1972).
107. FiA. STAT. § 877.03 (1973).
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ciently clear in that all the terms are of general understanding and,
therefore, the statute is valid. 08
In Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell,109 the Su-
preme Court of Florida found that any person who maintains a place
where the law is violated shall be guilty of maintaining a nuisance, that
a place in which drugs are continually being used is a nuisance and that
such a nuisance may properly be enjoined. Those statutes which provide
for declaration of nuisance and subsequent injunction were found to be
constitutionally acceptable. 10
The validity of Florida Statutes chapter 790, covering weapons and
firearms,"" was upheld in a number of cases during the survey period.
It is unlawful for felons to possess firearms under this chapter." 2 How-
ever, a number of felonies were exempted (e.g., antitrust violations, un-
fair labor practices, nonsupport) as well as "other similar offenses"
until the exceptions were eliminated in 1971.11' In Driver v. Van Cott,"4
it was held that the "other similar offenses" clause was unconstitutionally
vague and should be deleted from the statute, but such a finding did not
render the rest of the statute invalid. Defendants Van Cott and Smith,115
who had previously been convicted of forgery and lottery violations re-
spectively, did not come within the excepted felonies and were subject to
prosecution under the statute.
In Rinzler v. Carson,"8 it was held that the prohibition of possession
of short-barreled rifles, shotguns, or machine guns" 7 does not violate the
Florida Constitution, which gives a person the right to keep and bear
arms."" Although the legislature may not totally prohibit the right to
keep and bear arms, the court held that it was within the police power
to prohibit possession of certain weapons which are ordinarily used for
criminal and improper purposes. Semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic
shotguns and rifles are commonly used by citizens for hunting and pro-
tection and are not banned by the statute."9 The Rinzler decision went
on to state that where possession of a weapon was authorized by filing
under the National Firearms Act,'2" it was an exception to the Florida
108. State v. Magee, 259 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1972).
109. 262 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1972).
110. See FLA. STAT. §§ 60.05, 828.05, 823.10 (1973).
111. FLA. STAT. ch. 790 (1973).
112. FLA. STAT. § 790.23 (1973).
113. FLA. STAT. § 790.23(2) (1969). The exceptions were eliminated in FLA. STAT.
§ 790.23(2) (1971).
114. 257 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1971). See also State ex rel., Jones v. Morphonios, 258 So. 2d
42 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
115. This case was a consolidation of two prosecutions.
116. 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972).
117. FLA. STAT. § 790.221 (1973).
118. FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights § 8.
119. Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972). See also State v. Astore, 258 So. 2d
33 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972), holding FLA. STAT. §§ 790.001(14), .221, .221(3) (1973) (dealing
with short-barreled rifles), not to be an infringement on the right to bear arms.
120. 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq. (1970).
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statute. Where a municipal ordinance121 in that case failed to provide for
such an exception, it was contrary and inferior to the state statute and
could not be used to confiscate those weapons.
Those sections which make carrying a concealed weapon a third
degree felony122 and the shooting or throwing of deadly missiles into
vehicles, for example, 23 were held valid.'24
The Sex Offender Act 25 which provides a hearing to determine
whether a defendant is a mentally disordered person after conviction128
is not invalid as the statute meets the usual test of reasonable classifica-
tion.127
The statute which prohibits armed trespass upon a ranch with intent
to commit larceny, depredation or other offenses 2s was held valid1 21
as was the statute prohibiting lotteries.8
Florida Statutes section 836.05 (1973), dealing with extortion, does
not contain more than one subject and is thus constitutional. 3 ' The
bribery statute, 1 2 which prohibits the offering to a public officer of a
reward or compensation, is sufficient to withstand constitutional chal-
lenge.133
The robbery statute,3 4 which provides for a penalty ranging from
imprisonment for life to any lesser term of years given at the discretion
of the court, is not an improper delegation to the court by the legisla-
ture.13 5
In a federal district court decision,"' the term "lewdness" defined
in the prostitution statute, Florida Statutes section 796.07 (1973), as
any indecent or obscene act, was found to be unconstitutionally vague.
In Roe v. Wade,"37 the United States Supreme Court declared the
Texas criminal abortion statute to be unconstitutional and set forth a
"trimester" test for examining the validity of any similar statute. During
121. JACX SONVnLE, FLA., ORniNANcE CODE § 26-69 (1973).
122. FLA. STAT. § 790.01. (1973).
123. FLA. STAT. § 790.19 (1973).
124. Bruno v. State, 270 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1972), and Zachary v. State, 269 So. 2d 669
(Fla. 1972), respectively.
125.. FLA. STAT. ch. 917 (1973).
126. FLA. STAT. § 917.14 (1973).
127. Dean v. State, 265 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1972), reaffirmed, 277 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1973).
128. FLA. STAT. § 822.23 (1973).
129. Holmes v. State, 272 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1973). But see the dissent of Ervin, J.
130. Barron v. State, 271 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1972), construing FLA. STAT. § 849.09 (1971).
131. Honchell v. State, 257 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1971).
132. FIA. STAT. § 838.071 (1973).
133. DuCoff v. State, 273 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1973). The case continued to say that despite
the statute's validity, the defendant's acceptance of money was not in violation of the law
where he conformed to a municipal ordinance providing for distribution to charity where
it is inappropriate to refuse a gift.
134. FLA. STAT. § 813.011 (1973).
135. Byrd v. State, 253 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
136. Miami Health Studios, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 353 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Fla.
1972).
137. 410 U.S. 175 (1973).
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the first trimester of pregnancy, the abortion decision must be left to
the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's physician. For the second
trimester period, regulations which are reasonably related to the health
of the mother may be promulgated by the state. Finally, in the last tri-
mester (or period subsequent to the fetus' viability), the state may regu-
late and even proscribe abortions in order to promote the state's interest
in human life, unless appropriate medical judgment deems abortion
necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. It is
interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Florida had previously
found Florida's abortion statute138 to be unconstitutional.' 89
The United States Supreme Court' 40 upheld Florida's loyalty oath
statute' 4' but found the statute's summary dismissal provision a denial
of due process.
Florida Statutes chapter 800, which sets forth offenses for "crimes
against nature" and "indecent exposure" was the subject of a number of
decisions. In Franklin v. State,'42 the Supreme Court of Florida struck
down section 800.01, which had made "a crime against nature" a felony.
The court urged the legislature to delineate clearly those acts that it
wishes prohibited and found that their failure to do so made the present
statute unconstitutionally vague. The court went on to hold valid section
800.02, making unnatural and lascivious acts punishable as a misde-
meanor. 14 Those defendants prosecuted under the invalid section 800.01
would have their cases remanded for prosecution and sentence for the
lesser offense set forth in section 800.02."' The statutory provisions re-
lating to indecent exposure14 were held to be constitutional. 4
The Franklin decision was held not to have retroactive effect. The
United States Supreme Court 4 found this prospective interpretation to
be a valid exercise of the Florida court's power.
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,'4 8 the United States Su-
preme Court held that the Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance149 was un-
138. Comp. Gen. Laws §§ 7144, 7579, [1927] (repealed 1972) (now FLA. STAT. § 458.22
(1973)).
139. State v. Barguet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972) ; see also Medlin v. State, 267 So. 2d
823 (Fla. 1972) ; Gironda v. State, 263 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1972).
140. Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
141. FLA. STAT. §§ 876.05-.10 (1973).
142. 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971).
143. See also Witherspoon v. State, 278 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1973); Parisi v. State, 265 So.
2d 699 (Fla. 1972).
144. See Parisi v. State, 265 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1972); Robitaille v. State, 266 So. 2d 675
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). See also Christian v. State, 272 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973) ; Morris
v. State, 261 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
145. FLA. STAT. § 800.03 (1973) (prohibiting exposure of sexual organs in public places),
and FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1973) (prohibiting lewd and lascivious acts in the presence of a
child).
146. State v. Petillo, 250 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1971), upholding FLA. STAT. § 800.03 (1971);
Chesebrough v. State, 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971), upholding FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1971).
147. Wainwright v. Stone, 94 S. Ct. 190, rev'g 478 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1973).
148. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
149. JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDiNANCE CODE § 26-57 (1973).
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constitutionally vague in that it "failed to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
statute."' Justice Douglas found that the statute "encourages arbitrary
and erratic arrests."' Florida's vagrancy statute,5 2 very similar to the
Jacksonville statute, failed to meet constitutional muster as well in an
accompanying decision. 5 3
The disorderly conduct and unlawful assembly ordinances of the
City of Daytona Beach 54 were found to be sufficiently clear and not
overly broad. 5 In examining the language of the statute, the District
Court of Appeal, First District, found that the words "riot," "riotous,"
"tumultuous," etc., could be defined so as to inform persons of the con-
duct which is prohibited and not to infringe upon their freedom of
speech.'56 This case was so decided despite a holding by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that the disorderly conduct ordi-
nance' 57 of the Miami Code was void for vagueness.'51
In reversing a district court opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida
found a city ordinance' 9 proscribing "verbal abuse" of a police officer
while he is performing his duties to be valid because it was sufficiently
precise in describing the offense and gave fair warning to the citizen.'60
In Miller v. California,'"' the United States Supreme Court once
again attempted to formulate a test for obscene literature. It was held
that material is subject to state prohibition if, when taken as a whole:
1.) it appeals to the prurient interest; 2.) it is patently offensive in de-
picting sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law; and,
3.) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value. 6 2 The court attempted to provide a more concrete,
workable standard for use by the states and, in fact, permitted the states
to define "obscenity" according to local standards. Whether this will
truly provide a better test or result in an incomprehensible variety of
standards within the state itself, is yet to be determined.' 3
150. 405 U.S. at 162.
151. Id. citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) and Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242 (1937).
152. Comp. Gen. Laws § 1655, [1927] (repealed 1972).
153. Smith v. Florida, 405 U.S. 172 (1972), rev'g 239 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1970) ; see Russo
v. State, 270 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), relying on Smith and Papachristou to hold
Plantation's vagrancy statute unconstitutional.
154. DAYTONA BEACH, FLA. MIrN. ORDINANCE § 28-15(1)(b) (1973) (disorderly con-
duct), and § 28-58 (unlawful assembly).
155. City of Daytona Beach v. Brown, 273 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
156. Id. at 126.
157. MmI, FLA., CITY CoDz § 38-10(a) (1967) (breach of peace) and § 38-10(f)
(obscene or profane language in another's presence).
158. Livingston v. Garmire, 437 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1971).
159. ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CITY ORDINANCE § 25.43.1 (1969).
160. City of St. Petersburg v. Waller, 261 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
989 (1973), rev'g 245 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
161. 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
162. Id. at 2615.
163. See 28 U. MIAM L. Rv. 238 (1973).
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Prior to Miller, the Florida courts had consistently upheld various
obscenity statutes in a number of decisions.6 4
IV. RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held that the ad-
mission into evidence of a transcript of testimony given by a state's
witness at the preliminary hearing is proper should the witness die
prior to trial. The defendant was present with counsel at the preliminary
hearing and the witness was fully cross-examined, although the transcript
furnished the only evidence implicating the defendant.'65
The trial court must exercise its discretion in determining the non-
availability of a witness or the degree of diligence the state exercised in
attempting to locate that witness before admitting at trial, a transcript
of the missing witness's testimony at the preliminary hearing. 6 The
failure of the state to have a witness subpoena issued and delivered to
the sheriff's department does not necessarily preclude admission of such
a transcript. 6 7 Where the defense procured an affidavit from a witness,
absent at the retrial in order to impeach his testimony for the state at a
prior mistrial and which the state sought to reintroduce, such affidavit
was properly excluded because it was taken without the state's knowl-
edge and defendants could have taken steps to preserve the witness's
testimony before he left the country. 68
Judicial notice of a statute, taken at the defendant's request, will not
be construed as introduction of evidence on behalf of the accused for
the purpose of depriving him of his right to the concluding argument
before the jury. 69 Denial of the right to opening and closing arguments
164. Mitchem v. State, 250 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1971); May v. Harper, 250 So. 2d 880 (Fla.
1971); Paris Follies, Inc. v. State, 259 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Little Beaver The-
atres, Inc. v. State, 259 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); United Theatres of Fla., Inc. v.
State ex rel. Gerstein, 259 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972) ; State ex reL. Little Beaver The-
atres, Inc. v. Tobin, 258 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972) (Miami obscenity ordinance not
vague); Mitchum v. State, 251 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971); all holding FLA. STAT.
§ 847.011 (1971) valid; Davidson v. State, 251 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1971) (holding FLA. STAT.
§ 847.013 (1971) valid and using community standards test). But see the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Jenkins v. Georgia, 94 S. Ct. 2750 (1974), reversing
a conviction under the Georgia obscenity statute and holding that states do not have un-
bridled discretion to determine what is obscene because only the depiction of "hard core"
sexual conduct is excluded from constitutional protection.
165. James v. State, 254 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
166. Outlaw v. State, 269 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). The dissent strongly em-
phasized the abrogation of the defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses in the
presence of the jury where the state has failed to sustain its burden regarding the unavail-
ability of the witness and has failed to employ the power and experience of the sheriff's de-
partment which was characterized as the "very machinery available to the court for this
express purpose." Id. at 405.
167. Outlaw v. State, 269 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
168. Newton v. State, 272 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
169. Wyatt v. State, 270 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). Such a right accrued pursuant
to Florida Statutes section 918.09 (1971), which is no longer in force although rule 3.250,
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides for the same rights.
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on the ground that testimony of a witness called by a co-defendant ac-
crued to the benefit of all the defendants was reversible error.17
V. APPEAL
In Earnest v. State,171 defendant sought by certiorari to review the
trial court's refusal to suppress evidence in a criminal prosecution. The
court held that "the discretionary writ of certiorari will be granted to
review an interlocutory order ... only in those cases in which it clearly
appears that there is no full, adequate and complete remedy available
• . .after final judgment."' 72 When appeals to the circuit court from a
judgment of a municipal court have been exhausted, appeal to the district
courts of appeal by writ of certiorari is not authorized unless the actions
of the circuit court resulted in a clear miscarriage of justice.'
If a petition for a writ of certiorari is not the proper remedy, the
appellate court will consider the petition and determine whether another
remedy is available. Thus, in Thompson v. Dilley 7 4 the Supreme Court
of Florida held that under the new provision in the Florida Constitution,'175
it was required to "consider the petition-no matter its label or the
remedy sought-if it has merit and if we have jurisdiction upbn any
proper basis."' 70 The court thereupon issued the writ of habeas corpus.
Although a defendant has an absolute right to appeal, an appeal is
not automatic. 77 A court will grant delayed appellate review only where
it is shown by defendant that his right to appeal has been frustrated by
state action. 78 Thus, where a court-appointed counsel fails to prosecute
a requested appeal, defendant cannot be denied his constitutional right of
appeal. 179 It is not permissible for a defendant to file successive appeals,
stating a different ground in each one.80
In City of Miami v. Brown'8' no stenographic report was made of
the proceedings in the municipal court. The defendant and the City
would not agree on the contents of a record on appeal and the trial judge
could not remember the case. The district court held that the defendant
"should not be deprived of the benefit thereof by refusal of the appellee
170. Davis v. State, 256 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
171. 253 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
172. Id. at 459, citing Simpson v. Broward County, 241 So. 2d 193, 194 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1970).
173. Sossin Sys., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 262 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
174. 275 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1973).
175. "[N]o cause shall be dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought."
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2 (a).
176. 275 So. 2d at 234.
177. Harrell v. Wainwright, 268 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
178. Id.
179. Thompson v. Dilley, 275 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1973). The court relied on its decision
in Baggett v. Wainwright, 229 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1970).
180. Palmer v. State, 273 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
181. 256 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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or its counsel to co-operate"'8 2 and that the circuit court was entitled to
consider the appeal on the record as it then stood." 3
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held, that where
the transcript of instructions given to the jury was not available due to
the death of the court reporter and the disappearance of his notes, judg-
ment against the defendant must be reversed. 4
In Hooks v. State,'85 the Supreme Court of Florida held that though
an indigent defendant has an absolute right to counsel on his first appeal
no such right exists in subsequent proceedings. The court stated that:
The question in each proceeding of this nature before this Court
should be whether, under the circumstances, the assistance of
counsel is essential to accomplish a fair and thorough presenta-
tion of petitioner's claims. Of course, doubts should be resolved
in favor of the indigent petitioner when a question of the need
for counsel is presented. 86
The filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, but a dismissal of
an appeal for lack of jurisdiction does not prohibit a defendant from
filing a petition for habeas corpus in the same court.'8 ' If notice of appeal
was filed prior to the entry of the judgment and sentence, the notice does
not confer jurisdiction upon the district court of appeal and, absent
proper filing, the appeal must be dismissed.'
The Florida Appellate Rules provide that a decision, judgment, order
or decree shall not be deemed rendered until any proper and timely post-
trial motion is disposed of. 89 Thus, in White v. State,'" where a proper
post-trial motion for discharge in the nature of a petition for rehearing
was made, the case was reviewable since the judgment was not more than
30 days old when the appeal was taken. Since the time for filing a notice
of appeal is measured from the rendition of the order appealed, appellate
jurisdiction will not be conferred unless it is clear to the appellate court
at what date the order was rendered.' 9'
VI. BAIL
In Gustafson v. State,192 it was held that in the absence of statutory
authorization, a defendant's bail money may not be withheld to satisfy
182. Id. at 79.
183. Id.
184. Yancey v. State, 267 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
185. 253 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1971).
186. Id. at 426.
187. Evans v. State, 255 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
188. Holmes v. State, 267 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
189. FLA. APP. R. 1.3.
190. 267 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
191. Sparks v. State, 262 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). The judge endorsed on the
motion an order denying it, dated the motion and signed it, but the appellate court held that
there was no basis for determining the date on which the order was rendered.
192. 251 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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any fines or costs of the court as long as defendant has appeared at the
time specified. Although the court cited no Florida cases, it held void a
sheriff's "cash appearance bond" form that had been signed by the de-
fendant which authorized such a deduction.
Florida courts continued to follow the principles set forth in Young-
hans v. State'93 as to the handling of bail applications. In Wells v.
Wainwright,9 4 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the granting of
supersedeas bond following conviction was within the court's discretion
but that such discretion could not be exercised arbitrarily. In Wells, it
was clear that the court had not followed the standards enunciated in
Younghans in denying bail to the defendant.
A rehearing of a defendant's bail application was ordered following
a denial without explanation when a rubber stamp which stated "Motion
Heard, Considered and.. ." had been affixed to the application, to which
someone had added "Denied." The application was then signed by the
judge. 95
The granting of post-conviction bail is not subject to article I,
section 14 of the Florida Constitution, which concerns itself with bail
prior to adjudication. 9  Thus, in Hedden v. State,'9 7 the court found
that it was within the trial court's discretion to grant bail after conviction
despite the fact that defendant had been given a mandatory life sentence.
Bail as a matter of right is only available prior to conviction, except
in cases involving capital offenses or offenses punishable by life imprison-
ment where proof of guilt is evident or its presumption is great. 9 ' The
Supreme Court of Florida has held that the prohibition of capital punish-
ment by the United States Supreme Court' 99 does not affect the consti-
tutional bail provision in Florida, even though there are no longer any
"capital offenses."200
A habeas corpus petition challenging bail as excessive was held to
be best brought in the circuit court which could more ably deal with such
matters. The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district
courts of appeal even though it has no true supervisory or appellate juris-
diction over a circuit court which set bail.2 ' It had been previously stated
that, as a general rule, circuit courts are not empowered to deal by habeas
corpus with the propriety of an order of court over which the court has
193. 90 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1956).
194. 260 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1972).
195. Miller v. State, 272 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973), citing Younghans v. State, 90
So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1956).
196. Wells v. Wainwright, 260 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1972), cited with approval, Hedden v.
State, 275 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
197. 275 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
198. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14; FLA. STAT. ch. 903 (1973); FLA. R. CRm. P. 1.130,
3.130(c)-(f).
199. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
200. Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972).
201. State ex rel. Renaldi v. Sandstrom, 276 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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no appellate jurisdiction; nevertheless, it is proper to do so when ques-
tioning the legality of a detention or the granting of bail.202
VII. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
During the survey period, the law concerning the need for jury
instructions on lesser included offenses, as set down in Brown v. State,2"'
was the subject of several clarifying decisions. The Supreme Court of
Florida in Brown classified the situations where instructions on lesser
included offenses need be given:
(1) Crimes divisible into degrees.
(2) Attempts to commit offenses.
(3) Offenses necessarily included in the offense charged.
(4) Offenses which may or may not be included in the offense
charged, depending on the accusatory pleading and the
evidence .204
In State v. Anderson,20 5 the Supreme Court of Florida further elab-
orated on the discretion of the trial court with respect to the above-stated
fourth category:
[I]t means that he may be convicted of any lesser offense,
which, although not an essential ingredient of the major crime,
is spelled out in the accusatory pleading in that it alleges all
of the elements of the lesser offense and the proof at trial sup-
ports the charge. °8
The key consideration as to the propriety of any given instruction con-
cerning lesser included offenses is whether the defendant was apprised
of all of which he might be convicted.07 Thus, where the record did not
support the lesser included offenses of selling or offering for sale an inter-
est in a lottery, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct
thereon.08
The refusal of the trial court to charge the jury upon the offense of
aggravated assault as a lesser included offense in a homicide prosecution
was error where the accusatory pleading charged the use of a deadly
weapon and, therefore, encompassed aggravated assault. 9 Similarly, it
was error to refuse a request for an instruction on simple assault where
202. Janes v. Heidtman, 272 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
203. 206 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1968).
204. Id. at 381 (emphasis in original).
205. 270 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1972), rev'g 255 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, applied different criteria testing the necessity of giving a
requested lesser included offense charge, depending on whether the defendant or the state
requested the instruction. See Rodriguez v. State, 257 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972) which
adheres to the rationale as set forth by the Second District in Anderson.
206. 270 So. 2d at 356.
207. Id.
208. Id. Accord, State v. Fernandez, 270 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1972).
209. Appell v. State, 250 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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the information alleged that the defendant did, by force, violence and
assault, put the robbery victim in fear and where such allegation was
supported by the evidence. 210 Where the display of a deadly weapon
was adduced by the evidence and the pleadings, a charge on aggravated
assault as a lesser included offense of robbery was justified.21' A charge
on the offense of wilfully or wantonly unnecessarily or excessively chastis-
ing a child or ward was warranted in a prosecution for torturing or un-
lawfully punishing children.212 A simple assault and battery cannot be
viewed as a lesser included offense within an aggravated assault accusa-
tion where the state's position rested entirely upon the shooting.218 Where
the information is silent as to allegations of assault with a deadly weapon
and as to allegations of battery, neither a charge of aggravated assault
nor of assault and battery would have been appropriate in a prosecution
for robbery.214 The offense of carrying a concealed weapon is not a
lesser one included in the greater offense of assault with intent to commit
murder.215
In Wilson v. State,216 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
held that the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on bare assault
which was a lesser included offense of robbery but not a necessarily in-
cluded offense was reversible error. In doing so, the court refused to
declare the error harmless because it was too difficult to determine
"whether the failure of the trial judge to give the requested instruction
resulted in injury to the substantial rights of the defendant. 217 However,
the Supreme Court of Florida21 reversed, holding that the error was
harmless. The court rejected the rationale of the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, that it is difficult for an appellate court to determine
whether the failure to give the requested instructions resulted in injury
to the substantial rights of the defendant by noting that such a determina-
tion is precisely what is required under Florida Statutes section 924.33
(1973).
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Rayner v. State,21 9 interpreted
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.150 as requiring a trial judge to
instruct on necessarily included offenses. Such an instruction is manda-
tory notwithstanding the defendant's affirmative attempt to waive the
giving of the instruction or defendant's objection thereto. Thus, the fail-
210. Stephens v. State, 279 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). Accord, Bryan v. State, 279
So. 2d 332 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
211. Morrison v. State, 259 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
212. Robinson v. State, 254 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
213. Richardson v. State, 251 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
214. State v. Wilson, 276 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1973).
215. Glaze v. State, 249 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
216. 265 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
217. Id. at 414.
218. State v. Wilson, 276 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1973).
219. 273 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1973), rev'g 264 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972), where it was
held, in effect, that it was permissible for a defendant to affirmatively waive the giving of
such instructions. Accord, Henry v. State, 277 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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ure of the trial court to instruct the jury on a necessarily included offense
constituted reversible error, although it was omitted pursuant to the de-
fendant's request. Similarly, in State v. Washington,220 the supreme court
held that the trial court had properly given instructions on necessarily
included offenses over the objections of the defendant, and affirmed the
conviction. However, the refusal of the trial court to give a requested
charge of larceny in a robbery prosecution warranted reversal. 221 It has
also been held that in a robbery prosecution, where no charge on a neces-
sarily included offense of larceny was requested, and none was given, it
was not reversible error.222
Absent a request for a lesser included offense instruction, the trial
court is not required to give it.223 Neither is a trial judge precluded by an
objection of the defendant from charging the jury on a lesser offense,
which although not necessarily included, is embodied in the accusatory
pleading and supported by the evidence. 24 Where the evidence would not
support a charge of first-degree murder, the giving of instructions on
lesser included offenses was not error, notwithstanding defense counsel's
objections.225 Instructions to the jury on lesser included offenses must
be given even though it is the opinion of the trial judge that the proofs
clearly established the major crime charged. 226 However, a defendant
may waive his right to have the jury charged as to lesser included offenses,
where such charge is not mandatory. 2 7
The Supreme Court of Florida held in DeLaine v. State28 that the
only lesser included offenses in the crime of rape are assault with intent
to commit rape, assault and battery and bare assault, and that the failure
to so charge the jury constituted error. Accordingly, the court expressly
decided that fornication is an offense separate and distinct from rape and
is not necessarily an included offense.
It has been held that it is reversible error to deny a requested instruc-
220. 268 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1972). The trial court had instructed the jury in a rape
prosecution on the necessarily included offenses of assault with intent to commit rape, assault
and battery, and simple assault. The District Court of Appeal, First District, in Washington
v. State, 247 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971) had reversed and its decision was quashed by
the Supreme Court.
221. Miles v. State, 258 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Hand v. State, 199 So.
2d 100 (Fla. 1967).
222. Branam v. State, 265 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). Accord, Henry v. State, 277
So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). See note 223 infra and accompanying text.
223. Burney v. State, 276 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
224. Morrison v. State, 259 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
225. Smith v. State, 259 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). Accord, Morrison v. State, 259
So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). The charge was held to be mandatory where the crime
charged was not necessarily included, but where the evidence supported the lesser crime in
a particular case.
226. Lewis v. State, 269 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
227. Black v. State, 279 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
228. 262 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1972). It was held to be a harmless error where the trial court
gave a charge on assault with intent to commit rape only but the jury convicted the de-
fendant of rape. Contra, Miles v. State, 258 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). See also Logan
v. State, 264 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
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tion on conspiracy to commit petit larceny, a misdemeanor, where the
defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit robbery, a felony.2 29
Where the defendant was charged merely with illegal possession of a
firebomb, the court erred in instructing the jury on conspiracy to possess
the firebomb as a lesser included offense.280 Possession of an hallucino-
genic drug is not an offense which is necessarily included in the offense
of illegally selling an hallucinogenic drug.2 '
An attempt to commit a crime must be classified as a lesser included
offense if the crime charged is an offense prohibited by law.232 Thus, an
attempt to receive stolen property is a lesser included offense of a charge
for receipt of stolen property. 88 The provision of the rule stating that
the trial judge shall charge the jury as to attempts to commit the offenses
charged is mandatory, not merely permissive.28 4
A request for an instruction which has been denied, or an objection
to a failure to give an instruction is a prequisite to raising error on ap-
peal.2 15 Despite the fact that the defendant's counsel did not submit a
written request for instructions on the law of lesser included offenses
at any time during the trial, this objection to the court's failure to so
charge the jury was held to be adequate notice to the trial court, and the
refusal to give the requested charges at that time constituted reversible
error."' Where the defendant did not request a cautionary instruction
before the reception of evidence of prior convictions until most of the
evidence had been admitted, there was no error.28 7 Where the defense
fails to submit a request for a charge that the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice in a capital case should be received with great caution,
and does not object if it is not given, a new trial based on a finding of
fundamental error is not warranted.288
A defendant is entitled to the standard jury instruction upon the
229. Edwards v. State, 275 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
230. Swindle v. State, 254 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). The District Court of Appeal,
Second District, relied on Kinchen v. State, 235 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), where it
was held that conspiracy to commit a robbery is not an offense included under the charge
of robbery, and that the trial judge could not property adjudge the defendant guilty of con-
spiracy unless it was so alleged in the information.
231. McPhee v. State, 254 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), citing Parker v. State, 237
So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). See note 263 infra and accompanying text. Each is a sepa-
rate and independent offense and proof of one does not necessarily include the charge and
proof of the other.
232. Lewis v. State, 269 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Brown v. State, 206
So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1968).
233. Lewis v. State, 269 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
234. Henry v. State, 277 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
235. Id. Accord, Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972) ; Williams v. State, 247 So.
2d 425 (Fla. 1971) ; McPhee v. State, 254 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
236. Baker v. State, 254 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1971).
237. Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972).
238. Boykin v. State, 257 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1971). The court held that error harmless due
to the cumulative effect of the general witness charge, the revealing cross-examination of
the accomplice, and the inclusion of the content of the charge by counsel in their presentation
to the jury.
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defense of alibi in every case where there is sufficient evidence to take
the issue to the jury, and it is not the function of the trial judge to weigh
the evidence and decide on the basis when or whether the charge should
be given.23 0
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Kilgore v. State
held that "if any evidence of a substantial character is adduced, either
upon cross-examinaion ... or [directly] ... the element of self-defense
becomes an issue, and the jury, as the trier of the facts, should be duly
charged as to the law thereon .... ,240 Regardless of the quantum or the
quality of the proof of self-defense, the existence of self-defense as an




If there is any evidence to support a defense of entrapment,242 or
where there is conflicting evidence,243 the trial court must instruct the jury
on the issue of entrapment. Where the instructions given by the trial
court on the defense of entrapment were consistent with the law, the court
did not err when it refused to give the defendant's requested change.244
In Willcox v. State,24" the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
found fault with instruction 2.13, Standard Jury Instruction in Criminal
Cases, as promulgated by the Supreme Court of Florida, but held that
the error was harmless. The challenge to the circumstantial evidence
instruction was based upon objections to the phrase "if the circumstances
are susceptible of two equally reasonable constructions, one indicating
guilt and the other innocence, you must accept the construction indicating
innocence." 246 The court found the instruction erroneous in that once
having heard it, the jury might exclude a hypothesis of innocence if it
was equally as probative as the hypothesis of guilt, even though it might
otherwise be reasonable; instead, the court noted that, it is the exclusion
of all reasonable hypotheses of innocence which lends a reasonable
hypothesis of guilt the force of proof. Where the state relies solely on
circumstantial evidence, or when circumstantial evidence constitutes the
substantial thrust of the state's case, a proper jury charge thereon should
be given.247
239. Davis v. State, 254 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). The defendant had presented
four alibi witnesses.
240. 271 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). In Jackson v. State, 251 So. 2d 702 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1971), the district court held that the defendant's claim that he acted in self-defense
was insufficient to warrant an instruction on self-defense. Accord, Brosi v. State, 263 So. 2d
849 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), where the evidence did not warrant an instruction on the law of
entrapment.
241. Kilgore v. State, 271 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
242. Stiglitz v. State, 270 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), cting Stinson v. State, 245 So.
2d 688 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
243. Avilia v. State, 278 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
244. Evenson v. State, 277 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
245. 258 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
246. STANDAMw JURY INSTRUCTiON Nl CRnmqAL CASES 2.13.
247. Anderson v. State, 255 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
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The admission into evidence of impeachment statements with in-
structions that the statements were admitted solely for impeachment and
not as substantive testimony is proper 48 and the failure to so instruct
constitutes reversible error.249
Where a case is submitted to the jury on a two-fold theory of pre-
meditated murder and felony-murder, and the trial court fails to charge
the jury on the various elements of the substantive felony, the failure to
so charge is reversible error.25 0 In Anderson v. State,25'1 the supreme court
held that the failure of the trial court to define or explain to the jury
the meaning of "premeditation" as used in an instruction for murder in
the first degree was reversible error, even absent an objection by the
defendant.
Despite the fact that the trial court tracked the applicable statute
in defining murder in the second degree and manslaughter to the jury,
the use of an instruction in which the technical phrases "evincing a
depraved mind" and "culpable negligence" were given without further
definition or explanation was considered grounds for reversal, even
though the defendant had not requested additional explanatory in-
structions.2 52
Following a request by the jury that the court reread the instructions
on first and second degree murder, the defendant asked the court to also
give the instruction as to self-defense when the trial court repeated the
requested instructions, and objected when the court failed to do so. 253
The District Court of Appeal, First District,254 reversed the judgment of
conviction, holding that the failure to repeat the self-defense instruction
erroneously left the jury with an incomplete and potentially misleading
instruction.
In Walsingham v. State,255 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
an instruction defining the offense of abortion was prejudicial and mis-
leading where it failed to include a statement to the effect that abortion
is not unlawful if it is necessary to preserve the life of the mother. The
court further held that where a trial court attempts to define the crime
under which the accused is charged, it must define each and every element,
and if it fails to do so, the charge is misleading and necessarily prejudicial
to the accused.
248. Walter v. State, 272 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
249. Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
250. Wright v. State, 250 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
251. 276 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1973).
252. Bryan v. State, 271 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). The court, commenting on the
standard jury instructions noted that "any substantial deviation from use of these instruc-
tions will almost always end in error on the part of the trial court." Id. at 199.
253. Stills v. State, 272 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973), citing Hedges v. State, 172
So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1965).
254. Id.
255. 250 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1971). The failure of the court to furnish the jury with a
standard upon which to determine the lawfulness of the acts was reversible error.
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Where the evidence established that the defendant, who was present
prior to the crime, was apprehended in another city two weeks after the
crime, the court properly submitted the issue to the jury of whether the
defendant fled after the crime.25 6 Similarly, an instruction on flight was
proper where the evidence showed that the defendant left his home after
shooting his wife and was found by police crouched behind a dresser in
the bedroom of a friend's apartment.257
In a perjury prosecution, a requested instruction on the question of
inadvertence or mistake is not warranted when the defense presented is
contrary to and inconsistent with the content of such instruction.
258
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held in Joseph v.
State 5' that the trial court's instruction on burglary: "in this case . . .
the pushing open of a door entirely closed . . . is a sufficient breaking to
sustain a conviction," was harmless error in light of the fact that the evi-
dence sustaining a breaking was uncontroverted and that a corrected
version of the instructions was given subsequently by the trial court.
An instruction is not erroneously refused where it is an improper
statement of the law.26° Nor is it improper to refuse to give a requested
instruction which is a correct statement of the applicable law if the sub-
ject was fully covered in the general charges given by the court.26' A re-
viewing court will generally look to the entire charge rather than to one
statement out of context in determining whether a charge is erroneous. 26 2
Where the defendant, through his representations that under Florida
law possession of an illegal drug was a lesser offense necessarily included
in the greater offense of the sale of such drug misleads the state and the
trial judge, he is estopped to assert error where the judge incorrectly in-
cluded possession of a hallucinogenic drug as a lesser offense of selling
the drug and he failed to object thereto.268
VIII. SENTENCE
During the period surveyed, numerous cases have dealt with the
question of whether a defendant is entitled to credit for time served prior
to sentencing. Under Florida Statutes section 921.161(1) (1973), the
allowance of credit for time served prior to sentencing is a matter within
the discretion of the trial court and a defendant is not entitled to credit
256. Hargrett v. State, 255 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
257. Williams v. State, 268 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
258. Hirsch v. State, 268 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). Had the court given the re-
quested instruction, it would have been error.
259. 252 So. 2d 262, 263 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
260. Wells v. State, 270 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Gordon v. State, 119
So. 2d 753 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
261. Wells v. State, 270 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Mackiewicz v. State, 114
So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1959).
262. Yanks v. State, 261 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
263. McPhee v. State, 254 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). See note 231 supra and ac-
companying text.
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for presentence jail time as a matter of right." 4 The question of whether.
credit for time served was appropriate for a defendant awaiting court
action in an escape trial was addressed by the Supreme Court of Florida
in Law v. Wainwright .2 " The supreme court determined that the fact
that the trial court withheld adjudication on the escape charge could have
been dispositive of the issue. If there had been an order which either
allowed credit for time served, expressly denied it, or was silent on the
issue and, thus, tantamount to a denial, the sentence order would be bind-
ing; however, given the fact that nothing in the record indicated whether
the trial judge had reached the question, the court held as a matter of law
that the defendant was entitled to credit for the time served while awaiting
the trial court's decision.
The court subsequently modified its holding in Law to permit a
court to substitute its judgment where a sentence order had been issued,
but the order was silent on the question of credit for time served.26 In
Adams v. Wainwright,26 7 the supreme court held that time spent in a
county jail prior to the completion of a trial for escape from state prison
counts toward the original prison sentence. The court reasoned that the
existing, uncompleted prison term travelled with the escaped prisoner
and that the moment he was detained, the sentence resumed by operation
of law. Additionally, the court decided that the defendant was entitled
to credit toward his original prison sentence for time served in the county
jail following his conviction for escape and prior to his return to the
custody of the Division of Corrections.
In Blackmon v. State,"' the District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, held that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to grant a defendant credit
for time served on a sentence imposed by another court which was sub-
sequently vacated.
The United States Supreme Court, in Tate v. Short,269 held that a
statute which required defendants who were unable to pay a fine to re-
main in prison for a period sufficient to satisfy the fine denied equal pro-
tection of the law. The Florida courts have adopted Tate and invalidated
sentences of imprisonment imposed on indigent defendants who were
unable to pay the fines assessed against them.' Where the defendants
received the maximum sentences permissible and, in addition, were
264. Miller v. State, 270 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Richardson v. State, 243
So. 2d 598 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). Under Florida Statutes section 921.161 (1973), a sentence
shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence may
allow a defendant credit for all or a part of the time spent in the county jail before sentence.
265. 264 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972).
266. Adams v. Wainwright, 275 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1973). See also Falagan v. Wainwright,
195 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1967).
267. 275 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1973).
268. 253 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
269. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
270. Colocado v. State, 251 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971) ; Johnson v. State, 250 So.
2d 347 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971); Martin v. State, 248 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1971); Gary v. State,
239 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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assessed costs, the portions of the sentences imposing additional imprison-
ment in the event of non-payment of costs have been held constitutionally
invalid by Florida courts271 under the decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in Williams v. Illinois. 272 In City of Orlando v. Cameron,2 73
the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted the United States Supreme
Court's prohibition against giving defendants the option to pay a fine or
serve a term of imprisonment, 274 to apply only to those who are unable
to pay due to indigency. Thus, there is no constitutional infirmity in the
imprisonment of a defendant with the financial ability to pay a fine who
refuses or neglects to do so. However, in order to invoke the constitu-
tional protection, a defendant who wishes to avoid imprisonment but
is unable to pay a fine, must assume the burden of proving his indigency
pursuant to Florida Statutes section 27.52 (1973).275
In Phillips v. Allen,2 76 the defendant petitioned the Supreme Court
of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus following the imposition of alter-
native sentences requiring the defendant to either pay a fine or serve
time in jail. After granting the writ, the court relinquished jurisdiction
temporarily to the Municipal Court of Orlando which proceeded to vacate
the sentences and reduce the period of confinement. The supreme court
reassumed jurisdiction and held that the subsequent modifications of
the municipal court vitiated the violations of Tate and Williams and dis-
charged the writ.277
A number of cases have held that that portion of a sentence requiring
probation after a prison term is illegal. 27 However, when the defendant
was convicted on four charges, he could properly be sentenced on two
and placed on probation on the remaining charges to commence at the
conclusion of the imprisonment. 9
It appears to be well settled in Florida that where convictions are
entered on two offenses, each of which constitutes a facet of the same
transaction, it is improper to impose sentence on each. 2 0 Thus, where the
first count of the information charges possession of heroin and the second
271. Dancer v. State, 259 So. 2d 764 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1972); accord, Bell v. State, 249 So.
2d 706 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
272. 399 U.S. 235 (1970). Williams held that an indigent criminal defendant may not be
imprisoned for default in payment of a fine beyond the maximum authorized by statute
regulating the substantive offense.
273. 264 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1972).
274. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
275. City of Orlando v. Cameron, 264 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1972).
276. 255 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1971). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Ervin argued that the
majority opinion was patently discriminatory in that it indirectly authorizes trial judges to
impose alternative imprisonments after it is discovered that indigents cannot pay their fines.
277. Id.
278. Boyd v. State, 272 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973) ; Martinez v. State, 266 So. 2d 392
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Dancy v. State, 259 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Robinson v. State,
256 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
279. Harris v. State, 278 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
280. Hunt v. State, 264 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); accord, Moore v. State, 260
So. 2d 243 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
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count charges sale on the same day, each offense constituted a facet of a
single transaction.2 11 Similarly, where a defendant is convicted on sep-
arate counts of possession and sale of marijuana, and the record estab-
lishes that each of the offenses occurred the same day and that the mari-
juana sold was the same marijuana on which the possession charge was
based, each conviction represented a facet of a single transaction and
therefore justified only one sentence for the highest offense charged.282
The same has been held to apply in cases of possession and sale of nar-
cotics,2  barbiturates,2s8 amphetamines,288 cocaine28 and LSD.2 7 Addi-
tionally, charges of robbery and extortion288 represented offenses arising
out of the same transaction as did breaking and entering with intent to
commit a misdemeanor and petit larceny.289 It has been held that aggra-
vated assault and resisting arrest with violence constituted facets of the
same transaction and as such warranted only one conviction.290
Separate sentences were improper for convictions of both sale of
unregistered securities and sale by an unregistered dealer where the sep-
arate offenses were part of a single transaction.291 Where the defendant
was charged with and convicted of obtaining credit through the unau-
thorized use of a credit card under three separate informations, the fact
that such conduct occurred during his possession of the credit card on a
single day indicated that the three transactions should be treated as dif-
ferent facets of the same criminal offense and sentences on more than one
conviction were not warranted.29 2 While a conviction for displaying a
firearm during the commission of a robbery was proper, only one sentence
could be imposed if the defendant was also convicted of the robbery in
which he used the weapon.293
Conversely, it has been held that robbery and carrying a concealed
firearm are separate and distinct offenses and, therefore, a sentence im-
posed upon both under two counts of an information was valid.29 4 Sim-
ilarly, where the defendant shot and killed the victim in the process of
281. Johnson v. State, 260 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972) ; Martin v. State, 251 So. 2d
283 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
282. Keenan v. State, 253 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), citing Yost v. State, 243 So.
2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971) ; accord, Walker v. State, 261 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
283. Brown v. State, 264 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); Torres v. State, 262 So. 2d
458 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Martin v. State, 251 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971); Lietch v.
State, 248 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1971).
284. Warren v. State, 266 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
285. Weeks v. State, 253 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
286. Caivano v. State, 276 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
287. Farrell v. State, 259 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
288. Davis v. State, 277 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
289. Id.
290. Moody v. State, 279 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
291. Sparks v. State, 256 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Easton v. State, 230
So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
292. Lore v. State, 267 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Lietch v. State, 248 So.
2d 203 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1971).
293. Hernandez v. State, 278 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
294. Cooper v. State, 261 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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escaping after having committed a robbery, the crimes of robbery and
assault with intent to murder were considered two separate transactions
for the purpose of sentencing.291 5 Manslaughter and driving while under
the influence of alcohol were held to be separate offenses and separate
sentences were thus warranted. 96 Separate sentences following convic-
tions for breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony and for
possession of burglary tools were permitted to stand on the rationale that
one could be found guilty of possessing burglary tools but not guilty of
breaking and entering.2 97
Where the offense was committed by the same person, at the same
time, in the same place, under the same circumstances and with the same
intent, the only offense was that of receiving stolen property, thus, there
could only be one sentence even though the property was owned by four
different entities.298
The law permitting only one sentence for multiple convictions on a
single transaction applied even though the sentences were for identical
terms and were to run concurrently.2 99 However, where a sentence on one
count was erroneous, the court could not set aside both sentences in order
to impose a greater sentence on the remaining and still valid count, as
the validity of each must be determined separately.8 s°
If a sentence is proper under the law, it is not subject to appeal on
the grounds that it was excessive under the circumstances of the case.801
Nor is the imposition of the maximum sentence grounds to allege cruel
and unusual punishment.02 Thus, where the defendant rejected the
state's offer to recommend to the court a sentence of 15 years in return
for a plea of guilty, he could not claim that a sentence of 130 years was
meted out as a penalty for going to trial, absent a conclusive showing
that such was the case. 08 A lawful sentence of 35 years' imprisonment to
a defendant who sought a jury trial was not error, even though a co-
defendant who chose to plead guilty received only five years on a prop-
erly negotiated plea.804 A statement by the trial court during plea nego-
tiations in open court that it "wouldn't be thinking of less than 50 years"
295. Tarpley v. State, 258 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Footman v. State, 203
So. 2d 356 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
296. Dawson v. State, 266 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
297. Foster v. State, 276 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973), citing Washington v. State,
51 Fla. 137, 40 So. 765 (1906).
298. Avilia v. State, 278 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
299. Carr v. State, 264 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
300. Brown v. State, 264 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
301. Id. Accord, Godfrey v. State, 278 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
302. Cole v. State, 262 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
303. Id.
304. Weathington v. State, 262 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). The court commented
that "while such a diversity in results between the two paths pursued by the convicted
actors may be quite shocking to the judicial conscience of the appellate court . . .," it found
that the record did not support the contention that such a sentence constituted a gross
penalty placed on the defendant's right to choose a trial by jury. Id. at 725.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
was not binding on the judge following the defendant's refusal to plead
guilty. The defendant's subsequent conviction by the court was not sub-
ject to appeal absent a showing that the sentences of 101 years was vin-
dictive in nature. 05
Where a portion of the sentence exceeds the maximum allowable,
the excess is automatically vacated without the necessity of resentenc-
ing.806 Although there are a number of alternatives80 7 available to a trial
judge in imposing a sentence, he may not sentence a convicted criminal
for a term less than the minimum prescribed by law.808
Florida Statutes section 775.14 (1973) provides:
Any person receiving a withheld sentence upon conviction for
a criminal offense, and such withheld sentence has not been
altered for a period of five years, shall not thereafter be sen-
tenced for the conviction of the same crime for which sentence
was originally withheld.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in State v. Gazda,0 9 held that this statute
was tolled for the time during which the defendant was absent from the
court's jurisdiction, and extended the five year deadline for imposing
sentence. Where the defendant was convicted on three separate counts,
the trial court was justified in imposing sentence on one count and with-
holding sentence on the remaining two from day to day.810 However, the
trial court must exercise its power to sentence before the statutory time
limit expires."' 1
Before one may be sentenced as a second offender pursuant to Florida
Statutes section 775.09 (1973), there must be a constitutionally valid
prior conviction.812 Thus, where the defendant's allegation that his prior
conviction was constitutionally invalid under Gideon v. Waimrighto83
was not refuted, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.8 14
It has been held that a trial court may take into consideration the
contents of a pre-sentence investigation report prior to sentencing.81
Further, a sentence is not invalid merely because a pre-sentence investi-
gation was not held or because the court failed to afford a defendant an
305. Blackman v. State, 265 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
306. Chaires v. State, 265 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
307. In State v. Dull, 249 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), the court noted that the
fact that the trial judge might have withheld adjudication of guilt and/or placed the de-
fendant on probation, or might have imposed an indeterminate sentence, did not operate to
legitimize a sentence imposed contrary to law.
308. Id., citing Dean v. State, 83 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1955).
309. 257 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1971), quashing Grada v. State, 244 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1971).
310. Smith v. State, 259 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
311. Id.
312. Jackson v. State, 252 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), citing Lee v. State, 217 So.
2d 861 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
313. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
314. Jackson v. State, 252 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
315. Mincey v. State, 256 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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evidentiary hearing on mitigation, even though the court was informed
of circumstances which were worthy of consideration. 816 Similarly, the
trial court was not in error in failing to inquire about mitigation where
the defendant's counsel was permitted to state fully into the record the
matter which he would urge on mitigation, and was not prevented from
presenting evidence thereon. 17
The trial court is without jurisdiction to mitigate a defendant's sen-
tence by withdrawing adjudication and sentence and placing him on pro-
bation, after more than 60 days have elapsed from the imposition of
sentence.
81 8
In taking a plea of nolo contendere, character evidence is material
and properly admissible for consideration by the trial judge in deter-
mining sentence. 19 While it is permissible to allow a judge who did not
preside at the trial to pass sentence, the failure of the substitute judge
to familiarize himself thoroughly with the case prior to sentencing consti-
tutes an insufficient basis to determine the defendant's sentence.820
Florida Statutes section 922.051 (1973) provides:
When a statute expressly directs that imprisonment be in a
state prison, the court may impose a sentence of imprisonment
in the county jail if the total of the prisoner's cumulative sen-
tences is not more than (1) year.
Pursuant to the above statute, where a defendant was charged upon two
separate informations, and convicted on both, the trial court's sentence
of one year in the county jail on each charge, with the second sentence
to begin at the expiration of the first, was not permissible.8 21 The statute
was construed to prohibit imprisonment in the county jail if any combi-
nation of sentences would result in imprisonment in the county jail for
a period of more than one year. 8 22
The United States Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia, held that
the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments. 28 The opinion was rendered per curiam and each member of the
court contributed a separate opinion. Justices Stewart and White rejected
316. Cole v. State, 262 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
317. Holland v. State, 258 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
318. Sayer v. State, 267 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Ware v. State, 231 So.
2d 872 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
319. Chesebrough v. State, 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972).
320. Caplinger v. State, 271 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). The sentencing judge
availed herself of neither the benefit of a presentence investigation ordered by the presiding
judge, nor the record of the trial itself, but instead, relied solely upon the statements of counsel
to familiarize herself with the case.
321. Dade County v. Baker, 265 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1972), adopted the dissent of judge
Carroll in Dade County v. Baker, 258 So. 2d 511, 512-14 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), as the proper
interpretation of the statute.
322. Id.
323. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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the death penalty as being capriciously applied without a meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many
in which it is not. Justice Douglas found the discretionary statutes un-
constitutional in their operation because they were "pregnant with dis-
crimination." It remains to be seen whether a statute can be drafted
with a degree of specificity and with sufficiently objective criteria to
satisfy the diverse objections of the members of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in the wake of Furman, recognized
the elimination of the death penalty and held that the only sentence
which could be imposed upon conviction of murder in the first degree
is life imprisonment.8 24 Thus, death sentences previously imposed for first
degree murder were reduced automatically to life imprisonment while
those imposed upon convictions for rape were remanded for resentencing
consistent with the Court's holding in Furman.2 5 In Baxter v. Stack, it
was held that the court which sentenced the defendant to death had juris-
diction to correct its sentence and to impose a sentence of imprisonment
for life.826
IX. FORMER JEOPARDY
In Waller v. Florida,32 7 the United States Supreme Court established
that cities, and states, including their respective courts, are not separate
sovereignties. Consequently, a defendant's prosecution in a state court
for a felony arising out of the same acts for which he had been convicted
in a municipal court, would constitute double jeopardy, providing the
former conviction was a lesser included offense of the felony. Upon re-
mand to the Florida courts, however, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held that the municipal offense was not a lesser included
offense of the state larceny charge and, therefore, no question of former
jeopardy was involved. 28
There was also no former jeopardy in the following instances of suc-
cessive prosecution because the charges in the second action were not
lesser offenses included in those charged in the first action: where the
defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon following ac-
quittal of assault with intent to commit murder;129 where defendant was
324. Anderson v. State, 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972); accord, In re Baker, 267 So. 2d 331
(Fla. 1972).
325. Anderson v. State, 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972). See Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499
(Fla. 1972), where the Supreme Court of Florida, in an attempt to provide guidance during
the interim period following Furman and prior to the enactment of new legislation, held
that inasmuch as Furman eliminated capital punishment, it would eliminate capital offenses
as well. See section HI supra for a further discussion of the Furman case and its effect in
Florida.
326. 270 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
327. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
328. Waller v. State, 270 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
329. State v. Williams, 254 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971); Glaze v. State, 249 So. 2d
742 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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prosecuted for possession of marijuana after a municipal court convicted
him of driving while under the influence of drugs;' 30 where the conviction
in a city court for profanity was followed by prosecution for resisting ar-
rest; 83 ' where a conviction following a guilty plea of possession of less than
one gallon of whiskey for which no tax had been paid was followed by a
charge of concealment of 3 1/2 quarts of such whiskey and possession of
a container intended for bottling the illegal whiskey; 832 where a municipal
court convicted a defendant of performing an obscene play and defendant
was later prosecuted under a state statute for performing the same play
on another date; 33 where the defendant had been acquitted of careless
driving in a metropolitan court and was then prosecuted by the state for
leaving the scene of an accident.3 4
Although there were similar elements involved in the two offenses
for which the defendant was prosecuted, a defendant could properly be
prosecuted for manslaughter resulting from operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated after he had been convicted of driving while under the
influence of alcoholic beverages.338 The District Court of Appeal, Second
District, then held that in order for the defense of former jeopardy to
apply, it is necessary that the second prosecution arise out of the same
facts and that it be for the same offense.3 6 Proof of additional facts in
one charge is the determining factor in deciding whether each charge
may be prosecuted separately.
In Bernard v. State,837 it was held that jeopardy attached in a non-
jury case only when evidence is heard by the judge prior to the time
that the state has entered a nolle prosequi. In affirming the District Court
of Appeal, Third District's decision, 38 the court required actual presenta-
tion of proof by the state for commencement of jeopardy. Jeopardy does
not attach if a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute within the
statutory period after it had been transferred from municipal to state
court. Therefore, the state is allowed to file a subsequent information in
state court.889 Where the court required the state to proceed on two
counts (III and IV) of a four-count information, and the state used evi-
dence of other crimes, i.e., the other two counts to show intent and motive,
330. State v. Lampley, 250 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
331. State v. Lamons, 251 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
332. State v. Hart, 253 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
333. State v. Eli-Gee, Inc., 255 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436 (1970). See also State ex rel. McCausland v. Rowe, 272 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 3d
1973).
334. State v. Jackson, 248 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
335. State v. Stiefel, 256 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
336. Id. at 583, citing State v. Shaw, 219 So. 2d 49, 50 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
337. 261 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1972).
338. State v. Bernard, 254 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). Judge Pearson dissented, saying
that jeopardy attaches when the nonjury trial begins and that the majority confused the
taking of testimony with the taking of evidence since evidence had already been offered and
rejected at trial. Id. at 40.
339. State v. Ressler, 257 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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that evidence did not place the defendant in jeopardy for a new prosecu-
tion of counts I and II since the evidence was first used simply to
strengthen the state's case under counts III and IV. 40
A defendant's failure to raise the defense of former jeopardy at
trial constituted a waiver of that defense.841
It has been held that a plea of guilty raises the bar of former jeopardy
against another prosecution for an offense based upon the same transac-
tion and the state can not nolle prosequi such a case and recharge the
defendant for a higher offense. 42 However, where defendant pleaded
guilty and then withdrew his plea, it was as if the plea had never been
made, and the state was free to file a new information . 8  The state's
nolle prosequi of an information which has been brought within the two-
year limitation period but which has been dismissed more than two years
after the offense, prevented further prosecution for the same offense. 44
The fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy is a limita-
tion on the states through the fourteenth amendment . 45 Therefore Ashe
v. Swenson, 46 holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is imbedded
in the fifth amendment, is also applicable to the states. The United States
Supreme Court indicated that Ashe would be given retroactive effect.847
Nevertheless, in Brewer v. State,18 the Supreme Court of Florida found
Ashe to be prospective only, in a case where defendant's conviction had
become final prior to that decision. Since the collateral estoppel rule does
not raise serious questions concerning the actuality of guilt, according to
the court it must be treated in this manner, unlike the retroactive status
given to other rules. 49
In a case in which the defendant's conviction was not final, the
criteria for collateral estoppel were given effect where the defendant was
convicted of forcible rape following an acquittal for a felony-murder
which had occurred while the victim was being raped.850 Since the state
had initially failed to prove the fact that the defendant had raped the
victim, it was estopped from proving this necessary fact for the latter
conviction. A defendant's acquittal of robbery for lack of identity estop-
ped the state from retrying the defendant for conspiracy to commit
robbery where identification of the defendant was again a crucial
issue. 5' The collateral estoppel rule was not applicable, however, where
340. State v. Fisher, 264 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
341. Bell v. State, 262 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) ; Suiero v. State, 248 So. 2d 219
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
342. Ray v. State, 231 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1970).
343. Bell v. State, 262 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
344. Ball v. Goodwin, 249 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
345. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
346. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
347. Id. at 437 n.1.
348. 264 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1972), aff'g 253 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
349. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (voluntariness of confessions).
350. Eagle v. State, 249 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
351. Martin v. State, 260 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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the defendant was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to
commit rape following a previous acquittal of rape and assault to commit
rape charges, in that the ultimate facts needed for conviction were not
common to the other offenses.852 Neither collateral estoppel nor double
jeopardy bars the state from introducing evidence at trial after that evi-
dence was suppressed in a previous proceeding in another county.
853
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, 54 held that the denial
of defense counsel's motion for a mistrial followed by a later motion for
dismissal by the state, which was granted with a statement by the judge
that both parties had moved for a mistrial, could not be deemed a waiver
by the defendant of a double jeopardy claim since he was not a party
to the state's motion.
Juvenile proceedings are not of a criminal nature, and, therefore,
an adjudication of a delinquent in a juvenile court is not a bar to criminal
prosecution on the same facts. 55
Former jeopardy is not an issue where the court holds a retrial to
determine defendants' penalty where a federal court had set aside the
death penalty sentence which defendants had received following a con-
viction of murder. 56
In Roberson v. State,3 57 the Supreme Court of Florida required that
a recommendation of mercy which had been granted at the first trial, also
be given for the defendant who obtained a retrial, unless the record in the
second trial was significantly different from the first. The court cited North
Carolina v. Pearce358 for the proposition that a more harsh sentence in
these circumstances requires that some justification be noted in the record.
After a mistrial following defendant's conviction for aggravated assault,
it was improper on retrial to amend the information to assault with intent
to commit murder as an accused can only be retried for the offense for
which he was convicted before mistrial. 5 9
A minor traffic offender was immune from prosecution by juvenile
court where she had already been convicted and fined in another juris-
diction. 60
X. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
To warrant a new trial under Florida Statutes section 920.05 (1) (a)
(1973), it must be established that the defendant's absence at a pro-
ceeding where the jury was present operated to substantially prejudice
352. McDonald v. State, 249 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
353. Suiero v. State, 248 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
354. Fugett v. State, 271 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
355. State v. R.E.F., 251 So. 2d 672 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1971).
356. Barlow v. Taylor, 249 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1971).
357. 258 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1971).
358. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
359. Kilpatrick v. State, 262 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Ray v. State, 231
So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1970 [sic]) (decided in 1969).
360. In re S.S.Y., 273 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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his rights.861 Thus, if there is no objection to the absence of the defendant
it is harmless error if the jury returns to the courtroom. during delibera-
tions to make inquiries of the trial judge. 62 If a defendant voluntarily
absents himself from the courtroom once a trial proceeding has com-
menced, the trial need not be interrupted, and a denial of a continuance
will, at most, constitute harmless error where the sentence is not capital."'
There is no requirement under rule 3.180 of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure that the defendant be present at a hearing on a motion for a
new trial.364
XI. PRELIMINARY HEARING
There is an abundance of Florida cases holding that even a com-
plete denial of a preliminary hearing does not deprive a defendant of due
process, because it is not an essential stage in a criminal proceeding,
865
nor is it essential to a fair trial. 66 Given the fact that article one, section
15(a) of the Florida Constitution authorizes the state attorney, as a
constitutional officer, to initiate criminal prosecutions for felonies by
filing an information under oath, the Supreme Court of Florida held that,
in so filing, the state attorney conclusively determines that the evidence
is adequate to establish probable cause.367 A preliminary hearing is not
required where an information charging the commission of a felony has
been filed. Thus, the requirement in Florida Statutes section 901.0668
that one arrested by virtue of a warrant be taken without unnecessary
delay before a committing magistrate does not apply to those arrested
on a capias issued upon an indictment or direct information. 69
Where approximately five hours had elapsed between the time of
arrest and the time the defendant was taken before a committing magis-
trate, such delay was neither unreasonable nor violative of his constitu-
tional rights.870 Further, it has been held that an inculpatory statement,
otherwise admissible, is not rendered inadmissible solely because the
defendant has not been taken before a committing magistrate for a
preliminary hearing.871
361. Stephan v. State, 251 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
362. Id.
363. Barcia v. State, 249 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
364. Luster v. State, 262 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
365. See, e.g., Conner v. State, 253 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
366. Lovell v. State, 250 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), citing Baugus v. State, 141 So.
2d 264 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 879 (1962).
367. State ex rel. Hardy v. Blounts, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972), aff'g Maxwell v.
Blount, 250 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). See DiBona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1960).
368. Section 901.06 was repealed in 1973 to the extent that it conflicts with FLA. R.
Cim. P. 3.125.
369. Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971); accord, Bradley v. State,
265 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
370. Stevens v. State, 251 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), citing Pettyjohn v. United
States, 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
371. Robinson v. State, 254 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing State ex rel. Carty v.
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It is thus apparent that constitutional objections to incarceration
based on the filing of an information, with no judicial scrutiny prior to
arraignment, have gone largely unrecognized in the Florida courts872
despite statutory law878 mandating an appearance before a magistrate
without "unnecessary delay." In Pugh v. Rainwater,87 4 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that an incar-
cerated suspect must be afforded a preliminary hearing within a reason-
able time following arrest and directed the defendants to submit a plan
for the implementation of a committing magistrate system in all cases
where the prosecution is initiated by direct information. The district court
later adopted a plan which required that persons arrested in Dade County
be afforded expeditious preliminary hearings before a magistrate and
imposed certain sanctions, including the immediate release of those arres-
tees who were not provided with a timely preliminary hearing.875 Al-
though implementation of the plan was stayed pending appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision and held that the fourth and fourteenth amendments require
that arrestees held for trial upon informations filed by the state attorney
must be afforded a preliminary hearing before a judicial officer without
unnecessary delay.878
Additionally, the court extended the preliminary hearing protection
to misdemeanants, except when they "are out on bond or are charged
with violating ordinances carrying no possibility of pretrial incarcera-
tion.18 77 The court of appeals vacated that portion of the district court's
decision which required that the preliminary hearing be held within four
days of the initial appearance, as well as the portion establishing a dif-
ferent time schedule, because they discriminated against those accused of
capital offenses in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.8 78 Finally,
the court vacated those provisions of the plan adopted by the district
court imposing sanctions to insure compliance with the requirements of
probable cause and preliminary hearings.17 ' At the time of this writing,
Purdy, 240 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1970). The court found an additional ground for refusing to
reverse in that the defendant did not object at trial to the admission of the statement.
372. State ex rel. Carty v. Purdy, 240 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1970) ; Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235
So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970) ; State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1968); Palileri v. State,
198 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1967).
373. FLA. STAT. §§ 901.06, .23 (1973) dictate that when an arrest occurs, with or without
a warrant, the officer making the arrest "shall without unnecessary delay take the person
before a magistrate." Section 901.06 was repealed in 1973 to the extent that it conflicts with
F.A. R. CRm. P. 3.125.
374. 332 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973).
375. Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
376. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973).
377. Id. at 789.
378. Id.
379. Id. The court of appeals, while noting that "[these paragraphs were at the time
considered necessary by the court as a means for overcoming Florida's longstanding practice
of denying preliminary hearings to criminal defendants," vacated the sanctions on the as-
sumption that the adoption of the Amended Rules of Criminal Procedure by the Supreme
Court of Florida would obviate the need for such "onerous" sanctions. Id. at 790.
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Pugh has been argued before the Supreme Court of the United States and
a rehearing has been scheduled for the fall of 1974.
XII. FAIR TRIAL
In Smith v. State, 0 the prosecutor stated in his closing argument
that if the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity he would
be on the street in 30, 60, or 90 days and that there was no possibility
of keeping him off for longer than that. The court in reversing defendant's
conviction held that the first part of the prosecutor's argument was per-
rissible but that the last phrase incorrectly stated the law, was highly
prejudicial to the defendant and denied him his right to a fair trial. Also,
where the prosecutor appealed to the sympathies of the jury for the vic-
tim's family, and commented several times on defendant's desire to remain
silent, it was held that the defendant was denied a fair trial.88' In deter-
mining whether a statement made by the prosecutor is prejudicial, a court
will look to the entire charge rather than to one statement out of con-
text. 82 If the prosecutor's argument was a fair comment on the evidence
the reviewing court will not reverse.88 3
In Price v. State, 84 the court held that the defendant was denied his
fundamental right to a fair trial when the prosecutor stated in his closing
argument that the "jury must believe in the integrity of the system and
that if defendant had been named and not identified in another confession
defendant would not be on trial because the state had no reason to prose-
cute an innocent man." 8 5 The Supreme Court of Florida held that it is im-
proper for the prosecutor to refer to "mug books" or "mug shots" during
a criminal trial, but that such a statement does not deny the defendant
a fair trial where there is other clear evidence of defendant's identifica-
tion.886
Rule 3.250, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which entitles the
prosecution to the concluding argument before the jury if the defendant
calls witnesses, is not constitutionally objectionable under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments. 8"7 Rule 3.25088 gives the defendant the right to
the concluding closing argument when he has not called any witnesses on
his behalf. A denial of this right is a denial of a fair trial. The courts are
not concerned with whether a denial of this right is prejudicial to the
defendant. As the court in Raysor v. State"5 9 stated:
380. 273 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
381. Breniser v. State, 267 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
382. Yanks v. State, 261 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
383. Wade v. Wainwright, 266 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
384. 267 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
385. Id. at 40.
386. Loftin v. State, 273 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1973).
387. Preston v. State, 260 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1972).
388. "[A] defendant offering no testimony in his own behalf, except his own, shall be
entitled to the concluding argument before the jury." FLA. R. Camr. P. 3.250.
389. 272 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
[W]e are at a loss as a practical matter to know just how any
criminal defendant could in fact make a demonstration of error
because of the refusal of the trial court to follow the dictates of
the Rule. It is inherent in the procedure . . . that the right to
address the jury finally is a fundamental advantage which simply
speaks for itself.890
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that the
harmless error rule is inapplicable when the rule prohibiting comment on
the failure of the defendant to testify has been violated.89' In Jones v.
State 92 the prosecutor stated, "[t]here is not one word from the stand
that says they did not participate in this crime." The court held that
this was reversible error although it was susceptible to differing con-
structions. The statement could have been regarded by the jury as having
reference to the failure of the defendants to testify on their own behalf.
Neither the prosecutor nor the defendant should question prospective
jurors as to the kind of verdict they would render under any given state
of facts or circumstances. It was held to be reversible error when the
state asked prospective jurors whether or not they would convict on the
testimony of a person who has been granted immunity if the state proved
the case beyond a reasonable doubt.893
In Cole v. State94 the defendant argued that he was denied his right
to a fair trial when his defense counsel's final argument to the jury was
limited to 20 minutes. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held
that in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, a court may impose
reasonable restrictions on defense counsel's argument. In another case,
a ruling of the trial court cutting off the defense counsel's effort to attack
the credibility of a detective who produced an incriminating statement
signed by the defendant was held not to constitute reversible error. 95
When the trial court limits the type of questions which the defense counsel
may ask of a witness, a reviewing court will not reverse unless prejudice
is shown.8 "
Where it was clear from the record that the jury could not have de-
liberated free from outside influence and that a juror had engaged in a
conversation with someone outside of the courtroom concerning the case,
there was prejudice to the defendant's right to receive a fair trial, and
a new trial was ordered. 897
Whether a defendant has received a fair trial may depend on whether
he was able to obtain information important to his defense. In Carnivale
390. Id. at 869.
391. Mathis v. State, 267 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
392. 260 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
393. Smith v. State, 253 So. 2d 465 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1971).
394. 262 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
395. Lane v. State, 264 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
396. Girtman v. State, 270 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
397. Durano v. State, 262 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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v. State,9 8 the defendant had deposed all of the witnesses listed in the
statement of particulars and discovery, but defense counsel had no oppor-
tunity to depose the co-defendant because counsel was not informed that
the co-defendant had turned state's evidence the morning of the trial.
In reversing defendant's conviction the court held that the purpose of
discovery is to eliminate the likelihood of surprise at trial. The opinion
further stated that if the trial court rules that no prejudice resulted to
the defendant, it is essential that "the circumstances establishing non-
prejudice to the defendant affirmatively appear in the record."' 99 Where
a shirt worn by the victim, which was not listed on the bill of particulars
and discovery, was admitted into evidence, the defendant was entitled to
a new trial. °00 Allowing an unlisted witness to testify is not reversible
error in the absence of prejudice.4 01 A withholding by the state of knowl-
edge of evidence known to be useful to the defendant, even though useful
only for impeachment purposes, can be grounds for a new trial.402 If
certain testimony is introduced and the state has failed to comply with
pretrial orders relating to discovery, defendant is deprived of a fair and
impartial trial.0 8
A defendant can be denied his right to a fair trial if he is surprised
by other than evidentiary matters. In Robinson v. State,404 the informa-
tion was amended after the jury was sworn in. In reversing the conviction,
the court stated, "[wie believe this was a matter of substance which
constituted prejudicial error because of its potential for surprise which
would infringe upon the defendant's right of a fair trial. ' 4 5 A defendant
is not entitled as a matter of right to a pretrial copy of a complete and
detailed report on any and all prospective jurors or to copies of all
written statements made by witnesses to police officers and to the state
attorney's office.40
A defendant could be denied a fair trial when the trial judge makes
an unreasonably large number of statements, comments, suggestions and
innuendos. Though each alone may not constitute reversible error, in
their totality they could well have been the influencing factor in the
jury's verdict.40
In Moncur v. State,408 a co-defendant entered a guily plea which
the trial court received in the presence of the venire from which defen-
dants' jury was to be selected. The judge at that time spoke critically
398. 271 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
399. Id. at 795.
400. Garcia v. State, 268 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
401. Lopez v. State, 264 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
402. Matera v. State, 254 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
403. Lowell v. State, 253 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
404. 266 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
405. Id. at 695.
406. Robertson v. State, 262 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
407. Rockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
408. 262 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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of a jury which had acquitted another co-defendant. Defendant's motion
for a continuance until a new venire could be summoned was denied.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed and held that
the defendant "is entitled to a fair trial before an impartial jury, excluding
even those whose minds have been tainted by newspaper publicity long
before they have been called, much less sworn.140 9
XIII. GRAND JURY
The Supreme Court of Florida declared in State v. Silva4 10 that the
selection procedure of the Dade County Jury Commission was improper
and illegal. Following a mandate of the United States Supreme Court,411
the Florida court held that prospective jurors must be selected at random
without systematic and intentional exclusion of any economic, social,
religious, racial, political or geographical group.412 In forbidding propor-
tional racial limitations in the selection process, the court further warned
that by designating a prospective juror as black or white, the state as-
sumes a greater burden of showing that there was no racial discrimination
in the selection of the jury venire. Additionally, the court upheld the
Florida Statute413 providing for the selection of grand and petit jurors
from male and female persons over the age of 21, and held that it was
not violative of the twenty-sixth amendment, since each state has the
power to establish qualifications for jurors to serve in its courts.414
The Supreme Court of Florida in Portee v. State415 rejected the con-
tention that as a result of the elimination of the authorization for a
grand jury in the 1968 revision of the Florida Constitution, the Dade
County Grand Jury was illegally constituted. The court found that the
grand jury was based on common law principles and was therefore not
affected by the constitutional revision.
As a constitutional officer, the state attorney is authorized to initiate
criminal prosecutions by filing an information even though the grand
jury has failed or refused to issue an indictment.416 He has concurrent
authority with the grand jury to file a formal accusation, by indictment
or information, of a felony not involving capital punishment. 17 A circuit
court judge has the power pursuant to Florida Statutes section 905.21
(1973), to transfer a grand jury investigation to another county without
409. Id. at 688.
410. 259 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1972).
411. Shepard v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
412. State v. Silva, 259 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1972).
413. FLA. STAT. § 40.01(1) (1969).
414. 259 So. 2d at 153. The qualifying age for jury service was subsequently lowered to
18 years. FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1973).
415. 253 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1971) ; accord, Reed v. State, 267 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1972).
416. State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972), citing State ex rel.
Latour v. Stone, 135 Fla. 816, 185 So. 729 (1939).
417. State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972).
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the necessity of an adversary hearing if he determines that conditions
in that county make it impractical to convene a grand jury.418
If an in camera examination of the transcript of grand jury testimony
by a trial judge fails to reveal any material discrepancies in the testimony
of a witness, the defendant is not entitled to review that transcript for
cross-examination purposes.4 19 A defendant was not prejudiced by the
fact that two witnesses allegedly gave false testimony to the grand jury,
notwithstanding their refusal to testify at the defendant's trial after hav-
ing been advised of their constitutional rights. 42 °
In Branzburg v. Hayes,42' the United States Supreme Court held that
a grand jury is not required to show "sufficient grounds" for believing
that a reporter has information relevant to a crime being investigated, that
the information is unavailable from other sources, or that the need for the
information is sufficiently compelling to override first amendment inter-
ests. The case has the effect of requiring reporters to give up confidential
sources of information to the grand jury unless they can meet the burden
of showing an abuse of discretion by the investigating body.422
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in In re Brevard
County Grand Jury Interim Report423 warned that the grand jury may
not single out persons in civil or official positions to impugn their motives,
or hold them to scorn or criticism by word, imputation or innuendo with-
out presenting them for indictment.
XIV. IMMUNITY
The United States Supreme Court recently held that a claim asserting
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was adequately
met by granting a witness immunity from use of the compelled testimony
and any evidence derived from such testimony since the immunity was
"coextensive with the privilege. 4 24 The Court rejected the defendant's
claim that the privilege could only be maintained by immunity from
prosecution for offenses to which the testimony related. In another im-
munity decision,425 the Court upheld as "responsive" any answers sub-
418. McCall v. Askew, 262 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972) ; see Higginbotham v. State,
88 Fla. 26, 101 So. 233 (1924).
419. Williams v. State, 275 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), citing Minton v. State, 113
So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959).
420. Simpson v. State, 276 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
421. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
422. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270 (1st Cir. 1972) ; Levinson v. Attorney
Gen., 321 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
423. 249 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), citing State ex tel. Brautigam v. Interim Re-
port of Grand Jury, 93 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1957). Such an official is entitled to an order ex-
punging such a report from the public records.
424. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The Court adopted "use and deriva-
tive use immunity" as opposed to transactional immunity which the defendant was claiming.
42S. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Comm'n of Inves., 406 U.S. 472 (1972). But see United States
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mitted by a witness under a good faith belief that they were demanded,
and held that the witness had the right of counsel's advice in making the
determination.
In Brinson v. State,42 0 the appellant had been given immunity from
drug prosecution after she gave sworn testimony as to another's involve-
ment. However she was found to be in contempt because she failed to
testify at the trial.
XV. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
If an information wholly fails to charge a defendant with a crime it
is fundamental error. Thus, a conviction founded upon such an informa-
tion is void and must be set aside although the defendant pleaded guilty
to the charge. However, if the insufficiency of the information is such
that it does not wholly fail to charge a crime, the failure to timely raise
the defect by motion to dismiss constitutes a waiver of the insufficiency.4 27
It is not necessary that the indictment or information state the exact date
of the offense if it is not known; it is adequate to state that the crime was
committed within two specifically stated points in time. Also, it is not
essential that the date of the offense proved at trial be the same date stated
in the indictment or information.428 In Howlett v. State,429 the informa-
tion and bill of particulars reported the date of the crime as January 11
or thereafter. The evidence at trial proved that the crime took place on
January 6. The court, upholding defendant's conviction, stated:
There may be some variance between the date alleged in the
information as being the date the offense charged was committed
and that proven on the trial, which variance is immaterial if the
proof shows that the crime was committed before the filing of
the information and that prosecution therefore was begun within
the [statute of limitations] period, except in those rare cases
... where the exact time enters into the nature or legal existence
of the offense.48 0
It is reversible error to require the defendant to go immediately to
trial after allowing the prosecutor to substantially amend the information
to charge a felony after having originally charged defendants with a mis-
demeanor. Instead, the information should be re-filed with a new
arraignment for the defendants. 4 31 After a jury has been accepted and
sworn, any amendment of an information which affects a matter of sub-
v. Meyers, 339 F. Supp. 1154 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Davis v. Wainwright, 342 F. Supp. 39 (M.D.
Fla. 1972).
426. 269 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
427. Catanese v. State, 251 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See also FLA. R. CaE. P.
3.190(c), 3.610(a) (1).
428. Sparks v. State, 273 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1973). See also FLA. R. Camm. P. 3.140(d)(3).
429. 260 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
430. Id. at 880, quoting Horton v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 611, 15 So. 2d 327 (1943) (emphasis
in original).
431. Lawson v. State, 251 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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stance constitutes prejudicial error because of its potential for surprise
and thus infringes upon the right to a fair trial.432
In Wilcox v. State43 3 the state filed an information charging the de-
fendant with having received or aided in the concealment of certain
property. The state then obtained leave to file an amended information
which described different property. It then withdrew the amended infor-
mation, requiring the defendant to proceed to trial on the original in-
formation. The court, in reversing the conviction, held that when the
state abandoned the amended information it was left without a charge
against the defendant since the amended information vitiated and re-
placed the original.
Where the state amended the bill of particulars on the morning of
the trial, changing the scene of the alleged crime from the Youth Hall to
defendant's apartment, after the state attorney and the defense counsel
had discussed the change, the court held that the defendant had not been
prejudiced and affirmed his conviction.484
One may be convicted of any crime which is "necessarily included"
in the offense charged or which is included within the allegations of the
accusatory pleading and shown by the proofs. A "necessarily included"
offense of which a defendant may be convicted is one which is neces-
sarily proven by proof of another offense.4 5 Thus, in King v. State,411 the
court reversed a conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery based on
an information charging robbery because conspiracy to commit robbery
is not an offense included under a charge of robbery.
In Kilgore v. State437 defendant was charged in two separate infor-
mations with homicide and carrying a concealed weapon. The court pro-
posed to try the charges jointly. The District Court of Appeal, Second
District, held that this was error. At the time the case was decided, the
Rules of Criminal Procedure418 required that only the state or the de-
fendant could move for a consolidation. Also, a consolidation could take
place only if the charges could have been joined in a single information.48 9
XVI. ARREST
A warrantless arrest for violation of a municipal ordinance is valid
only if such violation is committed in the presence of the arresting officer
432. Robinson v. State, 266 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
433. 248 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
434. Hale v. State, 273 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
435. Payne v. State, 275 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
436. 267 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
437. 271 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
438. The applicable rule at the time the case was adjudicated was rule 3.190(g), (k).
This rule was subsequently amended by FLA. R. Cwm. P. 3.151(b) which provides that
only the defendant may move for consolidation of related offenses. Related offenses are those
triable in the same court and based on the same or connected acts or transactions. FLA. R.
Ca . P. 3.151(a).
439. 271 So. 2d at 151. Again, this requirement has been changed by FLA. R. Cam. P.
3.151(a), (b). See note 438 supra.
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and there is sufficient evidence to show that the arrest was made immedi-
ately or on fresh pursuit as required by Florida Statutes section 901.15 (1)
(1971). 440
A conviction for resisting arrest is dependent upon the state's proving
that the officer was making a lawful arrest.441 The legality of the arrest
and the justification for resisting arrest are determined by whether or
not the officer had substantial reason to believe that the defendant was
committing a misdemeanor.442
Where an officer observed the defendant in the commission of a
felony and filed for an arrest warrant with the state attorney, the arrest
was valid because it was based upon the mistaken belief that the warrant
was outstanding. 44
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Shadwick v. City of Tampa,444
upheld the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance which authorized
the city clerk to issue arrest warrants and, impliedly, to make a determi-
nation of probable cause. The decision that a determination of probable
cause need not be confined to strictly judicial officers was affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court,445 which required only that the issuer
be neutral, detached and capable of determining probable cause.446
XVII. EVIDENCE
A. Other Crimes
It is well settled in Florida that evidence of other crimes447 is admis-
sible if it casts light on the character of the act under investigation by
showing either motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme, iden-
tity or general pattern of criminality, such that it has a relevant or mate-
rial bearing on some essential aspect of the offense being tried.448 Evi-
dence relating to similar but separate crimes is admissible if relevant for
any purpose except that of showing bad character or propensity towards
criminal conduct.449 The application and interpretation of the relevancy
limitation have been the subject of numerous cases during the survey
period.
In Ashley v. State,4" 0 the Supreme Court of Florida reaffirmed the
principle that
440. City of Miami v. Crouch, 249 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
441. Rosenberg v. State, 264 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
442. Id.
443. Murphy v. State, 252 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). The court justified the arrest
under FLA. STAT. §§ 901.15(3), (4) (1973).
444. 250 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1971), aff'g 237 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
445. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
446. Id.
447. For a thorough analysis of the constitutional issues relating to this type of evidence,
see Bray, Evidence of Prior Uncharged Offenses and the Growth of Constitutional Restrictions,
28 U. MIAami L. Rav. 489 (1974).
448. William v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959).
449. Id.
450. 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972), citing Williams v. State, 117 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1960).
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the state, in introducing testimony concerning other crimes
committed by a defendant, may not make such crimes a feature
of the trial instead of an incident, so that the effect is to devolve
from development of facts pertinent to the main issue of guilt
or innocence into an attack on the character of the defendant.451
Thus, in Reyes v. State,0 2 a trial for possession and sale of drugs, ex-
tensive testimony as to the defendant's prior drug transactions was char-
acterized as a "side-show of unrelated past activities" and held inadmis-
sible. Similarly, proof of a prior robbery was termed "overkill" by the
state and was held to be reversible error.458 Testimony concerning prior
instances of breaking and entering were found not relevant in a prosecu-
tion for arson.454 The introduction of the testimony concerning the dis-
covery of burglary tools in the defendant's possession subsequent to the
events on which the information was based, prompted the court to note
that "the prosecution is not permitted to adduce every description of
evidence which according to their own notions may be supposed to
elucidate the matter in dispute. 455
In a prosecution for possession and sale of a narcotic drug, the intro-
duction of evidence concerning the defendant's subsequent criminal con-
duct warranted a reversal, despite the fact that the evidence of the
defendant's guilt was almost conclusive.4 6 In another case the testimony
of two witnesses who claimed that the defendant had subsequently per-
formed similar abortions on them was not relevant and was therefore
inadmissible to prove the prior abortion. 57
Evidence tending to place the defendant's automobile at the scene
of another crime on the same night as the robbery with which the defen-
dant was charged was held inadmissible as not showing a pattern, motive
or manner of operation.458 However, testimony concerning a robbery
committed by the defendant subsequent to the subject rape was relevant
where the automobile used in the robbery was proven to have belonged
to the rape victim's father.459
In a prosecution for incest, the admission of testimony concerning
two alleged incestual acts was held not to be reversible error.460 Similarly,
451. 265 So. 2d at 693.
452. 253 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
453. Davis v. State, 276 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
454. Machara v. State, 272 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
455. Simmons v. Wainwright, 271 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). The court fur-
ther characterized the introduction of such evidence as "one more example of overzealous
prosecutors submitting evidence of collateral acts ...that are not relevant to the issue
being tried." Id.
456. Denson v. State, 264 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1972).
457. Lucas v. State, 57 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). "A citizen accused of committing
a crime, no matter how heinous ... is entitled to be informed as to the nature of the charge
against him and afforded an opportunity to prepare his defense ... ." Id. at 263.
458. Walker v. State, 273 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
459. Brown v. State, 250 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing Gragnon v. State, 212 So.
2d 337 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
460. Clark v. State, 266 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). Judge Rawls, dissenting, stated
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in a rape prosecution, evidence of four prior rapes, where the defendant
had approached each victim in a manner identical to the subject case,
was held relevant and thus admissible.41' Testimony concerning a prior
assault by the defendant was deemed relevant where it tended to prove
a similarity between the crime the defendant was tried for and conduct
toward others at or about the same time and place.40 2 Evidence of four
prior murders was held to be relevant to the issues of the motive, intent,
identity, and modus operandi of the defendant.468 Additionally, evidence
dealing with certain events which transpired at a rape victim's home some
300 yards from the scene of a first-degree murder was sufficiently tied to
the subject murder to warrant admission. 464
Where a proper predicate is laid by a showing of some overt act by
the deceased at or about the time of the slaying that would reasonably
suggest the need for self-defense, evidence of prior specific acts of violence
by the deceased, known to the defendant at that time, are admissible for
the limited purpose of proving the reasonableness of the defendant's fear
of the deceased at the time of the slaying. 5
In Reams v. State,466 the Supreme Court of Florida, noting that evi-
dence relating to a similar crime is admissible in limited circumstances,
imposed the additional requirement that before such evidence may be
admitted there must be clear and convincing proof of a connection be-
tween the defendant and the collateral occurrences.
B. Character of the Accused
The state cannot introduce evidence attacking the character of the
accused unless the accused first puts his good character in issue.467 Thus,
the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed the state to
prove, over the defendants' objections, that the defendants were drug
that the evidence admitted was not relevant under the Williams test and that, in effect, the
defendant was tried for an incestuous relationship with his daughter which took place over
a period of 16 years. Accord, Nathy v. State, 275 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). Again, in
a dissenting opinion, Judge Rawls lamented that to admit a "tornado" of irrelevant and
immaterial evidence relating to the reconstruction of a depraved family life over a 20 year
period, "is to obliterate all concepts of due process granted by the Constitutions of the
United States and the State of Florida." Id. at 590.
461. Dean v. State, 277 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1973).
462. Booth v. State, 257 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
463. Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972).
464. Williams v. State, 249 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
465. Williams v. State, 252 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). The court detailed the evolu-
tion in Florida of judicial thought as to the admissibility of evidence of prior acts of violence
by the deceased when offered in support of a defense of self-defense citing Garner v. State,
28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891) (limiting such proof to evidence of the defendant's reputation
for violence in the community); Palm v. State, 135 Fla. 258, 184 So. 881 (1938) (first case
which permitted evidence of specific acts of violence by deceased known to the defendant at
the time of the slaying).
466. 279 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1973).
467. Mann v. State, 22 Fla. 600 (1886).
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addicts when that fact was not raised initially by the defendants.468
Similarly, in a murder prosecution, the state's line of questioning con-
cerning the defendant's alleged reputation for homosexual behavior was
improper. The defendant's failure to object, however, precluded a reversal
on that issue.469
C. Photographs, Tapes, Voiceprints and Fingerprints
During the period surveyed the Florida courts considered numerous
cases concerning the admissibility of voiceprints, tape recordings, photo-
graphs and fingerprints. In Worley v. State,470 a case of first impression,
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that voiceprints were
admissible to corroborate testimony identifying the defendant as the
person who had made false bomb threats by telephone. In holding that
voiceprints were competent evidence the court expressly refrained from
deciding whether voiceprint identification, standing alone, would be
sufficient to sustain the identification and conviction of the defendant.
471
Similarly, the admission of expert testimony concerning a spectrographic
voiceprint identification and the voiceprints upon which the opinions were
based was held to be proper.472 Thus, the introduction of tape recordings
of extortionary telephone conversations to a prosecution witness to cor-
roborate the witness's testimony was proper.4 71
The consent of one participant in a conversation to its interception
is a condition precedent to its admissibility, absent a duly authorized
warrant.474 The testimony of a police officer that he was given consent
to make the wiretap was not sufficient, where such hearsay was not cor-
roborated or authenticated by the competent in-court testimony of the
consenting party.475 Additionally, where the quality of a tape recording
is so defective and distorted as to render the conversation unintelligible,
it is reversible error to allow such a recording to be heard by the jury,
since the individual jurors might speculate upon the various portions of
the recording which can be understood.47
6
Gruesome and inflammatory photographs are admissible into evi-
468. Machara v. State, 272 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
469. Statewright v. State, 278 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
470. 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp.
641 (D.D.C. 1972); United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.MA. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967);
State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 192 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. 1971). The court interpreted these
cases and the available expert testimony and found that sufficiently impressive scientific data
had been amassed to verify the voiceprint's accuracy and reliability.
471. Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
472. Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
473. Id., citing Walker v. State, 222 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
474. Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1973), quashing 244 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1971).
475. Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1973).
476. Carter v. State, 254 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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dence if relevant to any issue which must be proved in a case. 77 In State
v. Wright,4'7 the supreme court held that the exceptional nature of the
proferred evidence is not to be considered in testing the relevancy thereof
but rather the determination of relevancy is to be made in the "normal
manner." Thus, photographs, even though clearly inflammatory and
prejudicial, are relevant and admissible to show decedent's position at
the time of death;47 9 to establish the cause of death and identity of the
deceased;480 to refute defendant's claim of self-defense;481 to prove that
force had been used against the victim during the attack; 4 2 to illustrate
or explain the testimony of a witness; 488 to support or refute the defense
of suicide; 4 4 or to reveal the nature and appearance of injuries. 485
However, in Beagles v. State,4 8 1 the court held that where the defen-
dant had admitted the victim's identity, her death and the fact that a
bullet had entered her brain and did not come out, it was error for the
trial court to allow into evidence more than 30 gruesome photographs of
the victim because there remained no pertinent issues to be resolved by
the use of such photographs. Additionally, the court noted that photo-
graphs should be received in evidence with great caution and those which
show nothing more than a gory or gruesome portrayal should not be
admitted. Further, gruesome photographs should not ordinarily be ad-
mitted if made after the body has been removed from the scene unless
they have some particular relevance.487
The admission into evidence of several police photographs from
which the defendant was identified prior to trial was not error where the
numbers thereon were obliterated, they were not referred to as "mug
shots" and they were introduced without objection. 488 In Loftin v. State ,1
the supreme court refused to grant an automatic reversal upon the mere
use of the words "mug shots" and chose instead to require a consideration
by the appellate court of the entire record and surrounding circumstances.
Thus, without defendant's objection, the prosecutor's reference to "mug
books" and "mug shots" in connection with the initial photo identifica-
477. State v. Wright, 265 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1972), quashing 250 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1971).
478. 265 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1972), citing Henninger v. State, 251 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1971).
The court rejected the District Court of Appeal, Second District's reasoning that, to be ad-
missible, such photographs must tend to resolve a conflict in evidence relating to a disputed
vital issue, not merely to prove a "technically relevant" issue.
479. Baker v. State, 251 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), citing Williams v. State, 228
So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1969).
480. Jones v. State, 257 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
481. Henninger v. State, 251 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1971).
482. Stevens v. State, 251 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
483. Pressley v. State, 261 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
484. Jones v. State, 257 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
485. Maness v. State, 262 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
486. 273 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
487. Id.
488. Greenwood v. State, 270 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
489. 273 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1973), af'g Loftin v. State, 258 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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tion of the defendant constituted harmless error where there was other
clear evidence of the defendant's identification, the prosecution stated
that the defendant's photograph was not among the "mug shots" and the
defendant expressly testified that he had never been convicted of a
crime. 490
Fingerprints alone are sufficient to clearly establish that an accused
committed a given crime if the circumstances are such that the print
could have been made only at the time the crime was committed. 9' Thus,
fingerprints are sufficient to sustain a conviction where the crime occurred
in a private house and no other plausible explanation existed for the
presence of the defendant's prints at the scene of the crime.0 2 However, in
Dargans v. State,493 the court declined to apply the well settled rule and
held that fingerprints found on a carton of beer were admissible notwith-
standing the defendant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove
that such prints could have been made only at the time of the commission
of the subject crime.
D. Circumstantial Evidence
A person charged with a crime may be convicted solely on the basis
of circumstantial evidence.494 However, the circumstances must be con-
sistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and must be of such a
conclusive nature and tendency that there can be no reasonable hypoth-
esis other than that the defendant is guilty. 95 Circumstantial evidence
is insufficient to sustain a conviction as a matter of law if it produced
nothing more than a suspicion of guilt.4 96 It is the actual exclusion of
every other reasonable hypothesis which clothes circumstances with the
force of proof.491
E. Identification of the Defendant
The propriety of the in-court identification of the defendant which
was preceded by a pretrial lineup or photo identification, has been the
subject of several cases during the survey period. Where the in-court
490. Loftin v. State, 273 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1973).
491. Wilkerson v. State, 232 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) ; Ivey v. State, 176 So. 2d
611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; Tirko v. State, 138 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
492. Roberts v. State, 268 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Anderson v. State,
241 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1970).
493. 259 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
494. Miller v. State, 270 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Navarro v. State, 262 So. 2d
729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
495. Camporeale v. State, 270 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973); accord, Weinstein v.
State, 269 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); Jacobs v. State, 268 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1972) ; Navarro v. State, 262 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972) ; Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d
253 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
496. Whitehead v. State, 273 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
497. Weinstein v. State, 269 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); Navarro v. State, 262 So.
2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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identification has a basis completely independent of the questioned line-up
or other identification confrontation, its admission is proper.""' Such
testimony will be set aside only if the identification procedure was so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification.4 99 Thus, in Chaney v. State,"°° the su-
preme court held that the identification of a defendent in a rape prose-
cution was not fatally tainted despite the fact that, prior to any arrests,
the victim was shown a single photograph of the defendant who had
admitted to her that he had been jailed for rape previously. The victim
had ample opportunity to see her assailant over a protracted period of
time and her in-court identification was clearly of independent origin.
The court further held that an accused is entitled to counsel only at a
post-indictment lineup.501
Similarly, it is not necessary that the defendant be represented by
counsel at a pre-information, out-of-court photographic identification to
have the evidence of identification properly admitted.0 2 Paschal v.
State,"' dealt with a prosecution for murder in the first degree in which
the witnesses clearly saw the faces of the gunmen at the time of the crime.
Prior to the inquest, they identified the gunmen from photographs. The
court held that the identification at the inquest, conducted without the
defendants being represented by counsel, did not prejudice the defen-
dants who argued that the witnesses' observations at the inquest bolstered
their subsequent identification at trial. The testimony of a police officer
concerning an extra-judicial photographic" °4 or lineup 05 identification
which the victim made of the defendant was not competent original or
substantive evidence to identify the accused, and was not properly ad-
mitted where there was no corroborative in-court identification by the
victim.50
F. Hearsay
An otherwise inadmissible hearsay declaration is not rendered ad-
missible merely because it is stated in the presence of the defendant.07
Such a statement is admissible under the hearsay exception of admission
by silence only under circumstances where it was so accusatory in char-
acter that the defendant's silence may be inferred to have been" an assent
498. Wilson v. State, 265 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972); Hearns v. State, 262 So. 2d
907 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) ; Daniels v. State, 262 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
499. See cases cited at note 498 supra.
500. 267 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972).
501. Id.
502. Staten v. State, 248 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
503. 251 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1971).
504. Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
505. Stevens v. State, 251 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
506. Id.
507. Daugherty v. State, 269 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing Johnson v. State,
249 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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to its truth.50 8 Thus, the testimony of a police officer as to the identifica-
tion of an accused made by an unknown second party was clearly inad-
missible to prove the truth of the assertion, notwithstanding the fact that
the defendant was present during the testimony. 09 Further, the admission
by silence exception has doubtful application to those situations where
the party is accused of a crime in the presence of the arresting officer. 10
The testimony of a police officer that a third party, who was not
allowed to testify, had told him that he saw the defendant's automobile
at the scene of another crime on the same night as the subject robbery
was inadmissible.5 ' Similarly, testimony grounded upon information from
two unidentified sources who were not present and unavailable for cross-
examination, was highly prejudicial to the defendant in that it deprived
him of his rights to confront those witnesses who were directly contra-
dicting his alibi defense. 12 Testimony sought to be elicited from the
arresting officer as to what time the complaining witness had told the
officer that the alleged crime took place was held inadmissible under the
hearsay rule.513
In Appell v. State,"" the court held that a statement must be spon-
taneous and made with little or no opportunity for reflection to be admis-
sible under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. The four main
factors to be evaluated in gauging the spontaneity of a res gestae state-
ment were listed by the court as: (1) the time gap between the statement
and the event, (2) the voluntary nature of the declaration, (3) the self-
serving nature of the statement, and (4) the declarant's physical and
mental condition at the time of the statement. 1 5
Under an exception to the hearsay rule, extra-judicial declarations
of one conspirator made outside the presence of the co-conspirator may
be admitted into evidence against the latter when the declarations were
made in furtherance of and during the existence of a conspiracy. 510 How-
ever, before the co-conspirator rule may be invoked, there must first be
independent evidence of the existence of a conspiracy and of the defen-
dant's participation therein.517 A determination as to whether or not a
prima facie case has been established as a predicate for the admission
of co-conspiratorial declarations is a question for the trial judge and
normally must be established before such statements are introduced,518
508. Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Walker v. State, 273 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
512. Webb v. State, 253 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
513. Jones v. State, 256 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
514. 250 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
515. Id.
516. Hudson v. State, 276 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
517. Id., citing Farnell v. State, 214 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968). Accord, Honchell v.
State, 257 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1971).
518. Hudson v. State, 276 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), citing Carbo v. United States,
314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
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but the trial judge in his discretion may permit the order of proofs to be
reversed. 19
If at the time a dying declaration implicating the defendant was
made, the circumstances were such that a jury might infer that the de-
clarant entertained no hope of recovery and felt that death was imminent,
such question was properly submitted to the jury.5 20
In Rollins v. State,,21 the court held that it was not an abuse of dis-
cretion to permit testimony by two state witnesses who had violated the
court's order for sequestration of witnesses, where the record disclosed
that after a voir dire examination the trial court determined that the
violation was unintentional and did not substantially affect the ability
of the witness to make an in-court identification.
Although a trial court has discretion to order the separation of wit-
nesses, such discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily. In County of
Dade v. Callahan, a refusal to invoke "the rule," absent any inquiry into
the identity of the witnesses or the nature of their prospective testimony,
constituted an abuse of discretion.2 2 Where the defendant failed to
object to the presence of two officers in the court room during the trial,
the argument that the trial judge "allowed" the rule on exclusion of wit-
nesses to be violated thereby depriving the defendant of due process, was
without merit.5 23 Additionally, the court reasoned that it is not error to
permit a witness who is a police officer to remain in the courtroom during
trial since such witnesses are "distinterested in the outcome of the
trial.' '524
While it is a well-established rule in Florida that a member of the
deceased victim's family may not testify for the purpose of identifying
the victim where non-related witnesses are available to make such identi-
fication, 525 the court in Scott v. State, 26 held that any error in so doing
was harmless, where the mother who identified the deceased also formed
an essential link in the chain of custody of additional critical evidence.
Similarly where the defendant failed to make a timely objection to the
testimony of the victim's father although non-related witnesses were
519. Honchell v. State, 257 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1971).
520. Mills v. State, 264 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing Johnson v. State, 113
Fla. 461, 152 So. 176 (1934), for the proposition that the apprehension of imminent death
need not be established by statements of the declarant, but may be proved by facts and cir-
cumstances from which the jury might conclude that the declarant must have known and
believed that he was on the threshold of death. In the subject case, the serious nature of
the wound, a slashed throat, and an enormous loss of blood warranted submission of the issue
to the jury.
521. 256 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
522. 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
523. Ratliff v. State, 256 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
524. Id., citing Spencer v. State, 113 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1961).
525. Abram v. State, 242 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 245 So. 2d 870
(Fla. 1971).
526. 256 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
available for that purpose, the violation of the well-established rule did
not constitute fundamental error.5 27
The supreme court, in Freimuth v. State, 28 held that courts may take
judicial notice of official records of administrative agencies without re-
quiring the introduction of an authenticated copy of the rule. Thus, the
trial court can take judicial notice of a Federal Register listing hallucino-
genic drugs.529 Further, a trial court may, in its own discretion, take judi-
cial cognizance of a municipal ordinance which the court is charged with
enforcing.580 Judicial cognizance of a domestic statute does not constitute
introduction of evidence by the defendant and thus does not abrogate
the defendant's procedural right to open and close.58'
During the survey period there were numerous decisions considering
miscellaneous evidentiary issues. Competent evidence as to value is
essential in a larceny prosecution and thus the jury cannot be permitted
to consider only the nature of the articles stolen.512 While the victim is
a competent witness as to value, the defendant is entitled to cross-
examine him regarding current value.58 Moreover, cost is not to be con-
sidered the equivalent of value.58 4 In Ashford v. State, 35 the supreme
court held that a cross-examination of the defendant based on an "FBI
report," which was secondary evidence of the information contained
therein, was not fundamental error and thus not a proper subject on
appeal where it was not raised before the trial court.5 3 It was error
for the trial court to refuse to permit the defendant to testify as to whether
he committed the crime for which he was charged, as it is basic to a de-
fendant's "right to be heard" to so testify.587 A pretrial order that wit-
nesses, who may be used by the state for purposes of identification, shall
be examined for visual acuity was improper and nothing in the common
law or the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes a trial court
to grant a motion compelling witnesses to submit to a physical examina-
tion of any sort.53s A comment on the defendant's silence contained
within a hypothetical question going to the issue of sanity was harmless
527. Barrett v. State, 266 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972); accord, Russell v. Wain-
wright, 266 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
528. 272 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1972), aff'g 249 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
529. Freimuth v. State, 272 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1972).
530. Holmes v. State, 273 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1972).
531. Wyatt v. State, 270 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing FLA. STAT. § 918.09
(1969). The court drew a distinction between evidence and proof, with judicial notice con-
stituting the latter.
532. Smart v. State, 274 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
533. Singleton v. State, 258 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
534. Id.
535. 274 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1973).
536. Id.
537. Moore v. State, 276 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
538. State v. Smith, 260 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1972), quashing 254 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1971).
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error where it was stricken from the record and the jury was properly
admonished.53 Testimony concerning a conversation in which the defen-
dant spoke of having refused to plead guilty because of his confidence
in his ability to convince the jury of his innocence was wholly immaterial
and irrelevant where its only purpose was to discredit the defendant's
anticipated testimony. 40 The testimony of an accomplice, even though
uncorroborated, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty.541
XVIII. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
The disclosure at trial of the identity of a confidential informant
who drove a police officer to a pool hall outside which defendant was
standing, was not required following a sale of drugs to that police officer
by the defendant. 42 The informant's participation was deemed minimal
and there was no evidence that he had done anything to pave the way for
the sale to the policeman. The court also distinguished this case from
those where the sale is made to a confidential informant rather than a
police officer.543 There was no error in refusing to provide the name of a
confidential informant where one defendant actually knew the name of
the confidential informant despite an allegation by the defendant's coun-
sel that the state had told him that he would be given the name of the
confidential informant at trial. 44
XIX. PLEA OF GUILTY
Since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Boykin
v. Alabama,545 holding that a plea of guilty must be made knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily, the courts in Florida have interpreted and
applied it under a broad range of circumstances. In Alexander v. Wain-
wright,546 the court held that the defendant's right to be thoroughly in-
terrogated by the trial judge as to the voluntariness of his plea is not
retroactive. Thus, there was no error when the trial court failed to in-
quire as to the defendant's understanding of the nature and consequence
of his guilty plea since it was a pre-Boykin case. 547 In Hall v. State,548
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, interpreted Boykin to
require only "an affirmative record showing that a guilty plea is entered
539. Zerega v. State, 260 So. 2d I (Fla. 1972).
540. Owens v. State, 273 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
541. Kellerman v. State, 261 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
542. Doe v. State, 262 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Harrington v. State, 110
So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
543. Monserrate v. State, 232 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
544. Rabreau v. State, 269 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
545. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
546. 262 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing Odle v. State, 241 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1970).
547. Alexander v. Wainwright, 262 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
548. 273 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). The court adopted the reasoning of People v.
Sepulvado, 27 Mich. App. 66, 183 N.W.2d 327 (1970).
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voluntarily, intelligently and understandingly" and rejected the necessity
of having the record demonstrate a specific enumeration and waiver of
federal constitutional rights in order for the plea to have been volun-
tarily made. A defendant need not be informed of his right to remain silent
nor of his right not to testify against himself as a condition precedent
to a voluntary guilty plea.549 A guilty plea is valid despite the finding
that the trial court did not advise the defendant of his right to remain
silent or his right to confrontation. 5 0 In Davis v. State,55 the court re-
jected the contention that Boykin requires the pronouncement of the
exact words to the defendant that he has the "opportunity to confront
his accusers if he went to trial and that he could not be compelled to
testify against himself." '552 In Kelly v. State,558 the District Court of
Appeal, First District, held that Boykin "does not require a step-by-step
recitation of each and every [one] of the defendant's rights" where the
defendant was represented by counsel and where the guilty plea was
the product of plea-bargaining negotiations between the defendant and
the state. Further, it is not a requirement in Florida that, prior to ac-
ceptance of a plea of guilty, the trial court must undertake an investiga-
tion as to the existence of a factual basis for the guilty plea; all that is
required is that the court determine that the plea is made voluntarily
with an understanding of the nature of the charge.554
If a plea of guilty is to be sustained as voluntary, it must be entered
by a defendant competent to understand the consequences and must not
be induced by fear, misapprehension, persuasion, promises, inadvertence
or ignorance.555 Thus the contention that the defendant was psychologi-
cally coerced by his attorney to enter a plea of guilty did not warrant
an order to vacate where the record demonstrated that the defendant
specifically denied that anyone had done anything by way of duress,
pressure, influence, force or any other method to cause him to plead
guilty, or that anyone had promised him anything.556 However, where
the trial court is notified immediately following pronouncement of a 10-
year sentence that the defendant had pleaded guilty after having been
advised by his counsel that he would receive a sentence of 3 years, the
trial judge should have set aside the finding of guilt as well as the sen-
tence and, ex mero motu, if necessary, set a hearing to determine the
voluntariness of the plea.557
549. Hill v. State, 256 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
550. Kelly v. State, 254 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
551. 277 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
552. Id. at 306.
553. 254 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), citing Wilson v. Wainwright, 248 So. 2d 249
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), and Johnson v. State, 248 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
554. Boyd v. State, 255 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
555. Stovall v. State, 252 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
556. Scarborough v. State, 278 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
557. Kirlis v. State, 262 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972), citing FLA. R. CaRM. P. § 3.170
(a), (f).
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The fact that the defendant was represented by competent counsel
at the time he entered his guilty plea was a factor which strongly mili-
tated against a conclusion that the plea was involuntary. 58 However,
the bare allegation that defendant was without counsel at the time he
pleaded guilty was insufficient to warrant vacating the judgment and
sentence.559 Nor does the mere fact that multiple defendants were repre-
sented by a single attorney necessarily warrant a finding of reversible
error based on a claim that defendants were denied effective assistance of
counsel where the defendants pleaded guilty. 60 Where the defendant was
informed by the court and advised by counsel as to the effect and con-
sequences of his guilty plea, the plea was voluntarily made. 6'
In State v. Pinto,16 2 the court noted that a defendant often pleads
guilty after consultation and advice from his attorney and held that such
decision was a tactical one which may not be whimsically revoked at a
later time. A plea of guilty that is otherwise entered knowingly and volun-
tarily is not vitiated when entered for the expressly stated reason that
the defendant had no witnesses and did not believe that he could "beat
the charge."1 63 The court in Scarborough v. State held that "even where
a defendant pleads guilty to avoid a death sentence and upon entering
his plea testifies that he is innocent, such a plea is not involuntary where,
upon the advice of counsel, he was pleading guilty to limit the penalty
that he might receive. 50 4
The mere fact that a defendant had a prior history of mental illness
did not serve to invalidate a guilty plea where the record affirmatively
demonstrated that the trial court accepted the plea following a detailed
inquiry sufficient to support a finding that it was entered voluntarily and
that there was nothing which would raise a doubt as to the defendant's
sanity.5 65 The fact that the state obtained the defendant's confidential
psychiatric report in contravention of a protective order, did not con-
stitute sufficient influence to nullify a plea, absent evidence that such
information was used by the state in an attempt to encourage the defen-
dant to enter a plea of guilty.566 The contention that the promises of
psychiatric care were used as an inducement to obtain a plea was without
merit where there was no showing that the defendant relied upon the
promise or that it in any way influenced his decision.56 7
558. Williams v. State, 259 So. 2d 753 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1972).
559. McCIendon v. State, 260 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
560. Williams v. State, 268 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
561. Johnson v. State, 248 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
562. 273 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), citing Belsky v. State, 231 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1970).
563. Carter v. State, 253 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
564. 278 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973), citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25 (1970).
565. Betts v. State, 255 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
566. Surrette v. State, 251 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
567. Id. at 152-53.
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Where the files and records did not conclusively establish that a
plea was voluntarily made free from any threat, intimidation, coercion,
promise or inducement of any kind, and that the defendant was advised
that he was waiving certain constitutional rights, the defendant was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a motion to vacate sentence.568
Absent any indication in the record that a plea was entered voluntarily,
an evidentiary hearing is required notwithstanding the fact that the
defendant was represented by a public defender. 69 The mere fact that
a defendant who entered a plea of guilty was represented by counsel of
his own choosing does not negate the need for an evidentiary hearing
on a motion to vacate and set aside judgment and sentence where the
defendant alleged that he was coerced into confessing by the arresting
officers, that no one explained to him the penalty for five counts of rob-
bery, that he did not know that he was entitled to a trial and that he
was both questioned by the police for hours and identified in a lineup
without the aid of an attorney.57° Where the record is devoid of any
inquiry by the trial judge into the voluntary nature of the defendant's
plea, the judgment will be vacated and the trial judge must either in-
quire into the voluntariness of the plea or allow the defendant to with-
draw it.57
During the survey period several cases dealt with the problem of
unfulfilled promises, pursuant to which pleas of guilt were entered. In
Santobello v. New York,5 72 the United States Supreme Court held that
when a guilty plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agree-
ment of the prosecutor, such promise must be fulfilled to the extent that
it constitutes part of the inducement. Thus, where the prosecutor inad-
vertently breached an agreement that he would refrain from making a
sentence recommendation, the Supreme Court remanded the case for fur-
ther consideration and left the ultimate disposition thereof to the discre-
tion of the state court. Such discretion was to be exercised in accordance
with the options outlined by the Supreme Court to either grant specific
performance of the agreement on the plea or afford the defendant the
opportunity to withdraw the plea.573
In Dade County v. Baker, 74 the Supreme Court of Florida held
that where cumulative sentences of imprisonment in the county jail were
bargained for so that the defendant could benefit from a drug rehabilita-
tion program offered by the county, the defendant would be given the
opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea as a result of the court's finding
568. Clark v. State, 256 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
569. Williamson v. State, 273 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
570. Gayle v. State, 265 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
571. Cheever v. State, 272 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
572. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). The Court concluded that the interests of justice and appro-
priate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotia-
tions of pleas of guilty could be best served by remanding the case.
573. Id.
574. 265 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1972).
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that felonies could not cumulatively exceed one year in the county jail.
However, the fact that during plea negotiations the trial court indicated
that it would consider a shorter sentence does not preclude that court
from imposing a harsher sentence following a full jury trial where the
court becomes better informed of the circumstances of the particular
crimes involved.575 Nor was the trial court's informal statement in open
court, during plea negotiations, that it would not be thinking in terms of
less than a 50-year sentence, binding on the court. 76 In Taylor v. State,577
the defendant was entitled to reversal and remand with directions that he
be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty where the sentencing judge over-
looked a condition of his plea bargain that he be allowed to withdraw
his plea if he should be found not to be a proper candidate for probation.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Barker v. State,7 8
rejected the employment of specific performance5 79 to enforce plea bar-
gains on the ground that to do so would bind the trial judge in his final
disposition of the case. However, the court did indicate that the status
of a specifically enforceable contract might be recognized upon a clear
showing of irrevocable prejudice to either the prosecution or defense.5"'
Additionally, where the trial court concurs in a plea bargain or enters
into plea negotiations which contemplate sentence or charge concessions
if defendant enters a guilty plea, and if the judge later decides that the
final disposition of the case shall not include such concessions, he has an
affirmative duty to so advise the defendant before sentencing and to pro-
vide the defendant with the opportunity to either affirm or withdraw his
plea as entered.581
While an agreement by the state to recommend probation does not
bind the trial court to accept such recommendation, the state is bound
either to make the recommendation as promised or to advise the defen-
dant prior to the withdrawal of the plea of not guilty of its intention
not to uphold the bargain.8 2 The state's failure to maintain its part of
the bargain renders the plea involuntary and the trial court must vacate
the judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea. 585 Where
a plea of guilty is predicated on a promise by the state not to prosecute
other pending charges arising from the same criminal transaction, and
the state, notwithstanding the promise to the contrary, files an information
575. Gause v. State, 270 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
576. Blackman v. State, 265 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
577. 275 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
578. 259 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
579. Id. at 204.
580. Absent such extraordinary circumstances, under rule 3.170(f), and Brown v. State,
245 So. 2d 41, 44 (Fla. 1971), if a trial judge decides that the final disposition of the case
should not include the concession of leniency contemplated by the negotiated plea bargain,
he should be most liberal in permitting a withdrawal of the guilty plea.
581. Enos v. State, 272 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
582. Crossin v. State, 262 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Ward v. State, 156
Fla. 185, 22 So. 2d 887 (1945).
583. Crossin v. State, 262 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
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based on the pending charges, that information may properly be dis-
missed.8 4
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Costello v. State,s85 after noting
that guilty pleas are voided when judges or prosecutors promise defen-
dants that they will be given lesser sentences than they actually re-
ceive,5 88 held that
[w]e do not believe the result should be different when a defen-
dant has a reasonable basis for relying upon his attorney's mis-
taken advice that the judge will be lenient. The effect upon the
defendant is the same; in each case he exchanges his constitu-
tional right to a jury trial for a promise of leniency.8 7
The court qualified its holding by noting that it is not enough for a
defendant to argue that he was under an impression that a promise
had been made; a reasonable basis for such an impression must be shown.
Thus, allegations by a defendant that he had entered guilty pleas in
reliance on his attorney's statement that the most the defendant would
receive was five years in prison, did not warrant vacation of the plea
where such contention was not supported by the record.5 88 In State v.
Pinto,"" the defendant's motion to vacate judgment and sentence on the
ground that he had entered a plea on the basis of promises made by
defense counsel after plea negotiations was not sufficient in the absence
of an allegation or showing that, at the time the guilty plea was made,
the trial judge was aware of the bargain or had been a party thereto.
The withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a matter properly addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial court.5 90 A defendant should be allowed
to withdraw a plea given inadvisedly when application is duly made in
good faith and sustained by proofs and a proper offer is made to go to
trial on a plea of not guilty. 91 In Facion v. State,592 the court held that
the exercise of discretion should be based upon considerations and facts
bearing only upon the merits of the motion to change the plea. The
accused's guilt or innocence, or the probable cause to believe he was
guilty were not proper subjects for consideration by the trial judge on
the motion to withdraw the plea. Additionally, the court held that per-
mission to withdraw "may not be refused where it is in the least evident
that the ends of justice will be subserved by allowing a plea of not guilty
584. State v. Drake, 276 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). Although the court avoided
characterizing it as such, the result approaches specific performance.
585. 260 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1972).
586. Id. at 201.
587. Id.
588. Robinson v. State, 270 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
589. 273 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
590. Stovall v. State, 252 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See FLA. R. Cum. P. 3.170(f).
591. Stovall v. State, 252 So. 2d 376, 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
592. 258 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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to be entered in place of a guilty plea."593 However, where the defendant
failed to make a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court
did not err in failing to allow him to do so.5 94 When a plea has been with-
drawn with the approval of the court, it is as if a plea had never been
entered. 95
An uncoerced guilty plea cures all non-jurisdictional defects preced-
ing the acceptance of such plea.596 The effect of a guilty plea is to waive
trial on the merits and preclude attack on the validity of any search and
seizure of evidence or the admissibility thereof, 97 by way of post-convic-
tion motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence. Similarly,
a defendant who entered a plea of guilty had no standing to urge that
the speedy trial rule should operate to discharge him. 9 The failure of
the information to state the specific amount of marijuana allegedly pos-
sessed constituted a jurisdictional defect which could not be cured by
consent or be waived in a guilty plea."" Similarly in Catanese v. State, 00
the court held that where the information wholly fails to charge the
defendant with a crime, it is fundamental error and a conviction founded
thereon is void and must be set aside even though the defendant entered
a plea of guilty to such charge.
Despite their acknowledgement of the general rule that voluntary
guilty pleas cure all non-jurisdictional defects, the court in State v.
Pitts,00 held that a guilty plea does not cure the defect of a state's sup-
pression or concealment of evidence favorable to the accused, 602 and that
matters going to the credibility of a state's witness are cognizable in a
post-conviction proceeding notwithstanding a guilty plea.
It is not necessary for a defendant to make a motion to withdraw
his plea as a condition precedent to an appeal based on an allegation
that the plea was involuntary.60 3
XX. NOLO CONTENDERE
A plea of nolo contendere has the same effect as a plea of guilty
such that one who is sentenced to imprisonment upon such a plea is
prosecuted and convicted under the same information. 604 A nolo plea
593. Id. at 30.
594. Schaefer v. State, 264 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
595. Bell v. State, 262 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
596. Williams v. State, 259 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); Morris v. State, 255 So. 2d
704 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
597. Whitlow v. State, 256 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
598. White v. State, 273 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
599. Pope v. State, 268 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
600. 251 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
601. 249 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
602. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
603. Enos v. State, 272 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969).
604. Chesebrough v. State, 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971).
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may be conditioned upon the reservation of a question of law; , if it is
not so conditioned, the defendant may not question the validity of a
judge's denial of a motion to suppress.60 6 However, where the record
showed that the defendant's nolo contendere plea was entered solely
in light of the court's denial of a motion to suppress, defendant could
appeal the denial of his motion despite the nolo plea.607
Where the state had promised to make a recommendation to the
court in return for a plea of nolo contendere, failure to make that recom-
mendation following such a plea is error because the state may not gain
an advantage in this way.608 The court recommended that if the state
decides against making its recommendation, it should advise the defen-
dant prior to the entry or charge of the plea.609
The Supreme Court of Florida later held that once the state attor-
ney's office has agreed to accept a plea of a lesser included offense, and
the plea has been made by the defendant, the state is estopped from
claiming that its representative had erred in making the offer unless the
defendant or his counsel caused the error.6 10
Whether a plea of nolo contendere was voluntary should be deter-
mined to see if withdrawal of such a plea should be allowed where a
defendant alleged that his plea was made upon advice of counsel that
he would get a three-year jail sentence in return.611
A plea of nolo contendere must be made knowingly and understand-
ingly without threat, intimidation, promise or inducement of any kind.612
Although a per curiam decision without opinion did not permit withdrawal
of a nolo plea,619 the dissent argued that the case's facts, including the
exchange between counsel and the court, clearly warranted permission
to withdraw the plea in view of earlier cases on point. '
XXI. SELF-INCRIMINATION
The United States Supreme Court 15 upheld a California statute
which required a driver who was involved in an accident to stop im-
mediately at the scene and to give the driver of the other vehicle his
name and address as not violative of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Evidence of a defendant's physical condition in a
605. State v. Ashbey, 245 So. 2d. 225 (Fla. 1971).
606. Chesebrough v. State, 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971).
607. Ackles v. State, 270 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
608. Crossin v. State, 262 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
609. Id.
610. State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baker, 276 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1973).
611. Kirlis v. State, 262 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
612. Hall v. State, 273 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). See also Cheever v. State, 272
So. 2d 875 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
613. McCarroll v. State, 264 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
614. Id. at 428, cidting Banks v. State, 136 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Ist. Dist. 1962); Costello v.
State, 260 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1972) ; Brown v. State, 234 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
615. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
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drunk driving case also does not violate the constitutional provisions
which protect a defendant against self-incrimination. 610
The reasonable seizure of a handwritten note which stated that the
defendant had killed the victim was inadmissible since such evidence,
which is "testimonial" or "communicative" in nature, would compel the
defendant to become a witness against himself in violation of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination.61 7
The exercise of one's privilege against self-incrimination by remain-
ing silent during interrogation 618 prohibits the prosecution from intro-
ducing that fact in evidence. 19
The District Court of Appeal, First District, restated that under
Florida law, a defendant who raises the defense of insanity in a criminal
case, and requests and is granted an examination, must cooperate with
court-appointed experts to the fullest . 20 However, the court went on to
state that the psychiatrist used by the court may be questioned only as
to his conclusion regarding the defendant's sanity, and any questions by
the state regarding incriminating statements made by the defendant dur-
ing his examination would violate his right against self-incrimination.
6 21
XXII. JURY TRIAL
A. Right to Trial by Jury
Having already decided that a six-man jury in non-capital cases
did not violate the sixth or fourteenth amendments, 22 the United States
Supreme Court continued to expand upon what procedures were allow-
able in meeting this constitutional right to trial by jury. In the companion
cases of Apodaca v. OregonO2 and Johnson v. Louisiana,24 the Court held
that state convictions for felonies by less than unanimous juries were
violative neither of the constitutional right to trial by jury nor of due
process under the fourteenth amendment. Although Florida has imple-
mented trial by a six-man jury, it retains the common law requirement
of a unanimous verdict in all cases.
A valid waiver of jury trial was found in Quartz v. State625 where the
defendant had signed an information providing for waiver of trial by jury
and where counsel for the defendant had made an oral waiver. Citing two
616. County of Dade v. Callahan, 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
617. State v. Kircdeis, 269 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Maryland Pen. v.
Hagden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
618. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
619. Brenisir v. State, 267 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
620. McMunn v. State, 264 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing Parkin v. State, 222
So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) and Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970).
621. McMunn v. State, 264 So. 2d 868, 870 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
622. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
623. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
624. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
625. 258 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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federal cases, the court found that although interrogation of the defendant
is a better practice, a waiver may meet the requirement of voluntariness
if the defendant knowingly signs a written document. 2 In a later case,
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that even absent a
waiver in an information signed by the defendant, a method of waiver
prescribed by Florida Statutes section 912.01 (1971), it was enough that
the record reflected that the defendant did in fact otherwise waive jury
trial. 27
The Florida statutes 28 providing for the transfer of cases from
municipal to state courts in order to obtain trial by jury were the subject
of a number of cases during the survey period. Such a transfer is not
permitted when the municipal court provides for jury trial. 29 The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, disallowed a motion for transfer
of a "speeding" case from municipal to state court under Florida Statutes
section 932.61 (1973), where there was no clear evidence showing that
the municipal violation was also a violation of state law.630
The requirement in Florida Statutes section 932.61(4) (1973), that,
upon a judge's order that a case be transferred to a state court, all record
materials must be sent to that court within three days, must be strictly
adhered to. Failure to follow this provision resulted in proper dismissal
of the case in State v. Cook.681 However, a dismissal for failure to follow
these statutory sections does not prevent refiling of an independent infor-
mation by the proper authorities, as jeopardy has not yet attached.632
The District Court of Appeal, First District, found no right to trial
by jury in a contempt of court conviction, and rule 3.840(a) (4), pro-
viding that all issues of law and fact be heard and determined by the
judge, was held valid under the state and federal constitutional provisions
for jury trial."8
Where it was apparent at a hearing for a new trial that the sole
material prosecution witness swore to two conflicting stories as to the
guilt of the defendant, one at trial and one thereafter, it was error for
626. See Baker v. State, 269 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Quartz v. State, 258
So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). In Baker, the court held that full concurrence with counsel
as to waiver at arraignment amounted to a knowing waiver.
627. Parks v. State, 263 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Ivory v. State, 184 So.
2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
628. FLA. STAT. §§ 932.61-.66 (1973).
629. Nesler v. Hampton, 260 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1972).
630. Mitchell v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 254 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). This
decision appears to be unfair in that the defendant is forced to predict the facts to be
alleged by the prosecution.
631. 254 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), aff'd, 264 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1972).
632. State v. Ressler, 257 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
633. Aaron v. State, 261 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg,
384 U.S. 373 (1966) (six month criminal contempt conviction is "petty" and thus no jury
necessary), and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (adhering to the rule that contempt
is "petty" if the sentence is six months or less). See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
(1970).
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the trial judge to determine at which time the witness was telling the
truth, for to do so pre-empted the function of the jury.6 4
A longer sentence may never be invoked simply because a defendant
asks for a trial by jury. However, where a defendant was sentenced to
35 years for robbery following a jury trial, it was not subject to review
despite the fact that defendant's cohort was only sentenced to five years
following a plea bargain, since the sentence was within the statutory
limits.6 5
B. Jurors
In State v. Silva,66 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the
propriety of jury selection using a quota system, and the requirement
that jurors be over the age of 21 and that they be of specified character,
e.g., law abiding, of good character and sound judgment. A system in
which the names of white persons and black persons were placed on jury
lists in proportion to the population of their respective classes in the
community was found violative of due process and equal protection as
such selection limits the number of qualified jurors in each class.6 37 It is
required that selection be made at random. The court suggested that the
county use its election data process equipment for that purpose.
Turning to the question of whether a Florida statute"" requiring
jurors to be above the age of 21 was in derogation of the twenty-sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court of
Florida"'9 concluded that the twenty-sixth amendment only provided
18-year-old's with the right to vote, but did not include a provision for
jury service at that age. Consequently, the states have the power to set
an age requirement for service as a juror. Also, a statutory provision of
random selection providing for the listing of only those persons which
the selecting officers believe to be law abiding citizens and of good char-
acter, was found constitutional and within the power of the selecting
body. It should also be noted that an objection to the panel of jurors must
be made prior to trial in order for the appellate court to grant relief to
one assigning this as error. 40 Relying on Silva, the Supreme Court of
Florida held that the mere showing of a certain percentage of eligible
black jurors is insufficient to prove that a particular panel was improperly
selected, although it may be considered in such a determination. 41 In
Peters v. Kiff,6 2 the United States Supreme Court held that proof of
634. Sols v. State, 262 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
635. Weathington v. State, 262 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
636. 259 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1972).
637. Id.
638. FLA. STAT. J 40.01(1) (1973).
639. State v. Silva, 259 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1972).
640. Foxworth v. State, 267 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1972) (defendant's failure to object to
panel prior to examination of Individual jurors was found to constitute waiver).
641. Id.
642. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
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systematic exclusion of blacks from a grand jury or petit jury was prop-
erly challenged by a convicted white even if he could not show that he
was himself harmed by such exclusion.
With the apparent elimination of the death penalty by the United
States Supreme Court,648 any questions revolving around the exclusion
of jurors with opinions against capital punishment have presumably
ended. " Nevertheless, prior to that decision, it was held that several
jurors were properly excluded when they were found incapable of render-
ing a verdict which would result in a sentence of capital punishment." 5
In a similar case, excusal of jurors because they either could not reach
an impartial decision on defendant's guilt or would never vote to impose
the death penalty was also held proper."'O
It was improper for a defendant to contest the propriety of a jury
venire through rule 3.850 when the issue was properly raised at the trial
level, and was a proper subject for direct appeal.147
The voir dire process cannot cure the effect a publication of a con-
fession in the news media has on the jury, and a change of venue should
be granted in such a case.648 No change of venue is required, however,
where a jury may have formed some impression or opinion as to the
case's merits through factual news items," 9 or where newspaper reports
of other criminal charges against the defendant had been made, and
prospective jurors may have heard of these charges, since such knowl-
edge alone would not disqualify a juror absent a showing of prejudice.650
XXIII. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES6 5 1
In State ex rel. Shelton v. Sepe,6 52 the court stated that it was "ill
advised" for a judge to make a public pronouncement concerning his
attitude toward sentencing offenders for specific crimes; nevertheless,
since the announcement of a policy of confinement for a conviction of
certain offenses pertained to matters after conviction, and was permitted
by statute, there was no reasonable basis for defendant's fear that he
would not get a fair trial. The Court also held that the judge could not
643. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
644. Subsequent to the survey period and in view of the Supreme Court's unwillingness
to completely forbid capital punishment in Furman, the Florida Legislature enacted a new
statute allowing capital punishment In certain cases. FRA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1973). Thus,
the problem alluded to in the text may be a reality in the future.
645. Paramore v. State, 251 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
646. Portee v. State, 253 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1971). This case presents an interesting
examination of the case law on this subject.
647. Yanks v. State, 273 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
648. Oliver v. State, 250 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1971), quashing 239 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Ist Dist.
1970), Colbert v. State, 239 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
649. Gavin v. State, 259 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
650. Murphy v. State, 252 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
651. See generally FLA. R. CRm. P. 3.230.
652. 254 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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be disqualified because he was employed as an assistant state attorney
at the time the defendant was bound over for trial, if he had no dealings
with the prosecution of the case.
Where the defendant failed to follow the proper procedure for ob-
taining disqualification of a judge,""a it was within the discretion of the
judge to determine whether he should disqualify himself. 54
XXIV. SPEEDY TRIAL 655
During the survey period, there was a great deal of litigation con-
cerning rule 3.191 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure as promul-
gated by the supreme court.56 In Turner v. State ex rel. Pellerin,5 7 the
Supreme Court of Florida outlined the two basic requirements which must
be met by one seeking to perfect his rights under the speedy trial rule.
The demand for a speedy trial must be made subsequent to the date of
the filing of an indictment, information or trial affidavit against the de-
fendant, and the defendant must be prepared for trial at the time he
makes his demand.
In United States v. Marion,"'5 the United States Supreme Court held
that, on the federal level, the sixth amendment guarantee of a speedy
trial is applicable only after a person has been accused of a crime, in
other words, upon initiation of a criminal prosecution. The function of
protecting the defendant from the possibility of prejudicial pre-accusation
delays, is performed by the applicable statutes of limitation.
In State ex rel. Hanks v. Goodman,59 the Supreme Court of Florida
held that the 60-day period does not begin to run until a demand for
speedy trial has been filed pursuant to the rule, and that such a demand
cannot become effective unless it is filed after the defendant has been
charged with a crime by indictment,"6 information"'1 or trial affidavit.
653. FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (1973); FLA. R. CPmm. P. 3.230.
654. In re A.S. v. State, 275 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
655. The authors have dispensed with cases construing the "three terms of court" speedy
trial rule of Florida Statutes sections 915.01 and 915.02 (Supp. 1970), which have been
superseded by the promulgation by the supreme court of rule 3.191 of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure. However, those cases which are analogous to and which might be
helpful in interpreting the provisions of the new rule will be discussed.
656. In State ex tel. Maines v. Baker, 254 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1971), the supreme court
upheld rule 3.191 as a proper exercise of the court's constitutional power to promulgate rules
of practice and procedure. See In re Fla. R. Crim. P., 245 So. 2d 33, amended, 251 So. 2d
537 (Fla. 1971).
657. 272 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1973), citing Hanks v. Goodman, 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971).
658. 404 U.S. 307 (1971). The court held that the amendment would not "require the
Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of
time." Id. at 313.
659. 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971). Accord, State ex tel. Young v. Willis, 257 So. 2d 64
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). However, Justice Rawls, dissenting, maintained that rule 3.191 as con-
strued in Hanks is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection because a person not under
indictment or information should be entitled to as great protection as a person just arrested
and either jailed or released on bond.
660. See State v. Gravlee, 276 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1973), rev'g 272 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Ist
Dist.). Accord, State ex tel. Dennis v. Morphonios, 252 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
661. See State ex tel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971); State ex tel. Hanks
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A demand by the defendant on charges of contempt of court was held
ineffective where it predated the rule to show cause."62
The supreme court also elaborated on the second general require-
ment for activation of the 60-day demand rule in Goodman,", and held
that a defendant cannot control the criminal docket merely by filing
spurious demands for a speedy trial although he is unprepared. Further,
the court warned that before dismissing a defendant at the expiration of
the 60-day period, the trial judge must ascertain whether or not the
accused had a bona fide desire to obtain a speedy trial and determine
whether or not the accused or his attorney has diligently investigated his
case and is prepared for trial.'" If these prerequisites are not met, the
court may strike the demand. Thus, where the defendant had filed two
motions to advance the cause, it was not error when the trial court set
the trial for two days after the arraignment and within four to six weeks
after the filing of the information. 65
Where the defendant continued discovery proceedings after filing
his demand and defense counsel was not ready to proceed when the case
was called on at least one occasion, denial of discharge was proper.6 '
Similarly, a motion to dismiss alleging that the information under which
the defendant was charged was so vague that he could not prepare an
adequate defense, filed subsequent to the filing of his demand for a
speedy trial, operated as an admission that he was not prepared for trial
and that his demand was spurious.66 7 A defendant who timely filed a
demand for a speedy trial was entitled to a trial within 60 days notwith-
standing the fact that his case was transferred to a lower court where the
new charge, a misdemeanor, was grounded upon the same conduct as
the charge originally pending.66 8
Rule 3.191 requires trial within 60 days of the filing of a written
demand by an accused charged with a crime, by indictment, information
or trial affidavit. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the filing of a
trial affidavit is applicable only in cases involving misdemeanors because
in such cases the trial affidavit is a sufficient basis for prosecution. 669
v. Goodman, 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971); State ex rel. Novak v. Sepe, 253 So. 2d 455 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1971).
662. Brinson v. State, 269 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
663. 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971).
664. Id.
665. Bradley v. State, 265 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). The court filed the following
caveat: "The defendant's counsel should not have asked for a speedy trial if he was not
ready to go to trial."
666. Savinon v. State, 277 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
667. State ex rel. Ranalli v. Johnson, 277 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1973).
668. State ex rel. Jenkins v. Maginnis, 254 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
669. Pitofsky v. State, 276 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1973), aff'g 267 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1972). The court noted that the Florida Constitution provides that no person shall be tried
for a non-capital felony without a presentment, indictment or information and, therefore,
since a trial affidavit is not a sufficient document upon which to try the accused for a felony,
the filing of a demand following the filing of a trial affidavit, but prior to the filing of an
information, is ineffective to invoke the demand clause of the speedy trial rule. FLA. CoNsT.
art. I, § 15(a).
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The supreme court, in McCauley v. State ex rel. Fouraker,670 held
that a demand for speedy trial which averred that the defendant was
available and prepared for trial was insufficient compliance with the rule
to warrant the discharge of the defendant, although the demand was
dictated into the record, in open court and in the presence of the state
attorney. The court held that the rule contemplates that a demand for
speedy trial be in writing, filed with the court having jurisdiction, and
served upon the prosecuting attorney.671 Where the defendant included
a request for a speedy trial within a written instrument entitled "notice
of intention to plead not guilty," such request did not constitute a proper
demand within the meaning, spirit and intention of rule 3.191.672
Absent a demand for speedy trial, a defendant is entitled to dis-
charge if not tried within 180 days after being taken into custody for
the crime charged. 73 Given the fact that proceedings in juvenile courts
are not criminal but civil in nature,67 4 the time spent in a juvenile deten-
tion home cannot be counted in computing the 180-day period.675
Where the first information filed against the defendant was "nolle
prossed" by the state, and a second, identical information was filed, the
failure of the state to bring the defendants to trial within 180 days of
their incarceration warranted discharge. 76 Subsequently, the state filed
a third information charging separate acts taking place within the time
span of the dismissed conspiracy charge but differing in times from the
specific acts alleged in the two previous informations. The court held
that, pursuant to rule 3.191(h) (2), which expressly prohibits avoidance
of the rule by prosecuting new or different charges based on the same
conduct or criminal episode, the later prosecution was precluded.O7 Simi-
larly, when separate informations, one charging bribery and the other
conspiracy, are based upon the same conduct or criminal episode, they
cannot be successfully manipulated by the state to extend the time within
which a prosecution can be maintained, despite the fact that the infor-
mations were filed in different counties.078 Nor can the state enlarge the
180-day period for bringing a defendant to trial by deliberately delaying
formal service of the warrant when the defendant is already in custody
670. 273 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1973), quashing 258 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
671. McCauley v. State ex rel. Fouraker, 273 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1973).
672. Harris v. Tyson, 267 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). The court, while noting that
the speedy trial rule specifically delineates neither the particular form of demand required
nor any particular wording therefore, apparently felt that when a "demand Is submerged
within an Instrument unrelated to speedy trial," the state was not capable of noticing the
"disguised" demand. rd. at 393.
673. State v. Bryant, 276 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973), citing FLA. R. Cari. P.
3.191 (a) (1).
674. State v. R.E.F., 251 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
675. State v. Bryant, 276 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
676. State v. Boren, 273 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
677. Id.
678. Bryant v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 267 So. 2d 82 (Fla.
1972).
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and known by the state to be so."79 A defendant was first charged with
a misdemeanor (driving while intoxicated) after he struck a pedestrian
and later charged with manslaughter after the pedestrian died, but the
180-day period was not triggered until the defendant surrendered himself
in response to the information on the felony manslaughter count. 80
The Supreme Court of Florida, in State ex rel. Maines v. Baker,81
dealt with the issue of when a person shall be deemed to have been
"brought to trial" within the meaning of rule 3.191. The court held that
a jury trial is commenced when the panel is sworn for voir dire examina-
tion, prior to the time that any questions are asked on voir dire. A trial
before a judge alone begins upon waiver of jury trial when counsel for
the defense and the prosecution appear before the judge to present their
cases.
In exceptional circumstances, rule 3.191 (f), allows the court, on its
own motion or the motion of either party to extend the time for trial
beyond that established by the rule. Although the rule defines certain
circumstances which will justify an extension, 82 there has been much
litigation concerning the propriety of such delays. The fact that the
grand jury did not convene until shortly before the expiration of the
180-day period following the defendant's arrest for a capital offense did
not constitute an exceptional circumstance within the provision for an
extension of time.8 ' The desire of the state to gain a strategic advantage
by delaying the defendant's trial until after that of his co-defendant, is
not an exceptional circumstance justifying an extension of time. 84 A
delay in the proceedings was justified, however, when a crucial witness
for the state fled after defendant's relatives purportedly made threats on
his life. 85 The unavailability of an essential witness who was still hos-
pitalized with the wounds received as a result of the offense charged in
the information, was an exceptional circumstance warranting an exten-
sion. 86 A continuance based on the fact that another case was already
679. State v. Sutton, 269 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
680. State ex rel. Lee v. Rose, 277 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
681. 254 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1971).
682. Rule 3.191(f) lists several exceptional circumstances such as: (1) unexpected ill-
nesses; (2) a showing by the state that specific evidence or testimony is not available, but will
become so later; (3) a showing by the state that the accused has caused major delay or
disruption of the preparation of proceedings; (4) a showing by the state of developments
which could not have been anticipated and which will materially affect the trial; (5) a
showing that a delay is necessary to accommodate a codefendant where the cases are not
severable; and (6) a showing by the state that the case is so unusual or complex that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the time periods established by this rule.
683. Allen v. State, 275 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1973).
684. State ex rel. Harris v. Wehle, 260 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
68S. State ex rel. Fort v. Driver, 270 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). The delay was
justified under exceptional circumstances pursuant to rule 3.191(f)(iii).
686. State v. Wolfe, 271 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). Consistent with the rule, after
justifiably delaying the trial pursuant to such exceptional circumstances, the trial court reset
the trial date within a reasonable time as is additionally required under rule 3.191(f).
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docketed for trial on the trial date did not operate as an exceptional cir-
cumstance to toll the trial period . 87
In State ex rel. Boren v. Sepe, s8  the trial court extended the trial
date beyond the 180-day period in an effort to afford the defendants ade-
quate time to peruse voluminous discovery materials belatedly provided
by the state, despite the fact that the state demanded a trial date within
the speedy trial period. Although the extension was granted at the urging
of the defendant, ostensibly for his benefit, the exceptional circumstance
was occasioned by delay on the part of the state, such that the extension
was not justified. Where the state moved to disqualify the trial judge and
pursued the cause on an appellate level to the supreme court, it was in-
cumbent upon the state to secure an impartial judge, and as long as the
pursuit was in good faith, the action tolled the effect of the speedy trial
statute.8 9
Additionally, a showing that the defendant was not continuously
available for trial will justify an extension of time beyond the periods
established by the speedy trial rule.690 Thus the failure of the defendant
to appear at his arraignment, 60 days after his arrest, and to show by
competent proof that he had nevertheless been continuously available
for trial operated to excuse the failure of the trial court to bring the
defendant to trial within 180 days.91
The fact that the sheriff's department had an incorrect address for
the defendant, was not sufficient to show the non-availability of the ac-
cused.692 While the state had the initial burden to present evidence dem-
onstrating the non-availability of the defendant, when such burden was
satisfied, the defendant was required to establish his continuous avail-
ability for trial. He did so by proving that he had lived continuously at
the same address up to the time of his arrest, that he had made periodic
reports to his probation officer and that he had been regularly employed
in a gainful occupation."' 3
Although the state may not extend the period of time in which a
person may be tried by first entering a nolle prosequi to the charges and
then filing different charges based on the same conduct,' if the evidence
bears out the state's claim of the non-availability of the defendant an
extension of time is justified.695 Thus, following the refiling of an informa-
687. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Willis, 255 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
688. 256 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. discharged, 271 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1972).
689. State v. Wolfe, 249 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). Rule 3.191(o)(2) which has
superseded FLA. STAT. § 915.01 (1971), which formed the basis of this decision, expressly
allows extension of the time period for interlocutory appeals.
690. Dara v. State, 278 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); State ex rel. Kennedy v. Mc-
Cauley, 265 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972); FrA. R. Cman. P. 3.191(c).
691. Dara v. State, 278 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
692. State ex rel. Kennedy v. McCauley, 265 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
693. Id.
694. State ex rel. Green v. Patterson, 279 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973), citing rule
3.191(h) (2).
695. State ex rel. Green v. Patterson, 279 So. 2d. 362 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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tion, where the defendant knew that he was being sought by the police
who made a diligent effort to locate him and, where the defendant did
not make himself available, the running of the 180 days was tolled for
such period of non-availability.6 96
A continuance chargeable to the defendant will also operate to toll
the running of the speedy trial rule.69 7 Thus, where the defendant re-
ceived two continuances, the first by stipulation to substitute counsel,
and the second by withdrawing his waiver of jury trial on the date set
for the non-jury trial, the fact that he was not brought to trial within
180 days was not grounds for discharge. 9 A defense request for an addi-
tional 20 days in which to file appropriate defense motions tolled the
operation of the discharge provisions for the amount of time required to
dispose of the motions. 99 However, a defendant was entitled to discharge,
notwithstanding six continuances granted in a violation of probation
proceeding brought in another county, where there was no showing that
they delayed prosecution of the original charges or prevented prompt
disposition thereof.10 Since a preliminary hearing is not a prerequisite
to a criminal prosecution, 70 1 a defense continuance of the preliminary
hearing does not toll the 180-day period.702 In State ex rel. Butler v.
Cullen,70 3 the Supreme Court of Florida held that where the defendants
requested additional time in which to prepare their defense prior to trial,
the time limitations of the speedy trial rule were waived by the defen-
dants once the continuance was granted. The court noted that after a
continuance has been granted, a defendant may file a demand for speedy
trial after completion of his preparation for trial, and must then be
brought to trial within 60 days. 70 4
Rule 3.191(d) (2) provides, in part, that the periods of time estab-
lished by the rule may be waived "upon stipulation, signed in proper
person or by counsel, by the party against whom the stipulation is
sought to be enforced, provided the period of time sought to be extended
has not expired at the time of signing ..... " The District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held that although the rule contemplates that such waiver
or stipulation be in writing, an oral stipulation, entered into in open court
by the defendant's counsel in the presence of an official court reporter
was sufficient to obviate the writing requirement.70 5 Where the defen-
dant's counsel entered into an oral out-of-court informal understanding
696. Id.
697. FLA. R. CRrm. P. 3.191(d) (3) ; White v. State, 273 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
698. Atkins v. State, 265 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
699. Kniffin v. Hall, 262 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
700. Ramos v. Amidon, 263 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
701. Anderson v. State, 241 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1970).
702. Edell v. Blount, 267 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
703. 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971).
704. Id.
705. Eastwood v. Hull, 298 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972); accord, KnIffin v. Hull, 262
So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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to defer the setting of a trial until after a controlling question of law was
decided in a companion case, such waiver was effective to bind the de-
fendant, notwithstanding the fact that it was entered into without his
knowledge, consent or understanding of his right to a speedy trial.70 6
The court explained that a defendant's right to be tried within 180 days
is a procedural right, as distinguished from a substantive right, and
therefore may be waived by his attorney without his prior knowledge or
consent.707 In a similar case it was held that even though the assistant
public defender who waived the speedy trial limitation had never met
the defendant and was not familiar with the case, it was not error for
the counsel to waive the defendant's right to trial within 180 days, with-
out consulting with or informing the accused, where in good faith the
public defender felt that such delay would or could benefit the accused. 0 8
A request for a continuance by a defense counsel who had been
rejected by the defendant operated to deprive the defendant of a dis-
charge based upon a denial of his right to a speedy trial .70 The failure
of the defendant to object to a continuance by the court on its own
motion is not a waiver by acquiescence of the right to a speedy trial
provided that a proper demand for a speedy trial has been made.7 10 In
State ex rel. Allen v. Taylor,711 the court rejected the argument that the
waiver provisions of rule 3.191 (d) (2) came into operation where the de-
fendant was released on bail and was not, therefore, continuously avail-
able for trial since "he was free to absent himself" under the terms of
the bail bond.
Where the defendant has not been brought to trial within 90 days
after his arrest on a misdemeanor charge pursuant to rule 3.191 (a) (1),
he was entitled to discharge upon timely motion.7 12 The fact that two
misdemeanor counts were joined in an information including a felony
count arising out of the same circumstances did not operate to extend the
time within which the misdemeanor counts could be tried to the limita-
tions applicable to the felony count./s
Where the defendant who was incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction
requested disposition of the charges pending against him in Florida, and
where a detainer had been issued based upon an arrest warrant, the
failure of the state to bring the defendant to trial for over a year war-
706. State v. Earnest, 265 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
707. Id.
708. State ex re. Gutierrez v. Baker, 276 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1973). As the court noted,
the rule may be waived or extended by order of the court with good cause shown and it is
not required that the accused be present when the waiver is made. The determination of the
propriety of such a waiver by the public defender depends upon the facts of the individual
case.
709. Llano v. State, 271 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
710. Harris v. Tyson, 267 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
711. 267 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
712. State ex tel. Jacobsen v. Goodman, 254 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citLng FLA.
R. Cmm. P. 3.191(a) (1).
713. Sibert v. Hare, 276 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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ranted discharge pursuant to rule 3.191(b) (2) and (3)."14 One who is
so held has a constitutional right to demand that Florida initiate the
available procedure to secure his return for a speedy trial.15 Where the
defendant, who was being held in jail on state and federal charges, filed
a demand for speedy trial, section (b) (2) of the rule controlled and the
state had six months after the service of the demand.7 16
XXV. PROBATION
Probation is a privilege afforded certain defendants in criminal pro-
ceedings and is discretionary with the trial court.71 7 While strict proce-
dural and substantive rights of a defendant need not be fully adhered to
in a revocation hearing,718 the proceedings must meet the minimum
criteria of due process. 719 Thus, a revocation hearing held without prior
notice to the defendant; without the presence or testimony of the victim
and sole witness to the alleged violation; without a full hearing as re-
quested by the defendant; without adequate time to confer with counsel
who was appointed at the hearing; and based only upon hearsay evidence
offered by police officers and the defendant's oral admission at the time
of arrest, denied the defendant his right to due process. 720
The discretion of the trial court in revoking probation is dependent
upon a finding that the probationer violated the law subsequent to the
probation order.72 1 Thus, conduct engaged in by the probationer prior
to being placed on probation cannot legally form the basis for the revo-
cation.2 It is also irrelevant that the conviction for such conduct oc-
curred during the period of probation.728 However, where the defendant
was on probation for a previous conviction and was subsequently con-
victed for arson, the revocation of probation on the prior conviction was
proper.72 4
Although proceedings for revocation of probation are informal in
nature, and hearsay evidence is permitted, a judgment revoking probation
may not be entered solely on the basis of hearsay testimony.7 25 Nor may
a revocation be permitted to stand where the state is unable flatly to
contradict the probationer's testimony which, if true, would justify his
conduct.7 26 A revocation of probation following regular proceedings
714. Shreves v. State, 269 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
715. White v. State, 273 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
716. State v. Featherston, 267 So. 2d 8S1 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
717. Borges v. State, 249 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
718. Mato v. State, 278 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
719. Id.
720. Id.
721. O'Steen v. State, 261 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
722. Id
723. Id.
724. Hoover v. State, 252 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
725. Hampton v. State, 276 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
726. Larocco v. State, 276 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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based upon an uncontroverted breach of a condition of the defendant's
probation, has been held to be proper. 27
In Borges v. State,723 the probationer sought a continuance based
on the grounds that criminal proceedings, were pending against him and
if he were to take the stand at the revocation hearing, his privilege against
self-incrimination would be jeopardized. Following denial of the con-
tinuance and revocation of his probation, the court emphasized that
probation was a privilege and that the probationer could have been
denied probation even if he had been acquitted on the subsequent
charges.7
29
The United States Supreme Court, in Arciniega v. Freeman,3 0 held
that mere on-the-job contact with fellow employees with police records
is insufficient evidence of parole violations, absent a clear Federal Parole
Board directive to that effect.
XXVI. EXPUNGING ARREST REcoRDS
It had been held that in absence of a statute for equivalent consid-
erations, a court order was an improper method to have an arrest record
expunged." 1 During the survey period, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, 2 adhered to this rule and vacated a federal district
court order which required the expunging of an arrest record after defen-
dant's conviction had been declared unconstitutional. The court held that
"public policy requires here that the retention of records of the arrest
and of the subsequent proceedings be left to the discretion of appropriate
authorities. 7 88
XXVII. SPECIFIC CRIMES AND DEFENSES
A. Specific Crimes
1. ATTEMPTS, AIDING AND ABETTING
In Robinson v. State,73 4 the court held that "an attempt to commit
a crime involves the idea of an incompleted act as distinguished from the
complete act necessary for the crime.1785 Gustine v. State738 was quoted
for the proposition that
[t]here must be intent to commit a crime coupled with an
overt act apparently adopted to effect that intent, carried be-
727. Granger v. State, 267 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
728. 249 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
729. Id.
730. 404 U.S. 4 (1971).
731. Mulkey v. Purdy, 234 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1970).
732. Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1972).
733. Id. at 1085.
734. 263 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
735. Id. at 596.
736. 86 Fla. 24, 97 So. 207 (1923).
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yond mere preparation, but falling short of execution of the
ultimate design.737
Intent alone as well as mere preparation is insufficient to amount to an
attempt.78  The act must constitute an "appreciable fragment" of the
crime, reach far enough to constitute an actual beginning of the crime,
and be of the nature that it would be consummated were it not for an
interruption independent of the will of the attempter.89
Where police officers arranged to buy stolen property from the
defendant at a certain time and place, and at the meeting, the defendant
refused to sell because he wanted to be paid first and the police had no
money, these facts were not enough to constitute an attempt.74° Since
receipt of stolen property is an offense prohibited by statute, an attempt
to receive stolen property is also a punishable and lesser included offense
of that crime, and failure to so instruct the jury is reversible error." 1
Attempted possession of marijuana is a crime recognized under Florida
Statutes section 776.04 (1971).742
In State v. Anderson,7 43 the Supreme Court of Florida held that it
is not necessary to prove the elements of selling a lottery ticket or a
share in it in order to prove the offense of aiding and assisting in the pro-
moting of a lottery.744 Where the defendant was charged with aiding and
abetting745 in a shooting death, evidence that the defendant had urged
her boyfriend to do something about the victim's alleged spilling of
catsup on her, followed by the boyfriend's shooting the victim, did not
constitute the offense where the defendant was unaware that her boy-
friend was carrying a gun.748
Although the defendant and an accomplice entered the house of the
victim with intent to commit robbery, the fact that another crime was
committed during the period they were in the house does not preclude
conviction of the defendant as an aider and abetter on this latter crime. 47
When the crime charged was committed during the commission of the
instructed crime, an accomplice will be held to answer for the crime as
an aider and abetter even though he didn't commit the other act.
737. Id. at 26, 97 So. at 208.
738. Robinson v. State, 263 So. 2d 595, 596 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
739. Id. at 596-97.
740. Id.
741. Lewis v. State, 269 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
742. Nichols v. State, 248 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
743. 270 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1973).
744. Acts such as "transporting, hiring, procuring, supplying telephones," etc., will con-
stitute aiding and assisting under FiA. STAT. § 776.011 (1973). 270 So. 2d at 355. The most
important issue resolved in this case, however, was that the defendant was not entitled to the
lesser included offense instruction if the lesser offense is one which is merely comprehended
or within the general scope of the charge made.
745. Fx . STAT. § 776.011 (1973).
7-46. Casey v. State, 266 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
747. Davis v. State, 275 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
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2. HOMICIDE
Where a defendant killed the victim from his second-floor porch
as the victim was leaving the defendant's house, it was neither in self-
defense nor justifiable,748 despite the fact that shortly before, while in
the house, the victim had pulled a gun and threatened to kill the defen-
dant during an argument and also had announced that he would return
to rob and kill the defendant. 749 The District Court of Appeal, Third
District, restated that in order to claim self-defense in any homicide, it
is necessary for the defendant to believe that he is in imminent danger
and that there is an actual necessity for the taking of life.750 It is neces-
sary that the person actually or reasonably believe that such force is
necessary in order to save his life or the life of a member of his family.75'
Where it was evident that the victim who had assaulted the defendant
was both subdued and disarmed, defendant's shooting of the victim was
not an act of self-defense.752
In Hernandez v. State,718 the element of "premeditation" we ex-
amined and the court found:
Though premeditation involves a prior intention to do the act in
question, it is not necessary that the intention be conceived for
any particular period of time before the act. A moment before
the act is sufficient. Premeditation may be inferred from evidence
as to the nature of the weapon used, the manner in which the
murder was committed and the nature and manner of the wound
inflicted.754
In Hernandez, premeditation was established where evidence showed that
the defendant had stabbed the victim 14 times in the back, resulting in
her death.
In Christian v. State,755 a first degree murder conviction was reversed
when the jury Was instructed that they could find the defendant guilty if
the killing was committed with either premeditated design or while per-
petrating or attempting to perpetrate a crime against nature. If the jury
had found the defendant guilty of first degree murder under the latter
instruction, the verdict would have been based on the felony-murder
concept. However, in Franklin v. State, 58 Florida Statutes section 800.01
(1973), covering crimes against nature, was found to be illegal and void.
Therefore, the defendant in Christian could not have been convicted of
748. FIA. STAT. § 782.02(2)(b) (1973).
749. McKinney v. State, 260 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
750. Gil v. State, 266 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
751. Id.; Raneri v. State, 253 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
752. Gil v. State, 266 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
753. 273 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
754. Id. at 133.
755. 272 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
756. 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971).
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a felony-murder under the statute. Consequently, premeditation was
necessary for a first degree murder conviction, and since the evidence
was insufficient in the court's mind to conclude that the jury found the
defendant guilty on that basis, reversal was necessary.
Where the defendant had agreed with the deceased to burn certain
campsite buildings owned by the defendant, he was not guilty of felony-
murder when the deceased was killed attempting to set fire to the buildings
while the defendant was out of the county.7 57 The court held that the
felony-murder rule has as its purpose, the protection of "innocent per-
sons" and that it is inapplicable under the above factual situation.758
The District Court of Appeal, Third District,759 found that where the
defendant had agreed with another party that the latter would hold the
gun while the defendant went through the victim's pockets, the fact that
the victim was shot by the other party during the commission of the
crime was sufficient to establish knowledge and intent of the defendant
and, therefore, conviction for second degree murder. Where the defen-
dant was under the influence of an hallucinogen at the time he killed
the victim, it was found that the killing was done while the defendant
was committing a felony 60 and he was guilty of third degree murder." 1
Defendant's conviction warranted reversal where the state failed to
prove that the defendant acted with a "depraved mind regardless of
human life," a necessary element of second degree murder.6 2 The
court found that no such state of mind existed where the defendant
stabbed the victim in his own apartment after being hit by the victim
and after the victim had assaulted another member of the household.
Where the defendant threatened to shoot an officer if he did not
help the defendant escape, the elements necessary for the conviction of
the crime of assault with intent to commit murder were present." 8 A
defendant who, while robbing a store, began to exchange shots with an
off-duty policeman was guilty of assault with intent to commit murder.764
It was improper to convict a defendant of assault with intent to
commit second degree murder and robbery since the elements of fear
and force necessary for the assault charge, were an integral part of the
robbery charge; consequently, the assault was essential to the robbery
757. State v. Williams, 254 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
758. The decision is well reasoned and gives effect to the true purposes of the rule. It
avoids the problems faced by the Pennsylvania courts in their varying interpretations. See
id., at 550-51. See also the dissent for a strong disapproval of the majority's thinking. 254
So. 2d at 551.
759. Williams v. State, 261 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
760. FLA. STAT. § 893.13 (1973) (possession of illegal drugs constitutes a felony),
formerly FLA. STAT. § 404.15 (1971).
761. Clayton v. State, 272 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
762. Raneri v. State, 255 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
763. Gavin v. State, 259 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
764. Wood v. State, 251 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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and becomes part of the "same offense," thereby allowing prosecution for
but one offense. 6 5
The Supreme Court of Florida stated that in defendant's murder
trial, the determination by one jury of both guilt and punishment was not
unconstitutional despite the defendant's claim that such a procedure
places the burden on the defendant of choosing between presenting
mitigating circumstances on issues of punishment or maintaining his
privilege against self-incrimination.0 6
3. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
The crime of aggravated assault requires general intent767 and must
be committed under circumstances in which the perpetrator has apparent
present ability to carry out the threat, thereby creating a fear of immi-
nent peril.76
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that a deadly
weapon is "any instrument which when used in the ordinary manner...
will or is likely to cause death or great bodily harm.... [But] the fact
that an instrument actually causes great bodily injury or death does not
necessarily characterize it as a deadly weapon."""9 The court held that a
shoe can be a deadly weapon although it is not inherently so, but that
where the evidence failed to provide any information regarding the shoe,
there could be no conviction of aggravated assault.770
Where the defendant pistol-whipped the victim about the head
following a robbery, such acts constituted a separate offense of aggravated
assault.771 The allegation that the defendant actually shot a person was
not a necessary element of aggravated assault; consequently, the state
needn't prove that element to maintain a conviction for that offense.772
a. Weapons and Firearms
The statute prohibiting the possession or use of short-barreled rifles
and shotguns778 "does not include weapons made from individual, non-
integrated rifle parts, if such weapons are not otherwise 'rifles.' ,,774 It is
not unlawful to own and possess a sub-machine gun registered under the
765. Hernandez v. State, 278 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). See also Cone v. State, 285
So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1973); Davis v. State, 277 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
766. Henninger v. State, 251 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1971).
767. Munday v. State, 254 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing McCullers v. State, 206
So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
768. Munday v. State, 254 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
769. Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
770. Id.
771. Wade v. Wainwright, 266 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), writ discharged, 273 So.
2d 377 (Fla. 1973).
772. Grimsley v. State, 251 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
773. FLA. STAT. § 790.221 (1973); see also, definition at § 790.001 (11). For relevant
discussion, see footnotes 860-73 and accompanying text.
774. State v. Astore, 258 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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National Firearms Act77 since the controlling statute 7 6 expressly excepts
such firearms lawfully owned and possessed under federal law."7
The question of whether a shotgun, which had been dismantled and
concealed beneath defendant's clothing, could be readily converted to ex-
pel a projectile778 which would cause death or serious bodily harm, was
one of fact and, thus, for the jury to decide.779
The throwing of a 12-ounce soft drink bottle at a police van from
a distance of less than 15 yards with enough force to that the trajectory
of the bottle is flat, is violative of the statute prohibiting the throwing of
any missile which could cause great bodily harm into vehicles. 80
A pistol in possession of a previously convicted felon is "contraband"
and possessed in violation of the law.78' It is not necessary to take finger-
prints from a gun found to be in the possession of the defendant in order
to sustain a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.72
4. FORGERY7 88 AND WORTHLESS CHECKS
Where there was lack of evidence to show the condition of a will
when it was filed, as well as an inability to show who had access to the file
from the date of filing, the state could not maintain an action against the
defendant for knowingly uttering, forging, publishing or altering784 the
will, where there was no proof that the will was in the same condition
at trial as when it was filed or when the tampering occurred.7 85 Intent
is a requisite element for conviction of possession of forged bills.78" Al-
though it is not usually the subject of direct proof, it is a question of fact
and, when controverted, may not be determined by the court. 7
In Robinson v. State,""8 the defendant was charged by information
with fictitious signature of an officer of a corporation..78  After the jury
was accepted and sworn, the state was allowed to amend the information
to charge the defendant with uttering a forged instrument.790 The court
held this to be reversible error because of its potential surprise to the
775. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-62 (1968).
776. FLA. STAT. § 790.221(3) (1973).
777. Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972).
778. FLA. STAT. § 790.001(6) (1973).
779. State v. Ware, 253 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
780. Zachary v. State, 269 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1972), construing FLA. STAT. § 790.19 (1973).
781. State v. Bryant, 250 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), relying on FLA. STAT. § 790.23
(1973).
782. Thomas v. State, 264 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
783. Both FLA. STAT. § 831.01-.02 (1973) (general forgery statute), and FLA. STAT. Ch.
817 (1973) (Credit Crime Act) will be discussed.
784. FxA. STAT. § 831.01-.02 (1973).
785. Pate v. State, 256 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
786. FLA. STAT. § 831.11 (1973).
787. State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
788. 266 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
789. FLA. STAT. § 831.06 (1973).
790. FLA. STAT. § 831.02 (1973).
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defendant. Forgery requires the making of a writing which falsely pur-
ports to be the writing of another, and the crime may exist when an
assumed or fictitious name is used as long as the name was used with
intent to defraud. 791 But, the signing of a fictitious name is not forgery
if it is not intended that the signature be taken as the genuine signature
of another, and there is no forgery where the defendant assumed the name
on the checking account he opened and proceeded to cash bad checks,
so long as the check purports to be the act of the person cashing it and
not the act of another.9 2
The general forgery statute798 and the Florida Credit Card Crime
Act794 both encompass the offense of forging a credit card, and the Act
specifically provides that prosecutions may be had under the general
statute.79 5 Thus, although the general statute is broader, there is no in-
consistency in the two statutes and the state may elect to proceed under
either.79 However, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,97 held
that if a defendant is in violation of both statutory provisions, he must
be sentenced under the penalty provisions of the more recent Credit Card
Crime Act where the penalties under the two statutes are inconsistent.
In Lore v. State,7 91 the same court found that where the penalty provi-
sions under one section 79 of the Act are less severe than the penalties
under another section 00 (both sections being substantially similar), the
less severe provisions supersede the other provisions. The court also held
that the defendant's falsification of several credit card receipts on the
same day only constituted different facets of the same offense and should
be treated in a single sentence.
The offense of issuing a worthless check 0' is committed despite
the fact that the defendant does not get instantaneous value when he
presents the check.0 2 Therefore, the defendant's conviction under the
statute was upheld because he received something for value when he
opened an account with an $850 worthless check and then wrote another
check for $250 for which he received cash. 08
5. CONSPIRACY
The state does not have to charge a co-conspirator in order to proceed
against a defendant for conspiracy.0 4 If charges against a co-conspirator
791. Rapp v. State, 274 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
792. Id.
793. FLA. STAT. § 831.01, .02 (1973).
794. FLA. STAT. ch. 817 (1973).
795. FLA. STAT. ch. 817.68 (1973).
796. State v. McCurdy, 257 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
797. Strada v. State, 267 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
798. 267 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
799. FLA. STAT. § 817.62(2) (1973).
800. FLA. STAT. § 817.481 (1973).
801. FLA. STAT. § 832.05(3) (a) (1973).
802. Shermar v. State, 255 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1971).
803. Id.
804. Di Stefano v. Langston, 274 So. 2d S33 (Fla. 1973).
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are dropped, this alone is insufficient to prevent defendant from being
prosecuted for conspiracy. 0
In order to invoke the "co-conspirator rule" which holds all acts
and declarations of each conspirator to be the acts and declarations of
all, it is first necessary to prove by independent evidence that a conspiracy
did exist. 8 ' Evidence is admissible to prove a conspiracy even though
the conspiracy is not charged in the indictment.80 7
Conspiracy to commit robbery is not a lesser included offense within
a charge of robbery.08
6. PERJURY
The elements of the crime of perjury are "(1) the wilful giving (2)
of false testimony (3) under lawful oath (4) on a material matter (5) in
a judicial proceeding." 09 Where the defendant's false testimony under
oath occurred during the period between the dropping of charges against
the defendant's son and the reinstatement of those charges, no perjury
had occurred since the defendant did not give false testimony while testi-
fying in the case against his son.10
In Wolfe v. State,"1 ' the Supreme Court of Florida held that if the
allegedly false statements were not material to the issue before the court,
there can be no conviction for perjury. The determination of whether
testimony assigned as perjurious is material when made in a prosecution
is a question of law for the judge although it may be a mixed question
of law and fact. The court also noted that statements must not be taken out
of context and must be viewed with the rest of the testimony. 12 Intent
and purpose must be shown to support a perjury conviction; mere inac-
curacy is not enough.18
If a false statement is capable of influencing the court on the issue
that it is considering, it meets the element of materiality and the degree
of materiality is irrelevant.8 4 The fact that the false testimony was not
believed is also of no importance in affecting its material character. 81 5
Two witnesses are generally required to convict a person of perjury.
However, where there is only one witness and other corroborating evi-
dence which is equal to the weight of a second witness, such is also deemed
sufficient for conviction.8 16
805. Id.
806. Honchell v. State, 257 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1971).
807. Id. at 890, citing Brown v. State, 128 Fla. 762, 175 So. 515 (1937).
808. King v. State, 267 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
809. Diamond v. State, 270 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Gordon v. State,
104 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1958).
810. Diamond v. State, 270 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
811. 271 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1972), rev'g 256 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist.).
812. Wolfe v. State, 271 So. 2d 132, 135 (Fla. 1972), quoting Van Lien v. United States,
321 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1963).
813. Wolfe v. State, 271 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1972).
814. Wells v. State, 270 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
815. Id.
816. Id., quoting McClerkin v. State, 20 Fla. 879 (1884).
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7. GAMBLING
In Perlman v. State,81 7 the offense of gambling was thoroughly ex-
amined. The court held that Florida Statutes section 849.01 (1973),
specifies two separate gambling offenses: (1) maintaining a house for
gambling purposes, and (2) permitting gambling in a place under one's
control. The state must show that the defendant had either ownership or
control of the premises where gambling habitually takes place with his
knowledge, direction and consent. The statute prohibits the maintenance
of the facility, but does not affect the gambler himself.
Proof of habitual play is necessary to show the purpose for which
the house is maintained and to show the requisite intent of the person
charged with maintaining the gambling house.818 Thus, where there was
proof that the premises were used in the past, such evidence was admis-
sible to show "purpose and intent" on the dates stated in the informa-
tion.819 Where a lease was assigned to a corporation of which defendant
was the sole executive officer, and where there was testimony that the
defendant referred to himself as manager of the hall, "control" was estab-
lished, and there was ample evidence for conviction of maintaining a
gambling house. 20
The court in Perlman, went on to state that although bingo is ex-
cepted from being a gambling offense by a specific statutory section, 2 1
when it is carried on by non-profit organizations within statutory limits,
it is still within the gambling statute when carried on outside of the
statutory restrictions. 822
Maintaining a gambling house is not established where the state
only showed the presence of newspaper racing results, handicap sheets,
water-soluble paper and that one person had asked for a "line. ' ' s -
8. BURGLARY
In Florida, the felony of burglary requires a showing that there is
a breaking and entering of a "building" with felonious intent.824 There-
fore, it is necessary to allege and prove that a "building" is involved.
Where a phone booth was in question in a burglary prosecution, the
few cases which had dealt with the subject had held that where the booth
was outdoors it was a building within the statute, 25 but when the booth
was inside another building, it was not a building. 28 During the survey
817. 269 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
818. Id. at 387.
819. Id. at 388.
820. Id. at 388-89.
821. FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1973).
822. Perlman v. State, 269 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
823. Gaetane v. State, 273 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
824. FLA. STAT. § 810.02 (1973). Section 810.01 is identical except that it provides for
burglary of a dwelling house.
825. Perry v. State, 174 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1965).
826. DaWalt v. State, 156 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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period, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that where
there was no allegation that the defendant entered a building, and, fur-
ther, no facts from which it could be determined whether the phone booth
involved was outdoors so that prior case law would apply, the information
failed to state a cause of action.827 Again, in Jackson v. State, 2' there
was no testimony to show the particulars of the phone booth's location.
The district court presumed that it was an indoor booth and not a
building. However, the court risked "obiter fever" and stated that a phone
booth was not a building whether indoors or outdoors in light of the
statute's historical background and in view of the normal definition
of a "building." Adding another obstacle in prosecutions for burglary
in phone booth cases, the court found that there is implied permission
or consent to enter phone booths, and that consent is a valid defense
to a breaking and entering charge.829 Relying on Jackson, the District
Court of Appeal, Second District,83 held that the failure to show non-
consent in a case involving an outdoor phone booth required dismis-
sal. These decisions appear to remove the need for the indoor-outdoor
test as most cases will involve public phone booths.
Despite the defendant's failure to assault or rape the alleged victim,
his conviction for breaking and entering with felonious intent to commit
rape was still proper in that the gravamen of the offense-the intent to
so act was present.831 Absent other information, the best evidence of the
defendant's intent in a breaking and entering charge is what he actually
stole, and when defendant only took $24 worth of clothing, he should
have been convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit petit
larceny, not grand larceny.832
Possession of burglary tools is a separate offense from breaking and
entering with intent to commit a felony. These are not facets of the same
crime; 833 therefore, a defendant may be convicted and sentenced sep-
arately for each offense. 84 However, in Davis v. State,835 the court fol-
lowed the rule that where offenses arise out of the same transaction and
criminal act, the defendant must only be sentenced for one offense.8
It was again held during the survey period that breaking and enter-
ing with intent to commit a misdemeanor is a felony. 37
827. Catanese v. State, 251 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
828. 259 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
829. Id.
830. High v. State, 260 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
831. Hall v. State, 260 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
832. Rumph v. State, 248 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
833. Foster v. State, 276 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
834. Id. cf. Yost v. State, 243 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), adopted in Walker v.
State, 261 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
835. 277 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
836. Breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor and petit larceny are
facets of the same criminal act.
837. Copeland v. State, 275 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973); Jenkins v. State, 267 So.
2d 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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9. LARCENY AND RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS
The identity and ownership of property claimed to have been stolen
must be proven to support a conviction for larceny.88 Where a television
theft from a common carrier was alleged and the serial number on the
television in question differed from that on the carrier's shipping papers,
the identity and ownership were not proven. 3 9
Competent evidence as to the value of stolen property is required
in a larceny prosecution, 840 and the market value of stolen property may
be determined by the owner's opinion, and any conflicts are determined
by the jury. 41 An owner's statement that his television set was worth
$160, which was supported by the fact that the set was purchased for
that price 30 days prior to the theft, is sufficient proof of value.842 But in
a grand larceny prosecution, original value of a purse and the articles
in it were not to be equated with the value for purposes of conviction. 48
Also, where the owner's testimony as to value is unreasonable and con-
trary to common knowledge, it should not be accepted.," The mere fact
that at defendant's apprehension, he had in his possession a color tele-
vision, a radio and a camera was not in itself sufficient to establish that
the property's value was more than $100.14"
A material element of the offense of receiving stolen property is
knowledge of its stolen character. 46
10. CONTEMPT
Rule 3.830,47 covering direct criminal contempt, provides punish-
ment only for acts of contempt which the court "saw or heard." This
allows the judge to govern fully the conduct and procedures that take
place before him. Refusal to obey an order which reinstated counsel and
his law firm as counsel of record for certain clients was not criminal but
civil contempt according to the supreme court. 48 Because of the diffi-
culty in delineating between criminal and civil contempt, and because
of the penalties and summary nature of criminal contempt, any doubt
in the area should be resolved in favor of the contemnor.8 49 However, a
doctor's failure to appear with his records following service of subpoena
from both parties amounted to direct criminal contempt, as the act was
838. Brinken v. State, 263 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
839. Id.
840. Smart v. State, 274 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
841. Wright v. State, 251 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
842. Martin v. State, 260 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
843. Singleton v. State, 258 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
844. Id.
845. White v. State, 274 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
846. Eagle v. State, 270 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
847. FLa. R. Cm. P. 3.830.
848. Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971).
849. Id.
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heard and seen within the court's presence and the doctor was without
adequate excuse. 50
An attorney was found guilty of criminal contempt after he refused
to obey a judge's order to sit down and be quiet.8 5' The attorney had
repeatedly persisted in trying to get the judge to hear his argument on
a motion despite the judge's assurance that he would hear the motion
later.152
Violation of an injunction brought by or on behalf of the state,
which relates to a matter offensive to the public or prohibited by statute
constitutes criminal contempt.853 Such action, however, is indirect crim-
inal contempt, governed by rule 3.840, which requires that an order be
issued to defendant "stating the essential facts constituting the criminal
contempt charge and requiring him to appear before the court to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt by the court." '54 Failure to
issue such an order requires reversal of a contempt order.855
Defendant's failure at trial to recollect the facts and circumstances
of a sworn statement made to a state attorney for which she was granted
immunity, amounted to contempt because obviously false or evasive
testimony will support such an order.8 16
11. DRUNK DRIVING
Charges of driving while intoxicated and manslaughter resulting
from the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated are not one offense
for the purpose of double jeopardy although they arise out of the same
facts.85 7 Thus, a defendant who was convicted of driving while intoxicated
was not immune from prosecution for manslaughter charges under former
jeopardy principles. Relying on Shaw v. State,858 the court held that if an
additional fact must be proved in one of the charges, there exists a sep-
arate offense. Driving while intoxicated was found to be a continuing
offense and the charge was not dependent on the accident. In fact, the
driving while intoxicated charge could have related to a time prior to the
accident. On the other hand, manslaughter is an "instant offense" which
begins with an assault and ends in homicide.
Testimony as to a defendant's physical condition, to wit: the results
of a breathalizer test and other physical tests performed on the defen-
dant, does not violate the constitutional protection against self-incrimina-
850. Aron v. Huttoe, 258 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
851. Kleinfeld v. State, 270 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
852. See id. at 22-23 n.1 for the dialogue between the judge and attorney.
853. United Theatres, Inc. v. State, 259 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
854. Id. at 214, quoting FLA. R. Cam. P. 3.840.
855. Id.
856. Brinson v. State, 269 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). See also Gilliam v. State,
267 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
857. State v. Stiefel, 256 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
858. 219 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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tion. 5 9 Relying on a number of cases from other states stating that
Miranda warnings do not apply for driving while under the influence
of intoxicating beverages or narcotics, 6 ° the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that charges of careless driving resulting in an acci-
dent, and operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
were petty offenses and the warnings need not be given.
If a municipality provides a jury trial for acts in violation of certain
ordinances, which are also violations of a state statute, the provision of
the state statute requiring the transfer of such cases to another court is
inapplicable. 6 1
12. R E
A victim's submission to sexual intercourse without physical resis-
tance after the defendant had pulled a gun on her and ordered her to
undress, supports a conviction of forcible rape, despite a medical exam-
iner's testimony that there was no evidence of force and a psychiatrist's
statement that the defendant would have "backed down" had the victim
said no.862 The testimony of a victim is ample evidence to support a con-
viction for assault with intent to commit rape even though the defendant's
testimony was in direct conflict.a63
Assault of a minor under 14 in a lewd and lacivious manner with
intent to have sexual intercourse is a separate offense from rape and does
not establish the requisite intent to commit rape.864 Fornication is a
separate offense865 from that of rape. The only lesser included offenses
in a rape charge are assault with intent to commit rape, assault and bat-
tery, and bare assault. 66
Despite a jury determination that the defendant was not guilty of
rape or assault with intent to commit rape, a jury was not precluded from
finding the defendant guilty of breaking and entering with intent to
commit rape, a felony, in a subsequent prosecution, as the defendant may
have intended to commit rape upon entering.86 However, where the de-
fendant was acquitted of a felony-murder which occurred while the victim
was being raped, the state was collaterally estopped from prosecuting the
defendant for the crime of rape. 68 In the first prosecution, the state had
859. County of Dade v. Callahan, 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
860. Id. at 506-07.
861. Nesler v. Hampton, 260 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
862. Dean v. State, 265 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1972).
863. Lustin v. State, 262 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
864. Bass v. State, 263 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) (dictum). The case held that
failure to include the words "without intent to commit rape" in an information alleging a
violation of section 800.04 of the Florida Statutes is harmless error when the defendant is
apprised of the crime for which he is being prosecuted. Id.
865. FLA. STAT. § 798.03 (1973).
866. DeLaine v. State, 262 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1972).
867. McDonald v. State, 249 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
868. Eagle v. State, 249 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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been forced to show that the defendant was the person who had raped or
sexually assaulted the victim, and since they failed to make this showing,
they were precluded from trying to prove this element in the rape prose-
cution.
13. ROBBERY
The intent to steal must exist at the time of the taking in order for
a conviction of robbery to be sustained. 6 It was also held that the
"gist" of the crime of robbery is assault with a deadly weapon or with
a weapon which can cause serious bodily harm, and the fact that only a
small amount of money was taken from the victim is of no consequence
in determining sentence. 7 ' The element of putting the victim in fear of
great bodily harm was met when the victim testified that she was "assured
that [the defendant] had a revolver or a gun . . . so [she] wasn't going
to take any chances," in addition to other evidence showing that the
defendant actually had a weapon when apprehended by the police. 71
The penalty for robbery is imprisonment "for life or for any lesser
term of years, at the discretion of the court.18 72 The fact that the court
rather than the legislature determines the exact sentence is of no conse-
quence. 73
When robbery and extortion arise out of the same transaction, the
defendant may only be sentenced once for both offenses.874
If the state is able to prove that the defendant was guilty of aiding,
abetting or procuring the commission of a robbery, such proof will sustain
a conviction for robbery.
875
Aggravated assault, although not always a lesser included offense
of attempted armed robbery, may be such where the evidence shows that
the assault was made with a deadly weapon . 7 However, even where the
court improperly includes a lesser included offense in its instruction, it
is harmless error if the defendant is convicted of the offense (attempted
robbery) for which he was charged. 77
Once again, the court stated that conspiracy to commit robbery was
not a lesser included offense to the charge of robbery. 878
869. Stevens v. State, 265 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972), citing Bailey v. State, 199
So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
870. Booth v. State, 257 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1972).
871. Rolle v. State, 268 So. 2d 541, 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
872. FLA. STAT. § 813.011 (1973).
873. Byrd v. State, 253 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
874. Davis v. State, 277 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
875. Rayne v. State, 264 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
876. Morrison v. State, 259 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
877. Id. See also State v. Wilson, 276 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1973), quashing 265 So. 2d 411
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
878. King v. State, 267 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
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It is initially presumed that the defendant is sane and, therefore, the
burden rests with him to establish an insane condition."' 0 However, once
there is testimony which raises a reasonable doubt as to the sanity of
the defendant, the presumption vanishes and the defendant is entitled
to an acquittal if the state is unable to dispel the reasonable doubt.8 '
During the survey period, the courts refused to accept another test
for insanity, and the "M'Naghten Rule" was once more adopted." 2 In
Anderson v. State,8s Justice Ervin presented a lengthy and well-reasoned
dissent advocating the adoption of the Model Penal Code"84 test for in-
sanity in preference to the less realistic M'Naghten Rule.
Rule 3.210(a) which provides the procedure to be followed where
insanity is pleaded as a defense, states in part:
If before or during trial the court of its own motion, or upon
motion of counsel for the defendant, has reasonable grounds
to believe the defendant is insane, the court shall immediately
fix a time for a hearing to determine the defendant's mental
condition.88 5
In Fowler v. State,886 the Supreme Court of Florida emphasized that the
word "shall" was indicative of the fact that the framers of the rule felt
that such a hearing is obligatory when there is reasonable ground to be-
lieve that the defendant is insane.8 7 Thus, after two court-appointed psy-
chiatrists had examined the defendant on defense counsel's motion and
both felt the defendant to be insane, the trial court must grant a hearing.
The court did, however, state that a hearing may be waived even where
there is reasonable ground to believe insanity exists. For example, where
the defense counsel has no other testimony to offer than that of the
psychiatrist, the trial court may decide the issue of competency on reports
alone. 88 Although a hearing is required, a defendant is not entitled to a
separate trial on the issue of insanity.8 9 In Presley v. State,""0 a non-jury
trial, it was permissible to find the defendant sane where there was con-
879. See generally FLA. R. Cmm. P. 3.210.
880. Cook v. State, 271 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973); French v. State, 266 So. 2d 51
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
881. Cook v. State, 271 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973) ; French v. State, 266 So. 2d 51
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
882. Anderson v. State, 276 So. 2d 18 (1973); Clayton v. State, 272 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1973) ; Cook v. State, 271 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
883. 267 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1973).
884. ALI MoDEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
885. FLA. R. Carm. P. 3.210(a).
886. 255 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1971).
887. Accord, Pedrerro v. State, 262 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
888. Fowler v. State, 255 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1971), citing Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 68
(Fla. 1971) as an example.
889. Murphy v. State, 252 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
890. 261 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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flicting testimony as to the defendant's ability to aid in the conduct of
his defense.
An order declaring defendant competent to stand trial must not be
based solely on the competency determination by a state mental hospital
just prior to trial; a hearing must be held.89' A defendant's sister was a
proper party to give testimony as to the defendant's sanity in addition
to two conflicting psychiatric reports."92 Where there is conflicting testi-
mony as to a defendant's insanity, it is within the province of the jury
to decide the issue. 93 Notwithstanding the testimony of a psychiatrist
that the defendant could not determine right from wrong at the time of
the offense, it was up to the jury as trier of fact to determine the defen-
dant's sanity.894 However, insanity will not be an issue of fact unless
rule 3.210 is complied with to properly lay the predicate for the intro-
duction of testimony relating to insanity.""5
Had the court ruled the other way in McMunn v. State,"98 a plea of
insanity could have become very risky business. Nevertheless, in what
seems to be a very good decision, the District Court of Appeal, First
District, stated that the state may only question a court-appointed psy-
chiatrist as to the issue of sanity or insanity, and, consequently, it is
impermissible for a psychiatrist to testify directly as to the facts elicited
during a compulsory psychiatric examination. Since the defendant is
compelled8 97 to follow a certain procedure and to answer those questions
posed by the court-appointed psychiatrist in order to rely on the defense
of insanity, such rules must be restricted in order to preserve the defen-
dant's constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. Any statute
which would allow the state to introduce the facts of the defendant's
confidential testimony, which could well amount to a confession, would
be constitutionally defective.
The fact that the Sex Offender Act provides for a sanity hearing
subsequent to trial898 is not a denial of equal protection in that it "comes
late."89 9 The court held that the statute meets the test of reasonable
classification in dealing with offenders.
Before sentencing a defendant to prison, if there is substantial doubt
as to his insanity at the time of trial on a sex charge, inquiries should be
made pursuant to statute"' in order to make such a sanity determi-
nation.901
891. Butler v. State, 261 So. 2d 508 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1972).
892. Id., citing Byrd v. State, 178 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). See also Williams v.
State, 275 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
893. Clayton v. State, 272 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
894. Ross v. State, 254 So. 2d 40, 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
895. Pedero v. State, 271 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
896. 264 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
897. FLA. R. CRiu. P. 3.2 10.
898. FLA. STAT. § 917.18 (1973), formerly FLA. STAT. § 917.12 (1971).
899. Den v. State, 265 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1972).
900. Sex Offender Act, FLA. STAT. § 917.14 (1973), formerly FLA. STAT. § 917.01 (1971).
901. Dorman v. State, 263 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1972).
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Finally, it is unnecessary for psychiatrists to conduct independent
tests, other than interviews with the defendant, in order for them to
testify as to the defendant's sanity.90 2
2. ENTRAPMENT
Entrapment is a question of fact for the jury to decide unless the
evidence is so clear and convincing that the judge can rule on the issue
as a matter of law. 08 Thus, it was improper for the court to dismiss the
case against the defendant where the evidence was in conflict regarding
the issue of entrapment.9°4
Suggesting their definition as an appropriate jury instruction, the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held:
The defense of entrapment... is available to (a) one who
is instigated, induced or lured by an officer of the law, (b) for
the purpose of prosecution into the commission of a crime, (c)
which he otherwise had no intention of committing. But such
defense is not available where the officer acts in good faith for
the purpose of discovering or detecting the crime and merely
furnishes the opportunity for the commission thereof by one
who already has the requisite intent.90 5
In applying this test, the court found that where there was evidence that
the narcotics officer had to repeatedly solicit the defendant in order to
get him to sell marijuana, and testimony that the defendant never sold
marijuana before, that the marijuana did not belong to the defendant,
and that the defendant got no financial benefit from the sale, the defen-
dant was entitled to a jury instruction and decision on the entrapment
issue.90
In Spencer v. State,07 the court chastised the use of a female agent
who allowed herself to be picked up at a bar and taken to the defendant's
apartment with the intent to lure the defendant into smoking marijuana.
Such activity carries with it inherent inducement and, in this case, the
agent's leaving the apartment to purchase papers so as to be able to
smoke the marijuana, was also active participation in the crime. In a fac-
tual situation somewhat similar to Spencer, the District Court of Appeal,
902. Murphy v. State, 252 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
903. State v. Robinson, 270 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973); Stiglitz v. State, 270
So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). See also Earman v. State, 253 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1971), quashed on other grounds, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972).
904. State v. Robinson, 270 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). See also Avilia v. State,
278 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
905. Stiglitz v. State, 270 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Lashley v. State,
67 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1963), and State v. Rouse, 239 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
906. Stiglitz v. State, 270 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
907. 263 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). The court stated that "society has always
condemned such conduct and that the state ought not condone it, must less have its paid
agents out trolling for unsuspecting males whose minds are otherwise occupied than with
thoughts of committing heinous crimes." Id. at 284.
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Third District,0° found, as a matter of law, that there was entrapment
when a girl working with police officers had offered "personal considera-
tion" in addition to the price in order to purchase drugs. In reversing this
decision, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the case presented a
situation for the jury and that there was evidence to support a conclusion
that the defendant was merely provided an opportunity to commit the
crime by the girl's actions, and that the facts did not show, as a matter
of law, that the crime was instigated by the girl's acts.909 A strong dissent
pointed out that the majority had improperly equated the inducement
offer with "the mere affording of an opportunity to commit crime."'91 It
would appear that the majority has, in effect, eliminated the possibility
of the court ruling on an entrapment issue as a matter of law. In State v.
Liptak91 there was no testimony from the girl who was working with the
police and no other evidence to dispute the "personal consideration" offer
alleged by the defendants which they claimed induced them to make the
sale.
Applying Liptak, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, found
that the "unconscionable conduct" of the police had implanted the crime
in the defendant's mind, thereby inducing the defendant to commit the
offense.912
The United States Supreme Court913 held that the rule prohibiting
the instigation of otherwise innocent persons to commit criminal acts, and
be prosecuted for them914 did not prevent conviction if there was a show-
ing that the defendant was involved (had requisite intent) in selling drugs
before and after his involvement with narcotics agents. The narcotics
agents in this case had supplied the defendant with the chemical needed
for the manufacture of the drug in question, but the Court found that
the circumstances indicated sufficient independent criminal design to
avoid the defense of entrapment.
A call to the defendant to set up a sale simply provides opportunity
for the commission of the crime and does not constitute entrapment where
the requisite intent existed.915
Once again, it was held that the defense of entrapment presupposes
908. Liptak v. State, 256 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
909. State v. Liptak, 277 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1973), relying on Kloptyra v. State, 172 So. 2d
628 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
910. 277 So. 2d at 23 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
911. Id. at 19.
912. Rogers v. State, 277 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
913. United States v. Russell, 94 S. Ct. 1637 (1973).
914. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435 (1932).
915. Brasi v. State, 263 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); see Roundtree v. State, 271 So.
2d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) (finding intent to have originated in the mind of the narcotics
agent and not in the defendant as required).
An interesting theory of "entrapment" is presented by the noted California jurist, Chief
Justice Traynor, dissenting in People v. Moran, 1 Cal. 3d 755, 463 P.2d 763, 83 Cal. Rptr.
411 (1970).
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commission of the offense by the defendant, and a defendant who denies
participation in the crime is foreclosed from pleading the issue."'
In Evenson v. State,917 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
found that a defendant had to prove the defense of entrapment for each
offense of which he was charged because entrapment for one transaction
is not effective for all transactions. The court acknowledged the possibil-
ity of a "spill-over" effect which might occur in an entrapment situation
in which a second transaction may have occurred as a result of entrap-
ment into an initial transaction.918 However, in Evenson, the court found
that there was no such "spill-over" immunity in two drug sales approx-
imately a month apart, and that despite the defendant's failure to request
an instruction to that effect, the court had done so anyway, thereby
giving the defendant the benefit of the instruction.
3. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A further interpretation of when the two-year statute of limitations
period for criminal offenses begins was made by- the court in State v.
King. 19 In a prior case involving embezzlement,92 the supreme court
found that the statute began to run when. demand was made upon a
fiduciary-executor by the probate court. This case was interpreted in a
larceny case as meaning that the statute begins to run from the date that
the act becomes known, or through reasonable diligence should have
become known, by the person having an interest in the fund.92'
In King, the defendant was to receive funds from one party which
would be transferred to the Dade County State Attorney, and then to the
New Orleans District Attorney. In early 1969, the first party learned that
the defendant had not delivered all the funds he had received to the state
attorney as had been agreed. After some time during which there were
contacts between the parties, a demand was made upon the defendant to
repay the money by a certain date. The defendant failed to do so and then
forestalled prosecution. Later, he tendered payment on December 13,
1971, which was rejected, and finally an information was filed against
him on December 20, 1971. The court was faced with deciding whether,
as the state contended,9 22 the statute began only after demand for the
funds had been made, or whether counting began when the interested
party knew or had reason to know the crime had been committed. In
916. Earman v. State, 253 So. 2d.481 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971),iquashed on other'grounds,
265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972).917. 277 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th'Dist. 1973).
,P18. Id. at '592. The cou'rt quoted United States v. Buie, 407 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1969),
vyhich supported this proposition.
91§.."27 S;o. 2d 274 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
920: State v Pierce, 201 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 19,67).
02i. bowiiing'v. Vaine,'228 S6. 2d 622 (Fla..lst Dist. 1969), appeal dismissed, 237 So. 2d
7 Fla. 1970).
922. The prosecution relied on State v. Pierce, 201 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1967).
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choosing the latter interpretation, the court stated that the interested
party certainly should have recognized that the defendant's intention to
evade payment of the funds in early 1969 when the state attorney in-
formed him that he had not received funds from the defendant as well
as having learned that the defendant had defrauded him in another trans-
action. Thus, this is an example of the court making the "should have
known" determination, an issue which appears to be a question of fact
for the jury.
The Supreme Court of Florida passed upon the constitutionality of
the limitation provision for state, county or municipal officials 923 which
requires that any offense committed by officials, which is within the
scope of their duties, be prosecuted within two years after retirement. In
State v. Dreyer,924 the statute, although different in time from that cover-
ing non-officials, was held to be a reasonable classification. However,
where the facts of the case presented a defendant who had left his office
as deputy constable to run for another position, only to return 66 days
later, this termination constituted retirement. Therefore, any prosecution
for offenses committed prior to his first leaving office, must be brought
within two years of that time.
Di Stefano v. Langston9 25 upheld as timely and sufficient an amended
information filed after the two-year statutory period had run because it
was properly "linked" to the first information which had been filed within
the statutory period. The court stated that this case did not present an
"abandonment" of the information by the state with an attempt at sub-
sequent prosecution-a procedure which would be prohibited if the
prosecution was not within the time prescribed.92 Relying on State v.
Emanuel,927 the court found that "the belated subsequent information is
saved if that new information makes the necessary recital as here regard-
ing its tie-in with the original commencement of the prosecution within
two years. s9 28
XXVIII. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Discovery9 2
9
1. EXCHANGE OF WITNESS LISTS
Rule 3.220(a)(1)(i) establishes the procedure for an exchange of
witness lists. The rule provides that within 15 days after written demand
923. FLA. STAT. § 932.465(3) (1973), transferred from FLA. STAT. § 932.06 (1971).
924. 265 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1972).
925. 274 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1973).
926. See State v. O'Neil, 174 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965), where the state abandoned
the information, then sought prosecution.
927. 153 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
928. Di Stefano v. Langston, 274 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1973).
929. The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended on September 30, 1971, to
become effective December 13, 1971, to substitute a "3" for the "1" in the existing numbering
system so that rule 1.010 becomes rule 3.010 and so on. In re Fla. R. Crim. P., 253 So. 2d 421
(Fla. 1971).
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by the defendant the prosecution "shall disclose to defense counsel ...
the names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecution to have
information which may be relevant to the offense charged, and to any
defense with respect thereto." Additionally, rule 3.220(b) (3) requires the
defense counsel, after receiving the list of prosecution witnesses, to recip-
rocate and furnish to the state a written list of all witnesses he "expects
to call as witnesses at the trial." The rule further authorizes several sanc-
tions, including prohibiting the use of an undisclosed witness, in order
to insure compliance. Noncompliance with the provisions of the rule does
not by itself constitute reversible error, but it is incumbent upon the trial
judge to determine whether the state's noncompliance has resulted in
harm or prejudice to the defendant."' The court must make an adequate
inquiry into all of the surrounding circumstances, particularly into the
effect of the state's noncompliance on the ability of the defendant to
prepare properly for trial. If the circumstances were non-prejudicial,
they must affirmatively appear in the record .931 Similarly, the testimony
of defense witnesses should not be summarily excluded where the defen-
dant did not furnish a witness list pursuant to the rule.93 2 The court in
Williams v. State warned that the discovery rule should not be artificially
or technically administered but requires instead a "careful and discerning
employment of the court's discretion," taking into consideration such
factors as the reason for the noncompliance, the extent of prejudice to the
state and the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by some intermediate
procedure.933 While the power to prohibit a witness from testifying is
available under the rule, it should be employed only under the most
compelling circumstances, where the omission can not be remedied
otherwise.9 34
Thus, a trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the
state to use a rebuttal witness not previously listed where the need for
such testimony was prompted by testimony on behalf of the defendant
and where such need reasonably could not have been anticipated. 935 De-
spite the fact that the defendant had invoked reciprocal discovery, where
the state failed to inform the defendant of the fact that his co-detenoant
ad turned state's witness and would testify against him, such non-
compliance on the part of the state did not warrant reversal, absent
inquiry into the surrounding circumstances.30 The exclusion of the testi-
mony of a doctor, offered as a witness for the defendant in a rape prosecu-
930. Carnivale v. State, 271 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), citing Richardson v. State,
246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). Accord, Ray v. State, 262 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
931. Carnivale v. State, 271 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), citing Ramirez v. State,
241 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
932. Williams v. State, 264 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
933. Id. at 107-08.
934. Id., citing Sheridan v. State, 258 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
935. Rowan v. State, 252 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
936. Carnivale v. State, 271 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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tion was proper for want of compliance with the rule requiring that the
names of witnesses on the issue of insanity be furnished in advance." 7
Where a state's witness was available and not otherwise secreted by
the prosecution, and the defendant made no attempt to take the deposi-
tion of such witness, the trial court's order refusing to vacate a prior
order excluding the testimony of the witness was error and sanctions, if
any, should have been imposed against the witness for non-appearance
pursuant to rule 3.220(f).111 A trial court did not abuse its discretion in
permitting police officers to testify although they had not appeared for
discovery depositions, where the officers' failure to respond was not de-
liberate.'19
2. PRETRIAL DISCOVERY OF STATEMENTS OF STATE WITNESSES
Under certain circumstances, provided for in rule 3.220(a)(1)(ii),
the defendant is entitled to written statements given to agents of the
state by witnesses identified in the exchange of witness lists. Where the
defendant was furnished a list of witnesses and could have deposed them,
the denial of both a motion to produce statements made by prospective
witnesses to the police, and a motion for a copy of investigative reports
relating to prospective jurors, did not constitute a denial of the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial.90 A defendant is not entitled as of right to a
pretrial copy of all written statements made by witnesses to police
officers, nor to a complete and detailed report on any and all prospective
jurors. 4' A defendant who has failed to pursue the discovery procedures
available to him and, additionally, has failed to demonstrate that the in-
formation sought was not otherwise available to him, cannot demonstrate
reversible error in the state's failure to furnish certain statements made
by a co-defendant. 4
3. DISCOVERY OF TANGIBLE PAPERS, OBJECTS AND SCIENTIFIC TESTS
Rule 3.220(a)(1)(vi) provides for the discovery of any tangible
papers or objects which were obtained from or belonged to the accused.
Failure to produce requested items may warrant their exclusion from evi-
dence. Thus, the failure of the state attorney to produce a pair of sun-
glasses for the defendant's examination in response to the latter's pretrial
motion for discovery was reversible error where the existence and dis-
937. Richardson v. State, 248 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
938. State v. DeVille, 258 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
939. Lopez v. State, 264 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Richardson v. State, 246
So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971) for the proposition that it is the defendant's burden to show prejudicial
error.
940. Dixon v. State, 261 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
941. Robertson v. State, 262 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
942. Kelsey v. State, 267 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing State v. Gillespie, 227
So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
covery of such glasses at the scene of the crime was a critical item in
contradicting the defendant's alibi defense. 4
In Johnson v. State, 4 the defendant moved for production of the
fatal bullet in order to afford his own expert an opportunity to examine it.
Although the state was unable to produce the bullet, the trial court denied
a defense motion to suppress "any testimony from a ballistics expert re-
garding this bullet." The District Court of Appeal, Third District, re-
versed, holding that the defendant's right to examine tangible evidence is
a part of his right to confront witnesses against him and his right to a
full and complete cross-examination of those witnesses. Simply by claim-
ing that they have "lost" the physical evidence, the state cannot prevent
the exercise of these rights and then use the "lost" evidence against the
defendant.9 45 The admission into evidence of a shirt prejudicial to the
defendant, despite the fact that it was not listed on the state's bill of
particulars furnished pursuant to the defendant's timely motion, was
held to be reversible error.946
Additionally, rule 3.220(a)(1)(vi) provides for discovery of re-
ports or statements of experts, including results of physical or mental
examinations and scientific tests and experiments. The admission of
testimony relating to blood alcohol tests is improper where the state
did not comply with an order granting the defendant's motion for
production of scientific tests and where there was no showing that
the defendant's counsel knew that the results of such tests existed. 47
Similarly, where the state failed to produce certain pills which were the
subject of an alleged sale of LSD, as well as the report of the chemist
who analyzed the contents thereof, it was held that the defendant was
prejudiced in the preparation of her defense to such extent that she was
not accorded her right to a fair and impartial trial. 948
4. DISCOVRY OF POLICE REPORTS
In response to the defendant's request for production of the criminal
and F.B.I. records of the defendant, the victim and all persons whom the
943. Cunningham v. State, 254 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). The court noted that
the reception of so critical an item of proof into evidence could have no effect other than to
surprise the defendant and present a factual issue which he was unprepared to meet and
that, as a result, the defendant's right to due process was violated.
944. 249 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
945. Id.
946. Garcia v. State, 268 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). The trial court also failed to
make adequate inquiry as to why the disclosure was not made as required by Cunningham v.
State, 254 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
947. Sheridan v. State, 258 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). Such a test, administered
while the defendant was unconscious, was crucial and material to the charge of manslaughter
by intoxication and the testimony regarding the test proved the only incriminating evidence.
Additionally, the court held that a trial judge, faced with the state's failure to disclose,
should make careful inquiry as to why disclosure was not made, the extent of the prejudice
to the defendant and all other relevant circumstances before it can properly exercise its
discretion.
948. Lowell v. State, 253 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
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state intended to call at trial, the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Crawford,949 held that the state may be required to disclose to defense
counsel any record of prior criminal convictions of the defendant or of
any prospective state witnesses, if such material and information is
within its possession. If such information is not in the possession of the
prosecuting attorney, there is no further duty on the part of the state to
secure it. With respect to the conviction records indicated above, if a
witness denies having been convicted of a crime and the prosecution
knows that such is not the case, then the state has an obligation to pro-
vide the defense counsel with the information which would lead him to
admissible evidence, but neither a criminal record nor an F.B.I. rap sheet
is admissible for that purpose. 50 The holding of the supreme court in
Crawford was extended by the District Court of Appeal, First District,
in State v. Coney,9 ' which held that it is the state's duty to furnish the
defendant not only those records of criminal convictions which were in
their possession, but those which were in the constructive possession of
the state attorney as well. The court further held that the state must
furnish all pertinent and material information requested by a defendant
which is necessary to assure him of a fair trial and which is not other-
wise available to him, even if not in its actual possession, if it can be
readily procured from the Bureau of Law Enforcement of the State of
Florida or the F.B.I. 52 Before a defendant is entitled to such information,
the trial court must decide whether all or any part of the information is
readily available to him by the exercise of due diligence, subpoena, de-
position or otherwise. If not, the court must make a determination as to
whether the information sought may be admissible and useful to the
defendant because it is material and exculpatory.9 53
The District Court of Appeal, First District, in Johnson v. State,9 "
held that a police report was admissible for impeachment purposes, as a
result of certain discrepancies between the arresting officer's in-court
testimony regarding the defendant's jacket which was inexplicably lost
by the police, and his report submitted on the night of the commission
of the alleged crime. The denial to a probationer of the opportunity to
examine a report of the probation and parole commission at his proba-
tion revocation hearing did not deprive him of his right to cross-examine
and to confront witnesses, since such a report is for the confidential use
and consideration of the court and is not a police document.955
949. 257 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1972), quashing 245 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). The
supreme court granted certiorari based on conflict between the District Court of Appeal, First
District's holding in Crawford and prior decisions in Anderson v. State, 241 So. 2d 390
(Fla. 1970) and State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
950. State v. Crawford, 257 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1972).
951. 272 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
952. Id.
953. This provision raised the prospect of a mandatory in camera inspection following
each request for discovery in this area.
954. 268 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing Pitts v. State, 247 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1971
and State v. Pitts, 249 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
955. Blackburn v. State, 261 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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B. Motion to Dismiss
Rule 3.190(b) provides that all defenses available to a defendant,
other than the plea of not guilty shall be made by a motion to dismiss.
The Supreme Court of Florida in Carroll v. State,956 held that an accused
has a right to be charged by an information free from patent defects and
that the sufficiency or validity thereof may be tested by a motion to dis-
miss.
Rule 3.190(c) (4) permits the defendant to move to dismiss the in-
formation on the ground that there are no material disputed facts and
the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against
the defendant. In State v. West,957 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that in a summary judgment proceeding the trial court may
not try or determine factual issues, nor consider either the weight of the
conflicting evidence or the credibility of the witnesses in determining
whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. Thus the trial court
erred in granting a motion to dismiss where it assumed the role of the
trier of fact in resolving the issue of the state of mind of the defendant.95s
A trial judge in a criminal prosecution has been held to have the
inherent power to make a finding that a criminal prosecution has been
abandoned. 5"
C. New Trial
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.590(a) requires that a motion
for a new trial be made within four days, or such greater time as the court
may allow, not to exceed 15 days, after the rendition of the verdict or
the finding of the court. It appears to be well settled in Florida that this
time limit is jurisdictional and strictly enforced, and that the trial court
has no discretion to grant the motion after the expiration of the time
limit. 6° Thus, without such jurisdiction, the trial judge could not act upon
his own motion."' The rule has been interpreted to require that the mo-
tion be made within 15 days following the factual determination of guilt as
made by the judge when sitting without a jury; it does not run from the
date of formal adjudication of guilt. 62
The failure to grant a hearing on the motion for new trial before
denying the same is not error. 6 Further, the defendant need not be
present at a hearing on a motion for a new trial. 64
956. 251 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1971). Additionally, the court held that a genuine motion
testing the validity of an information does not serve to toll the running of the speedy trial
rule.
957. 262 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
958. Id.
959. State v. Alvarez, 258 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
960. State v. Pinto, 273 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); Adams v. State, 250 So. 2d
309 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), citing Long v. State, 96 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1957).
961. State v. Pinto, 273 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
962. Martin v. State, 262 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
963. Johnson v. State, 248 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing Tibbits v. State, 146
Fla. 69, 200 So. 373 (Fla. 1941).
964. Luster v. State, 262 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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The grounds upon which the court must grant a new trial are listed
in rule 3.600. An oral motion where the defendant did not proffer any
grounds for a new trial may properly be denied.8 5 Further, a trial judge
may not grant a new trial simply because it will do no harm. 6 Sub-
section (a) (3) of rule 3.600 authorizes a new trial if new and material
evidence is discovered, which "would probably have changed the verdict,"
and if the defendant could not with "reasonable diligence have discovered
and produced [it] at trial." A motion for a new trial is not properly
granted upon the ground of newly discovered evidence where the evidence
so discovered goes merely to impeach witnesses who testified at the
trial . 67 Absent a showing that the existence of certain witnesses was not
known to the defendant prior to trial-, a claim that there were new wit-
nesses who would be able to give testimony favorable to the defendant
does not constitute a sufficient basis upon which to grant a new trial.968
There was no error when a trial judge in the exercise of his discretion
determined that due to the unavailability of a witness, justice required
a new trial."69
It is well settled in Florida that a timely motion for a new trial is a
prerequisite to the preservation of appellate review based on insufficiency
of the evidence, except in those cases where the defendant is sentenced to
death.970 The general rule is applicable whether the trial is before a
jury or before the court without a jury, despite the argument that by
rendering a judgment against a defendant in a non-jury trial, the court
necessarily will have determined that the evidence was sufficient. 71 In
Huntley v. State,9 72 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held
that the defendant's filing of a notice of appeal prior to this timely filing
of a motion for a new trial, rendered that motion a nullity, and defendant
thereby waived his right to file the motion for new trial. Thus, the sub-
sequent filing of the motion for a new trial was useless in preserving the
question of the sufficiency of the evidence for appellate considerationY7
D. Severance, Joinder and Consolidation
Rule 3.150(a) permits the joinder of two or more offenses in the
same information with a separate count for each offense, when the offenses
are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more connected
965. Quartz v. State, 258 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Silver v. State, 188 So.
2d 300 (Fla. 1966).
966. State v. Pinto, 273 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
967. Weeks v. State, 253 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
968. Luster v. State, 262 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
969. State v. Levine, 258 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
970. State v. Owens, 233 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1970); Huntley v. State, 267 So. 2d 374 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1972); Martin v. State, 262 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972); Wells v. State, 249
So. 2d 507 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
971. Wells v. State, 249 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing State v. Wright, 224 So.
2d 300 (Fla. 1969).
972. 267 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
973. Id.
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acts. The trial court in Moore v. State974 denied a motion to sever offenses
and the defendant was tried upon a two count information which charged
separate incidents of robbery and attempted robbery. The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, held that the two incidents occurring on the
same night and in the same general vicinity were "connected together"
within the meaning of the rule,975 and thus the trial court did not commit
error, despite the defendant's claim that he was prejudiced by their trial
together .97
6
Pursuant to rule 3.151, two or more informations charging related 977
offenses shall be consolidated for trial on a timely motion by a defendant.
It is well recognized that consolidation for the trial of criminal cases
rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.978 In Ashley v. State,97 9
the trial court refused to grant the defendant's motion for consolidation
of five homicide cases in one trial. The supreme court affirmed, holding
that one homicide was committed at a different time and was factually
unrelated to the other cases, thereby justifying the refusal to consolidate.
Further, the consolidation of two or more separate criminal charges is
not a matter of right and must be moved for by the party desiring it."s
Thus, it was improper for a trial court to force the defendant to defend
two separate informations charging separate and distinct felonies before
the same jury.981
In Rowe v. State,9 82 the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
upheld the trial court's denial of a motion for severance on the part of
a defendant. The court was confronted with evidence concerning the flight
of a co-defendant from the scene of the arrest and so ruled notwithstand-
ing the fact that such evidence had been ruled inadmissible against the
moving defendant.
E. Continuance
Rule 3.190(g) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that the court may in its discretion grant a continuance for good cause
shown. It appears well established in Florida that the granting or denial
of a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the trial court
and that its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a
clear showing that there has been a palpable abuse of that discretion to
974. 259 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
975. FLA. R. CaM. P. 3.150(a), formerly rule 3.140(d) (4).
976. Moore v. State, 259 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
977. Rule 3.151(a) defines "related" to mean "if they are triable in the same court and
are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more connected acts or transactions."
978. Hall v. State, 66 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1953); Baker v. Rowe, 102 Fla. 622, 136 So. 681
(1931).
979. 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972).
980. Kilgore v. State, 271 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
981. Id. The defendant was forced to admit as the basis for self-defense to the homicide
charge that he was carrying a concealed weapon, which was the gravamen of the other charge.
982. 250 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). Judge Mann, in his dissent, stressed the weak-
ness of limiting instructions and the fact that the inadmissible evidence was prejudicial, not
merely cumulative.
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the disadvantage of the accused. 88 It is not an abuse of discretion to deny
a continuance for the purpose of presenting a witness, where the case had
been set for trial for a considerable period of time and the defendant
failed to take the necessary steps to insure the presence of the witness." 4
Neither was it an abuse of discretion to deny an oral motion for con-
tinuance for additional psychiatric examinations, when that motion was
made at the call of the case for trial three months after the reports of
the court-appointed psychiatrists were filed.9 85 The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to grant a continuance despite the publica-
tion of news stories relating to the case shortly before trial was to com-
mence.
9 86
The failure of the defendant to retain private counsel until the eve
of trial, despite the fact that 11 days intervened between his arraignment
and trial did not render the trial court's denial of a continuance an abuse
of discretion.987 The argument that counsel had not had an opportunity
to fully prepare a defense has met with little success in contesting the
denial of a continuance, particularly when the defendant contributed to
the change of counsel prior to trial. 8 8 The denial of a continuance was
held to be within the court's discretion where the defendant requested a
continuance in order to obtain private counsel after the jury was sworn. 89
A request for a continuance was not improperly denied where the only
ground was dissatisfaction with court-appointed counsel. 9 0 There was no
abuse of discretion in denying a motion for a continuance on the ground
that retained counsel would be out of state on the trial date, where defen-
dant had been represented for two months by a public defender, had
retained private counsel only one week before trial and where private
counsel was absent only during jury selection, during which the defendant
was represented by the public defender.99'
Where the court granted a continuance of the motion to suppress,
on the condition that the defendant inform the court when he was ready
to proceed, the court was not in error in proceeding to trial, absent objec-
tion or a request for a hearing on the motion.9 2
XXIX. LEGISLATION
Florida Statutes section 910.035 (Supp. 1972),111 has been added to
permit a person who is held in custody in a county other than the county
983. Mills v. State, 280 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973) ; Angell v. State, 271 So. 2d 37 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1972) ; Harrelson v. State, 259 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
984. Coney v. State, 258 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
985. Girtman v. State, 270 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
986. Harrelson v. State, 259 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
987. Palladino v. State, 267 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
988. Gause v. State, 270 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
989. Fuller v. Wainwright, 268 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
990. Tilly v. State, 256 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
991. Angell v. State, 271 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
992. Dickenson v. State, 261 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
993. Created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-45.
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in which an indictment or information is pending against him, to waive
trial on a charge pending in the other county and have his case disposed
of in the county in which he is being held. But he must agree in writing
to plead guilty or nolo contendere and the prosecuting attorney of the
county in which the charge is pending must consent. The statute also
provides that if the defendant pleads not guilty after the transfer, the
case will be transferred for disposition to the court of the county in which
the prosecution was commenced.
Florida Statutes sections 404.01(3) and 404.02(1) (Supp. 1972),'1 4
have been amended to include marijuana (cannabis) within the scope of
the Florida drug abuse law. Cannabis is now included within the defini-
tion of an "hallucinogenic drug."
Florida Statutes subsections 775.082(2) and (3) (Supp. 1972),"' 5
provide that if the death penalty is held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court of Florida or the United States Supreme Court, persons previously
sentenced to death shall be brought before the appropriate court and re-
sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole. Florida Laws
1972, chapter 72-724,99' creates a category of life felonies less serious
than capital felonies but more serious than felonies of particular degrees.
It provides that capital felonies be punished either by death or life im-
prisonment with a minimum of 25 years' service before parole considera-
tion. It also provides that life felonies be punished by life imprisonment
or a term of not less than 30 years.
Florida Statutes section 939.17 (Supp. 1972),911 provides that in
criminal prosecutions any judgment against the defendant for costs or
a fine may be satisfied from any cash bond deposited by the defendant.
Florida Statutes section 776.04 (Supp. 1972),998 reduces the penalty
for an attempt to commit a misdemeanor from misdemeanor of the first
degree to misdemeanor of the second degree. The crime of larceny has
been redefined to include, specifically, the stealing of real or personal
property and a second conviction for petit larceny is now punishable as
a misdemeanor of the first degree. 999
Florida Statutes section 837.021 (Supp. 1972),'00 provides that the
wilful making of two or more contradictory material statements under
oath in trials, depositions, affidavits and the like is punishable as a felony
of the third degree. Other newly created felonies of the third degree are
tampering with jurors,' 0 1 tampering with or fabricating physical evi-
994. Amended by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-97.
995. Created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-118.
996. Amending FLA. STAT. §§ 775.081(l), 779.07, 782.04, 790.16, 790.161, 794.01, 805.02
(1971).
997. Created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-235.
998. Created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-245.
999. FLA. STAT. § 811.021 (Supp. 1972), created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-252.
1000. Created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-314.
1001. FLA. STAT. § 918.12 (Supp. 1972), created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-315.
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dence,1°0 2 tampering with a witness °°3 and, as to a witness, to solicit or
accept a bribe to testify or inform falsely or to withhold information. °10
Florida Statutes sections 27.51(1) and 27.54(2) (Supp. 1972),100
now authorize public defenders to represent indigents accused of mis-
demeanors or violations of county or municipal ordinances. Counties and
municipalities are authorized to provide funds for this service.
Florida Laws 1973, chapter 73-27,1006 provides that persons accused
of misdemeanors, violations carrying civil penalties, or violations of mu-
nicipal or county ordinances may be released upon issuance of a "notice
to appear" in lieu of being arrested.
Florida Laws 1973, chapter 73-71,107 requires trial judges to provide
credit in a defendant's sentence for all time spent in the county jail
prior to sentencing.
Florida Laws 1973, chapter 73-120,1008 makes unlawful the distribu-
tion of obscene materials, as well as requiring purchasers of other goods
or services to accept obscene materials as a condition to delivery or per-
formance.
Florida Laws 1973, chapter 73-271,1009 allows peace officers to make
arrests for shoplifting, either on or off the store premises, if based on
probable cause.
Florida Laws 1973, chapter 73-257,°10 makes it a felony of the third
degree to attempt to break and enter with the intent to commit a mis-
demeanor.
Florida Laws 1973, chapter 73-194,1°11 provides that a grand jury
report or presentment not accompanied by a true bill or indictment shall
not be made public until the individual concerned has received a copy
and has been given 15 days to move that any improper or unlawful part
be expunged. The motion shall stay public announcement until the circuit
court's ruling thereon is affirmed or denied by the district court of appeal.
1002. FLA. STAT. § 918.13 (Supp. 1972), created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-315.
1003. FLA. STAT. § 918.14 (Supp. 1972), created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-315.
1004. FLA. STAT. § 914.14 (Supp. 1972), created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-315.
1005. Amended by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-722.
1006. Creating FLA. STAT. §§ 901.27-.32, repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 901.06, .23 (1971).
1007. Amending FLA. STAT. § 921.161(1) (1971).
1008. Creating FLA. STAT. § 847.07-.09 (1973).
1009. Amending FLA. STAT. § 811.022(2) (1973).
1010. Creating FLA. STAT. § 810.05(2) (1973).
1011. Creating FLA. STAT. § 905.28 (1973).
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